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This thesis is a history of American and British efforts to halt or retard the Pakistani nuclear 
weapons programme. It assesses US and UK non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan from 
the Indian nuclear test of May 1974 to the decline of anti-proliferation activity in 1979 and 
1980. A broadly chronological analysis of key government and media sources from 
American and British archives highlights the development of non-proliferation policy and 
the factors that influenced anti-proliferation activity. 
Scrutiny of British—and not just American—involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme permits an assessment of the existence of a ‘non-proliferation special 
relationship’ between Washington and London. This study demonstrates that successive 
British governments played a significant role in creating, shaping, and at times adversely 
affecting, non-proliferation activity on the sub-continent. Additionally, this thesis 
demonstrates that the UK frequently deprioritised non-proliferation concerns in favour of 
economic considerations, creating tension between London and Washington. Thus, it is 
shown that there was a close working relationship between the US and UK governments, but 
the relationship was riven with fissures. Alongside this examination of British policy, this 
study also examines American policy and attitudes, demonstrating that infighting and 
conflicts between strategic priorities impaired the effectiveness of American non-
proliferation policy. 
 Furthermore, this study offers a detailed examination of the cultural underpinnings 
of UK-US non-proliferation policy directed against Pakistan. It demonstrates that—contrary 
to popular and long-lasting media representations—the paradigm of an ‘Islamic bomb’ 
played no part in the creation and application of non-proliferation policy. This thesis makes 
it clear that in UK-US efforts to halt or retard Pakistani nuclear attainment, issues of 
credibility and global standing were far more significant than religious factors. Overall, this 
study examines a key moment in non-proliferation history and offers new findings on the 
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On May 28, 1998, Pakistan—responding to Indian atomic tests conducted two weeks 
previously—set off five nuclear explosions beneath the hills of Balochistan. Despite 
international efforts to prevent their development of atomic capability, Pakistan thus became 
the seventh admitted nuclear weapon state. The nation’s 1998 tests were the result of a 
lengthy development programme that in its infancy two decades earlier had occupied the 
attention of successive British and American governments.  
 Preventing the global spread of nuclear weapons had been a pressing concern for 
international policymakers since 1945. For the American and British administrations in 
office during the 1970s, Pakistan was one of the foremost proliferation worries. Accelerating 
that nation’s drive towards nuclear capability during this period were a series of military and 
authoritarian governments, coupled to Islamabad’s fear of its much larger neighbour India. 
Both of these factors caused considerable diplomatic difficulties for the United States and 
United Kingdom during the 1970s. 
 This thesis examines US and UK non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan from the 
catalytic Indian nuclear test of May 1974 to the decline of overt anti-proliferation activity in 
1979 and 1980. The case of Pakistan reveals a ‘non-proliferation special relationship’ 
between the United States and United Kingdom in the 1970s. Despite this cooperation, 
however, there were core disagreements between Washington and London that pointed to 
divergent interests in nuclear and other policy questions. Whereas, particularly under the 
Carter administration, the Americans focused on non-proliferation, their British partners 
found it more difficult to juggle those concerns with commercial and energy interests. In 
addition to that, this study also argues that—in contrast to widespread public alarm—in the 
case of Pakistan the fear of an ‘Islamic bomb’ failed to influence non-proliferation policy. 
 
The study of United States and United Kingdom cooperation in non-proliferation activity 
against Pakistan illustrates a functional ‘special non-proliferation relationship.’ This 
contrasts significantly with America’s non-proliferation relationships with France and the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), both of which were plagued with acrimonious public 
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and private disputes.1 Major factors in these disputes were France and West Germany’s 
sizeable deals to sell nuclear technology to developing world states. Britain, by comparison, 
held no such contracts. This thesis supports and extends the arguments of Susanna 
Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge who contend that a ‘non-proliferation special relationship’ 
existed in the 1950s and 1960s, compared to the frequently troubled relations between the 
United States and other major Western European allies.2 These findings stand in contrast to a 
literature that mostly interprets a ‘special relationship’ in terms of US-UK nuclear relations 
(for example, collaboration over nuclear technology in the form of missiles) or intelligence 
sharing.3 John Baylis and Ronald Powaski, for example, have identified nuclear ties as 
paramount within the so-called 'special relationship,’ even during periods of ‘cooling’ such 
as the 1970s. However, these ties relate specifically to nuclear defence and US-UK 
technology exchanges and there is only the briefest mention of non-proliferation within this 
scholarship.4 Furthermore, the literature on US-UK Cold War relations concentrates on the 
nuclear capabilities of both states and pays little attention to non-proliferation beyond limited 
discussions of the 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The works of Christopher Bartlett, 
John Dumbrell, and Ritchie Ovendale typify analyses of Cold War Anglo-American 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 On the acrimonious US-FRG non-proliferation relationship in the 1970s, see William Glenn Gray, ‘Commercial 
Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: The US-German Feud Over Brazil, 1975-7,’ The International History Review, 
34:3 (2012), 449-474 and Fabian Hilfrich, ‘The Roots of Animosity: Bonn’s Reaction to US Pressures in Nuclear 
Proliferation,’ The International History Review, 2014, online publication 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.864694 (accessed on February 6, 2014). The US-French discussions 
over Pakistan shall be covered within the body of this thesis. 
2 Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the Struggle 
for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945-1970 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004). 
3 For a sample of works in this vein, see Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American 
Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (new York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1987); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear 
Partnership: Britain, the United States, and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959 (Groningen: Styx 
Publications, 1993); Len Scott and Stephen Twigge, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States, and 
Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000); and John Simpson, 
The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom, 2nd edition (London: 
Macmillan, 1986). One volume that does offer an analysis of the US-UK arms control relationship is J. P. G. 
Freeman, Britain’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957-68 
(Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1986). Because of its age, Freeman’s work obviously does not benefit from the many 
valuable archival releases that have taken place in the intervening years.  For a recent work on the intelligence 
relationship, using the most up to date sources, see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, In Spies We Trust: The Story of 
Western Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
4 John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1980, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan, 1984), 213-14; 
Ronald E. Powaski, Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950-1993 (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood, 1994). Scholars are beginning, however, to offer increased attention to the fine detail of US-UK non-
proliferation relations beyond the NPT negotiations. For example, see John Krige, ‘US Technological Superiority 
and the Special Nuclear Relationship: Contrasting British and US Policies for Controlling the Proliferation of Gas 
Centrifuge Enrichment,’ The International History Review, 2014, online edition 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.864691 (accessed on February 6, 2014), 1-22. 
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relations.5 The authors posit a relationship that waxed and waned, with highs and lows across 
the years as administrations changed in both countries and international issues—such as the 
Vietnam War—prompted markedly different responses in Washington and London.  
It is important, however, not to overstate the ‘special’ nature of this trans-Atlantic 
relationship. Although US-UK non-proliferation cooperation was certainly stronger than that 
between the United States and France or the United States and West Germany, it was also 
beset by problems. There were significant clashes between American non-proliferation 
policy and British commercial interests during the 1970s. The case of Pakistan brought 
Washington and London into conflict over domestic nuclear policy and international arms 
sales, both of which were inextricably tangled up with the Pakistani nuclear problem. By 
analysing these areas, this study highlights how the domestic economic and energy 
imperatives of the US’s most important ally (the UK) affected global attempts to prevent 
proliferation. This typifies what John Young describes as “an intensification of the 
relationship between domestic and international problems,” that became apparent as British 
influence in the world steadily declined from its imperial heyday.6 
Bringing the UK into the picture allows a revealing examination of the ways in 
which British arms sales to India had a deleterious effect on the relationship between Britain 
and America and contributed to Pakistani anxiety. Islamabad’s insecurity and fear of Indian 
military power thus fed the desire for nuclear capability. The United Kingdom’s negotiations 
and eventual deal with India in 1979 to sell Jaguar strike aircraft—a deal worth billions of 
pounds to the teetering British aerospace industry—problematized the issue of non-
proliferation on the subcontinent. In comparison, the US government—particularly the 
Carter administration—chose to abandon commercial advantage in favour of non-
proliferation. The sale of potentially nuclear capable aircraft to Pakistan’s regional arch-rival 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 C. J. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989); John Dumbrell, A 
Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001); Ritchie 
Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). John Dumbrell 
mentions non-proliferation (specifically, the NPT negotiations) once in A Special Relationship (Dumbrell, 72); In 
Britain and the Cold War, 1945-91 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) Sean Greenwood discusses non-proliferation 
only within the limited context of the NPT (see Greenwood, 170-171); Ovendale mentions anti-proliferation policy 
within the context of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty and the international Multi-lateral Force concept of the 
1960s, but does not reference the NPT or subsequent developments (Ovendale, 129-130); Mark Curtis does not refer 
to non-proliferation in The Ambiguities of Power: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Zed Books, 1995). 
Likewise, Bartlett does not mention non-proliferation policy in British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century.  
6 John W. Young, Twentieth-Century Diplomacy: A Case Study of British Practice, 1963-1976 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 18. 
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demonstrated that in times of economic crisis, the British government was unwilling to 
prioritise non-proliferation over economic self-interest. The UK also pursued an expansive 
domestic nuclear reprocessing industry while supporting the United States against the 
Pakistani quest for similar facilities. This created tension between Washington and London 
and between London and Islamabad. In the US-UK case, the British pursuit of reprocessing 
facilities conflicted with Jimmy Carter’s stated mission to see such facilities eliminated, 
despite his public assurances that Western European states would not find their reprocessing 
ambitions inhibited by the United States. In the UK-Pakistan case, British actions left 
successive governments open to Pakistan’s accusations of hypocrisy and double standards. 
In addition to examining these conflicting facets of the so-called ‘special 
relationship,’ this study further enhances our understanding of US and UK foreign policy by 
analysing in detail how and why America and Britain attempted to influence the nuclear 
affairs of a sovereign third party and how such efforts related to other foreign policy 
priorities. In terms of the United States, this thesis critically adds to the literature on the 
foreign policy of the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter by offering a detailed 
case study of policy in action. Both presidencies have been included in significant foreign 
policy studies by Odd Arne Westad and Dennis Kux that respectively offer analyses of the 
many travails that afflicted Ford and Carter’s foreign policy and the broad contours of US-
Pakistani relations from 1945 to 2000.7 The recent works of Betty Glad, Scott Kaufman, and 
Robert Strong excellently cover Jimmy Carter’s career in foreign policy, highlighting—as 
this thesis also does—the tension between the various strands of Carter’s foreign policy.8 All 
of the above scholars note that there were within the Carter administration clashes of 
principles and personalities that actively inhibited the successful implementation of foreign 
policy. However, in all of these cases wider discussions of foreign policy issues take 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 In particular, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 218-330 and Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies: The United 
States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 215-255. Kux is the 
author of two volumes that shall be referenced in this thesis. The aforementioned Disenchanted Allies, and 
Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941-1991 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1993). In the text these will be referenced by their two word initial titles. 
8 Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign 
Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the 
Carter Administration (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); Robert A. Strong, Working in the 
World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2000). 
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precedence over any deep-seated analysis of Pakistan and non-proliferation. Only Kaufman 
devotes significant attention to the non-proliferation issue in US foreign policy, but again the 
analysis does not cover in detail the situation of Pakistan in this context.9  
The foreign policy of the British governments that held office during the mid to late 
1970s—especially pertaining to non-proliferation—has not been the subject of such a vast 
scholarship as their American counterparts. The work of John Callaghan, Rhiannon Vickers, 
and a volume on the Wilson and Callaghan governments edited by Anthony Seldon and 
Kevin Hickson offer valuable insights into Labour Party foreign policy but, as with many 
such studies, non-proliferation policy is markedly absent, subsumed beneath offensive and 
defensive Cold War nuclear strategy.10 This broad omission of non-proliferation policy has 
thus created a further gap in existing scholarship, which this thesis will also fill.  
 In the face of a state determined to acquire nuclear capability, were there alternatives 
short of direct intervention that would move Pakistan away from the nuclear path? Two 
broad options were open to the United States and United Kingdom: placing diplomatic 
pressure on Pakistan or putting pressure on Islamabad’s nuclear technology suppliers. 
Attempting to influence Pakistani leaders had little effect. In the face of a determined drive 
for the bomb that remained consistent across the governments headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
and Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, failure was the norm.  
However, for the US and UK, placing pressure on Pakistan’s mostly Western 
European nuclear technology suppliers was potentially the most promising non-proliferation 
tactic. Most notably, US diplomatic pressure at least in part served to persuade France not to 
sell a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan, although French economic considerations also 
played a role in this decision. Although America and Britain made efforts to prevent 
Pakistani acquisition of uranium enrichment capacity, the skilful Pakistani purchasing 
programme, the recalcitrance of key nuclear equipment suppliers such as the FRG, and the 
difficulty of enforcing vague international standards for nuclear trade hampered non-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Kaufman, 52-54, 103, and 217-218. 
10 John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2007); Rhiannon Vickers, The 
Labour Party and the World, Volume 2: Labour’s Foreign Policy 1951-2009 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2011); Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson (eds.), New Labour, Old Labour: The Wilson and 
Callaghan Governments, 1974-79 (London: Routledge, 2004). Within the Seldon and Hickson volume, Ann Lane 
briefly alludes to the non-proliferation interests of David Owen that shall be examined within this thesis. 
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proliferation efforts. Thus, this thesis offers an opportunity to study relative success and 
failure, inexorably demonstrating that short of military intervention against Pakistan, there 
was no chance of diminishing Islamabad’s nuclear aspirations. 
 
A theme that unites much of the specific literature on non-proliferation is the positioning of 
the United States as the critical—and often solo—player in global non-proliferation affairs. 
While it is obvious that the US was a preeminent force in Cold War nuclear affairs, the 
history of non-proliferation is an international one. Other actors, even those in the past 
considered insignificant, must be given due attention by historians. In order to understand 
the global, transnational history of nuclear non-proliferation, it is vital to take on board Odd 
Arne Westad’s exhortation, in relation to the broader history of the Cold War, to examine the 
role and influence of non-superpower actors.11 
While there is an extensive literature on non-proliferation as it relates to the United 
States and Pakistan in the 1970s, Britain has so far received limited attention. More 
specifically, Britain’s contribution to anti-proliferation action in relation to Pakistan in the 
1970s has frequently been ignored or placed in the shadow of the United States. This study 
finds that Britain played a significant—and at times critical—role in combating Pakistani 
nuclear ambitions. The case for foregrounding Britain in studies of the impact of policy and 
action on non-proliferation is crucially supported by the work of Schrafstetter and Twigge, 
Matthew Jones, and John W. Young.12 Schrafstetter and Twigge argue that the role of 
European states in non-proliferation is an important and often overlooked dimension, 
European governments frequently acting in opposition to the United States but never acting 
as a monolithic entity and always primarily pursuing national interest as a primary goal.13 As 
well as moving Britain, France, and West Germany from the periphery to the centre of post-
war non-proliferation policy in the years to 1970, Schrafstetter and Twigge identify major 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Westad, 1-7. One work that does examine nuclear history through a global lens is Lawrence S. Wittner’s 
magisterial study of the worldwide anti-nuclear movement The Struggle Against the Bomb: A History of the 
World Nuclear Disarmament Movement (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993, 1997, 2003). 
12 Susanna Schrafstetter, ‘Preventing the “Smiling Buddha”; British-Indian Nuclear Relations and the 
Commonwealth Nuclear Force, 1964-68,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 25:3 (September, 2002), 87-108: 
Matthew Jones and John W. Young, ‘Polaris, East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 
1964-1968,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 33:6 (December, 2010), 847-870. 
13 Schrafstetter and Twigge, 10-13. 
! 7!
gaps in the scholarship surrounding pre-1970 British, French, and West German non-
proliferation policy. In the case of the UK, these gaps relate to the overweening emphasis on 
nuclear strategy and its place within the ‘special relationship,’ and the lack of an overarching 
analysis of British non-proliferation policy.14 These absences become even more apparent 
when examining the 1970s. This thesis redresses the balance by moving Britain towards the 
centre of non-proliferation discussions over Pakistan during the 1970s. 
In addressing this gap in the literature, this study does not ask if Britain influenced 
non-proliferation policy in the 1970s, but rather how it influenced non-proliferation policy.  
By adopting this approach, it makes plain that the governments of Harold Wilson (1974-76) 
and James Callaghan (1976-79), and the initial eighteen months of Margaret Thatcher’s first 
administration (1979-1983) played an important role in creating, shaping, and at times 
adversely affecting, non-proliferation policy on the sub-continent. In so doing, this thesis 
provides a focused case study to help illuminate the contours of Anglo-American relations 
regarding the spread of nuclear weapons to the developing world. 
In analysing US and UK non-proliferation policy with regard to Pakistan in the 
1970s, this study looks beyond the technical and technological aspects of non-proliferation 
to integrate analyses of policy, action, and culture. Although in the case of Pakistan technical 
and technological considerations are significant and play a role in US-UK non-proliferation 
policy, a focus by scholars on the technical aspects of non-proliferation—for example, the 
operation of supplier controls and means of retarding access to nuclear technologies—has 
dominated the literature on non-proliferation. This thesis follows the precedent set by 
William C. Potter in the early 1980s, where he challenged the preponderance of technical 
and economic considerations—and the focus on the United States—within the non-
proliferation literature, issuing a clarion call for a broader examination of non-proliferation 
issues.15 Potter warned against the purely technical view of non-proliferation, suggesting that 
it was simplistic to see non-proliferation as a mechanical challenge to be overcome, as if by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Schrafstetter and Twigge, 10. In ‘Spinning into Europe: Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands: Uranium 
Enrichment and the Development of the Gas Centrifuge 1964-1970,’ Contemporary European History, 11:2 
(May, 2002), 253-272, Schrafstetter and Twigge also provide a compelling account of Britain’s use of uranium 
enrichment centrifuge technology as a means to speed up integration with Europe, weaken the Franco-German 
axis, and ensure continued supplies of enriched uranium regardless of the effect on the US-UK relationship. 
15 William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Cambridge, MA: 
Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1982), xiv-xv. 
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instrumentally restricting access to technology and imposing increasingly complex 
international laws the desire of some states to acquire nuclear weapons could be inhibited. 
Furthermore, Potter argued that this single-minded approach divorced the analysis of 
proliferation policy objectives from broader foreign policy considerations and ignored the 
connection between non-proliferation policies and domestic/foreign policy goals.16 
Potter’s call for a broader understanding of non-proliferation policy threads through 
recent literature on the topic. Selected examples include Jacques Hymans’ argument that, for 
nations looking to attain nuclear capability, the psychological makeup of those in charge 
plays a significant—indeed, vital—role in decision making about how and when to pursue 
the atomic bomb. Hymans recapitulates many of Potter’s arguments, noting that many works 
on non-proliferation that emerged after the implementation of the NPT placed an 
overweening emphasis on the technical aspects of non-proliferation: safeguarding nuclear 
facilities, the workings of the international regime, and technological means of preventing 
proliferation.17 Within her study on American non-use of nuclear weapons from 1945 
onwards, Nina Tannenwald offers a constructivist analysis of the role of moral norms—in 
particular the evolution of a ‘nuclear taboo’—in inhibiting the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.18 These studies demonstrate that cultural factors are a vital element when analysing 
the phenomenon of nuclear proliferation and the efforts to combat it, which this thesis 
recognises and correspondingly reflects.  
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16 Ibid, xiii-xv and 230-32. 
17 Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 11. 
18 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For other approaches and methods of analysis, see for example 
Michael J. Brenner, who offers a still relevant analysis of bureaucratic and institutional factors affecting US non-
proliferation policy in Nuclear Power and Non-proliferation: The Remaking of U.S Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981); Peter A. Clausen takes a classically realist approach to the topic in Non-proliferation and 
National Interest (New York, NY: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1992); John Mueller provides a forthright 
interpretation of global nuclear fears in Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); Mohamed I. Shaker’s detailed work on the NPT remains relevant, see The Nuclear 
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alarmism—defined by Mueller as an obsession with “an endless array of creative, if consistently unfulfilled, worst-
case scenarios deriving from fears about the cold war arms race, nuclear apocalypse, and the proliferation of the 
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Francis J. Gavin argues in Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2012) that nuclear alarmists claims are “overstated, and in some cases, wrong, emerging from a 
poor understanding of the history of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation.” (Gavin, 135). 
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As this study argues, during 1979, a key change in non-proliferation policy occurred 
that typifies the need to look beyond technical considerations and examine the cultural 
components of non-proliferation policy and strategy. Often, the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in December 1979 is cited as the turning point for proliferation policy towards 
Pakistan. Various scholars have confidently observed that after the intervention, the Carter 
administration—in the face of a reinvigorated Cold War—abandoned attempts to prevent 
Pakistani acquisition of nuclear capability in favour of bolstering their South Asian ally. 19 
This thesis contends, however, that the major change from a policy of prevention of 
Pakistani acquisition to one of mitigation of that eventual acquisition took place in mid-
1979, several months before the Afghanistan crisis. Key to this mitigation approach were 
requests by the US and UK that Pakistan should not test a nuclear device. This would be the 
most public expression of nuclear capability, and could cause considerable loss of credibility 
for the US and the UK who had invested so much in preventing Pakistani nuclear capability. 
Thus, considerations of national standing and ‘face’ played a significant role in shaping non-
proliferation strategy and policy. 
 
Following on from the above, woven into this analysis of US and UK non-proliferation 
policy is an important investigation into the cultural aspects of non-proliferation. During the 
late 1970s, the cultural paradigm of an ‘Islamic bomb,’ a nuclear weapon originating in 
Pakistan but which would allegedly be proliferated to other Muslim states because of the 
bonds of faith, emerged from the rhetoric of Pakistani leaders. This coincided with the rise of 
modern, political Islam, typified by the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The ‘Islamic bomb’ 
remains a powerful and influential trope today. Offering a detailed investigation of the roots 
and spread of this idea, this thesis demonstrates that while a media ‘scare’ developed around 
the issue, the ‘Islamic bomb’ construct had no actual effect on American and British non-
proliferation policymaking in the case of Pakistan. While individuals within the US and UK 
governments may have expressed fears of an ‘Islamic bomb’ there is no evidence to suggest 
their concerns found concrete form in policy outcomes. 
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Additionally, therefore, this thesis challenges the substantial body of literature that 
positions Pakistani nuclear aspirations as an ‘Islamic’ project. This literature is heavily 
influenced by the media accounts of ‘Muslim’ nuclear aspirations that came to prominence 
from 1979 onwards, the journalism of the 1970s, and continues to feed perceptions today. As 
Fawaz Gerges argues, “in the minds of many Americans, the menace of ‘extremist Islam’ is 
multiplied by its equation with domestic and international terrorism and the spectre of an 
Islamic nuclear bomb.”20 This thesis demonstrates that hallmarks of these books (a belief in 
the United States as the almost sole actor, a contention that Washington could and should 
have prevented Pakistani nuclear acquisition, and a belief that Islam was a significant factor 
in the Pakistani drive for nuclear capability) are founded in media constructs established in 
the late 1970s. As this thesis emphasises, there were limited measures that either America or 
Britain could have taken short of military intervention that could have halted the Pakistani 
drive for nuclear capability. Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney’s The Islamic Bomb: The 
Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East is the foundational text of these accounts.21 
Krosney and Weisman write The Islamic Bomb more in the style of a cheap thriller than as a 
serious investigation into the issues surrounding international proliferation. As Eric Davis 
observes, Weissman and Krosney’s thesis is “glib” and anchored in a perception of Islam as 
irrational and violent.22 Nevertheless, this book continues to be influential, referred to by 
commentators, politicians, and academic institutions such as the National Security Archive.23  
The notion of an ‘Islamic bomb’ remains a popular theme in the media and the 
world of geopolitical punditry. In the post-9/11 milieu, a wide range of popular works on the 
Pakistan nuclear programme appeared in the years 2006-07, all inspired by the 2004 
revelations about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s international nuclear proliferation network. 
The media devoted considerable space to detailing how Khan and his subordinates supplied 
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nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. From these dramatic tales of intrigue 
sprang alarmist works typified by David Armstrong and Joseph Trento’s America and the 
Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise.24 All of these books place an overwhelming 
reliance on media sources, anonymous or unreliable interviewees, and secondary texts.25 
Furthermore, they all implicitly support the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis—arguing that 
global conflict is now rooted in tension between the largely secular, rational West and the 
religious, irrational ‘Islamic world’—popularised by scholars Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. 
Huntington.26 This emphasises the need for a rigorous, archivally based study that examines 
the origins and—most importantly for US-UK non-proliferation policy—influence of the 
‘Islamic bomb’ paradigm. This thesis therefore demonstrates that it was not religion but the 
cultural factors of credibility and ‘face’ that had the greatest influence on British and 
American non-proliferation policy in the case of Pakistan. 
In investigating the paradigm of the ‘Islamic bomb,’ this thesis thus forms part of a 
broader school of literature that analyses the impact of cultural factors on nuclear issues. 
Although the cultural construct of religion in the form of the ‘Islamic bomb’ did not have the 
effect on policymaking that might be expected, there were irrefutably cultural factors— 
namely credibility and international standing—that did significantly influence policy and 
strategy. Correspondingly, this study may be located among the works of scholars such as 
Matthew Jones, Shane J. Maddock, and George Perkovich, who have discovered that cultural 
constructs such as race, gender, and identity, exerted a powerful influence on nuclear 
policymaking. The pioneering work of Matthew Jones analyses US nuclear policy in Asia 
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through the lens of race, demonstrating the previously undervalued impact of race, racism, 
and racial issues on nuclear affairs.27 Maddock integrates an examination of race and gender 
into his chronological overview of US non-proliferation policy from 1945 to 1970.28 
Although concentrating on the Indian nuclear programme, George Perkovich’s India's 
Nuclear Bomb makes an important contribution to the general area of this study. Perkovich 
argues against the dominant theory that India developed nuclear capability because of 
national security concerns related to China and Pakistan, instead contending that domestic 
politics, and moral and political norms bound up in the evolving post-colonial identity of 
India, have been more significant determinants of India's nuclear policy.29 More narrowly, 
this thesis situates itself within a significant body of work that examines the role and salience 
of the cultural construct of religion in foreign affairs and on those who make foreign 
policy.30 Critically, however, this thesis argues that despite considerable public disquiet over 
the ‘Islamic bomb’ and the efforts of the Israeli state to use the issue to promote its own 
interests, the paradigm failed to influence actual non-proliferation policy in the case of 
Pakistan, thus challenging the popular literature and the findings of scholars such as Hugh 
Gusterson, who argue that fear of ‘Islamic’ nuclear proliferation has been a significant force 
in non-proliferation policy since the 1970s.31  
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Since this study focuses on the United States and United Kingdom, it is not 
primarily concerned with the evolution of the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme, 
technically, politically, or culturally. It investigates American and British attitudes and 
policies towards Pakistan, not Pakistan itself. There are several reasons for this. Primarily, 
this is a study of US and UK policy. Secondly, there is very little—if any—extant official 
primary source documentation available from Pakistan. The government of Pakistan is 
rigorous in preventing foreign scholars from examining materials related to the nuclear 
programme. Thus, researchers must rely on secondary sources, often written by former 
Pakistani ‘insiders’ and frequently unhelpfully speculative. Useful studies of the ‘insider’ 
variety include those by Feroz Hassan Khan, Kamal Matinuddin, and Saeem Nalik.32 As 
former senior Pakistani military officers, these men bring substantial personal experience to 
their respective studies, and there is considerable reliance on interviews that could only be 
gained by insiders. There are, however, problems inherent in such works in that there is a 
reticence on the part of the authors to delve into certain areas and, significantly, they rely 
largely on popular works on the Pakistani nuclear programme. However, by making careful 
use of such accounts, Pakistani voices are granted a presence as far as possible within this 
study. 
 
With its firm focus on foreign relations, this thesis takes as its key sources documents 
associated with the foreign policy arms of the US and UK governments. These have been 
acquired from the national archives of both states, and from collections associated with 
particular leaders, such as the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, the Jimmy Carter 
Presidential Library, and the Margaret Thatcher Archives. Through research into these US 
and UK government documents, this thesis offers significant new insights into non-
proliferation in the 1970s. Many of the sources consulted have only recently been 
declassified, or have been declassified through freedom of information requests made as part 
of the research for this work. In terms of media sources, this thesis utilises the major 
newspapers of record from the United States (the Washington Post and New York Times) and 
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United Kingdom (The Times and the Guardian). Finally, there have been investigations into 
critical oral history collections in order to provide nuance to various points within the thesis. 
In this regard, the British Diplomatic Oral History Project (BDOHP) administered by 
Churchill College Cambridge has been an invaluable resource. 
 
In order to chart the progression of US-UK non-proliferation policy, this thesis is structured 
chronologically. Chapter One focuses on the impact of the Indian nuclear test on May 18 
1974 on the sub-continental non-proliferation policies of the Nixon-Ford administration and 
Wilson governments up to the end of 1975.  
Chapter Two examines in detail the changes that took place in 1976, in particular, 
the transition during the late-period Ford administration from non-proliferation laxity to a 
more active policy. This was also the period when British government officials discovered 
the first hints that Pakistan was, in addition to its very public quest for a nuclear reprocessing 
plant, undertaking a clandestine purchasing programme aimed at building a uranium 
enrichment plant. 
Chapter Three studies the arrival of Jimmy Carter in the White House and the effects 
his dedication to non-proliferation had on relations with the Callaghan government and on 
joint-action directed against Pakistan. This chapter also demonstrates that British economic 
requirements and the energy crisis created by the ‘oil shocks’ of the 1970s intersected in 
adverse ways with non-proliferation policy as it related to Pakistan. 
Chapter Four, examining the period from March to December 1978, interrogates the 
formation of a strong Anglo-American alliance to prevent Pakistani acquisition of nuclear 
capability. While Pakistan was pursuing the twin means of reprocessing and enrichment in 
order to access fissile material, the US and UK governments engaged in coordinated 
diplomatic efforts aimed at cutting off Pakistani access to vital nuclear equipment and 
materials. 
Chapter Five stresses the hugely significant change from a strategy of prevention to 
a strategy of mitigation. The Carter administration and the Callaghan and Thatcher 
governments radically changed their non-proliferation policies in the case of Pakistan, in 
essence acquiescing to eventual Pakistani nuclear status while taking overt and covert action 
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to retard the attainment of that status as much as possible. This chapter also offers a detailed 
account of the public and private impact of the ‘Islamic bomb,’ demonstrating that while 
there was a media outcry surrounding perceived proliferation throughout the Muslim world, 
such concerns did not have the same impact in Washington or London. 
Finally, Chapter Six assesses the impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on 
non-proliferation policy. This chapter explains that the policies of America and Britain 
underwent further change, transitioning from a stance of mitigation combined with 
withholding arms sales and aid to a posture where mitigation of nuclear attainment was de-
linked from arms sales and aid. This ultimately found expression through US and UK 
willingness to arm Pakistan in the face of perceived aggressive Soviet expansionism.  
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Chapter 1: “No hope of preventing proliferation” 
May 1974 to December 1975 
 
In December 1975, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued a report arguing that 
globally there was “no hope of preventing proliferation.”1 This fatalistic analysis came after 
eighteen months of half-hearted and generally fruitless American and British attempts to 
persuade Pakistan—a key state highlighted by the CIA—not to go down the nuclear path. In 
the aftermath of India’s May 18, 1974 nuclear test, the US and UK did little to discourage 
Pakistani nuclear ambitions, despite ample evidence—in the form of statements by Pakistani 
politicians and an overt quest for advanced nuclear facilities—that Islamabad sought nuclear 
weapons to counterbalance the new Indian capability. 
 During 1974 and 1975, notable differences existed between United States and 
United Kingdom on non-proliferation matters. America concentrated on regional factors, in 
particular the sub-continental rivalry between India and Pakistan. America founded its 
regional focus in a desire not to highlight Nixon and Kissinger’s extreme laissez-faire 
attitude towards non-proliferation from 1969 to 1974. Furthermore, Henry Kissinger’s 
fatalism about proliferation and emphasis on regional security reinforced the American 
position. Britain concentrated on the Indian test’s wider effects on the terrain of non-
proliferation, unwilling to damage relations with its two ex-colonies and aware of the 
potential hypocrisy of a nuclear weapon state (NWS) being overly critical of a new entrant to 
the ‘nuclear club.’ 
 Arms sales to the sub-continent—in particular advanced aircraft—played a major 
role during this period. On one hand, the United States used weapons sales as a non-
proliferation tool to either bribe or coerce Pakistan into foregoing nuclear capability. On the 
other hand, Britain’s determination to land a lucrative Indian contract for strike aircraft 
actively inhibited non-proliferation by alarming Islamabad. Despite debates in London, 
British commercial considerations took precedence over anti-proliferation imperatives. 
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 This eighteen-month period highlights many issues that remained significant for the 
rest of the 1970s. These included the deleterious effects of British economic self-interest on 
non-proliferation goals and American political decisions in favour of Pakistan. Provoked by 
Indian actions, Pakistan would become the most significant US and UK proliferation 
concern as the decade progressed. 
 
The Indian Test 
For America and Britain, the Indian detonation of May 18, 1974 was a nuclear Rubicon. The 
explosion under the Rajasthani desert destroyed the fragile perceptive membrane embodied 
in the NPT that separated civilian and military nuclear technology. The explosion had 
implications far beyond the sub-continent and, as Michael J. Brenner contends, the test 
“blew a psychological hole in the world’s confident perception of how difficult it was for a 
marginally proficient state to build a bomb, and how hard it was to evade safeguards against 
the surreptitious exploitation of a nominally civilian program.”2 As Samina Ahmed notes, 
the test was also a turning point that set Pakistan irrevocably along the nuclear weapons 
path.3 The US and the UK reacted to the explosion in a modest fashion, but for quite 
different reasons. President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger (occupying the dual role of 
Secretary of State and National Security Adviser), despite an outwardly exemplary arms 
control record—such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the Anti Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) treaty—lacked enthusiasm for preventing the further horizontal and vertical 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.4 This was despite the fact that it was the relaxation in 
superpower tensions inherent in détente that allowed non-proliferation to flourish.5 The 
Nixon administration saw the Indian test as a fundamentally regional issue, and treated it as 
such, seeking to de-emphasise US laxity on non-proliferation matters and avoid setting a 
precedent demanding future action on non-proliferation. Harold Wilson’s government 
emphasised the case’s global consequences in an effort to avoid antagonising either India or 
Pakistan by singling them out for criticism. Furthermore, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan 
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wished to avoid the suggestion of hypocrisy inherent in a NWS criticising another nation for 
gaining atomic capability.  
 India presented its test as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE) designed to gain 
scientific data and examine the civil engineering possibilities of nuclear explosives, Indian 
Prime Minister Indira Ghandi insisting that there was "nothing to get excited about.”6 The 
distinction between peaceful and non-peaceful explosions built into the NPT allowed this 
characterisation of the detonation.7 A majority of Indians welcomed the test and it provided a 
much-needed political boost for Gandhi.8 Journalists reported a mood of national rejoicing at 
all levels of Indian society, despite the shadows of economic deprivation and labour unrest.9 
US analysts noted that alongside the morale effect of the explosion, New Delhi also hoped 
that Indian nuclear capability would have a deterrent effect on China. However, this was at 
the cost of provoking considerable alarm in Pakistan.10  
 The State Department informed Kissinger about the test during the twenty-first day 
of exhausting shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. The Secretary of State ordered his 
subordinates to remain silent but, if pressed, to offer a low-key response, stating that, “the 
United States has always been against nuclear proliferation for the adverse impact it will 
have on world stability.”11 Kissinger rejected the State Department’s draft of a critical 
response to Indian actions. Bilateral relations were one reason for this. Dennis Kux notes that 
Kissinger had concluded, “public scolding would not undo the event, but only add to US-
Indian bilateral problems and reduce the influence Washington might have on India’s future 
nuclear policy.”12 Relations with India had been problematic at least since the 1971 Indo-
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Pakistani War, when the United States had ‘tilted’ towards Pakistan.13 However, bilateral 
relations were not the sole motivating factor.  
 Kissinger had a fatalistic view of the inevitability of proliferation that de-emphasised 
non-proliferation as a foreign policy priority.14 The relative importance that Kissinger 
attached to non-proliferation is highlighted, as George Perkovich notes, by the fact that in the 
relevant volume of his memoirs, neither the Indian test nor the general problem of 
proliferation are discussed.15 Coupled to this, Kissinger and Nixon believed that nuclear 
weapons did not actually transform the way nations behaved. Atomic bombs, according to 
this view, were important, but they did not alter more powerful political forces. Arms control 
was thus a useful tool, but not an end in itself.16 Treating the Indian test as fundamentally a 
regional issue and downplaying its significance allowed Kissinger to achieve three broader 
political goals. Firstly, not reacting to the test and treating India as just another state 
mitigated the ‘prestige’ effect of nuclear acquisition. Secondly, a strong stance against India 
would have required a strong stance against all other proliferators.17 Such broader non-
proliferation action was not a desired part of Kissinger’s finely tuned network of policies and 
alliances. Thirdly, and finally, J. Samuel Walker argues that the subdued reaction to the test 
can at least in part be accounted for by Nixon-Kissinger plans to export nuclear technology 
to Israel and Egypt, plans that were enacted a mere month after the Indian detonation.18 
A rapidly produced State Department analysis emphasised that containing an 
adverse Pakistani reaction was the most immediately pressing issue, an interpretation 
confirmed when Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto angrily commented that 
Pakistan would never be the victim of “nuclear blackmail” or be intimidated by India.19 
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There was also the consideration that other nuclear “potentials” were watching the US 
reaction very closely.20 Nixon and Kissinger had far less belief in the significance of nuclear 
weapons than the US arms control community did, and the subdued response to the test 
provoked concern over the long-term impact on proliferation. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director Fred Iklé warned of the impact on regional South 
Asian stability, the dire consequences for further ratification of the NPT, and the potential 
impetus that the Indian test could give to other nations’ nuclear programmes.21 This was a 
warning that Iklé had been issuing for years. As far back as 1965, he argued that if 
proliferation cascaded beyond the “middle powers” then the result would be “owners of 
nuclear weapons who cannot be deterred because they feel they have nothing to lose.”22 Led 
by Iklé, the ACDA had been the only organisation within the US government to maintain, as 
Michael Brenner points out, “an institutional and intellectual commitment to the spirit of 
non-proliferation, as well as to the law of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”23 Kissinger 
approved Iklé’s take on events as a response to individual enquiries, with the proviso that 
communications did not suggest that the US was attempting to marshal opinion against India 
and an order not to comment on the wider proliferation issues the test raised.24 The State 
Department recognised the dichotomy of the US position: avoiding being seen as 
orchestrating a worldwide campaign against India, while evading perceptions of 
acquiescence to Indian nuclear status. The State Department instructed US diplomatic posts 
around the world not to take the initiative in raising the test.25 
 The response to the Indian test had a similar, but subtly different, tone in London. 
The British government initially reacted along analogous lines to the US, stating, “We would 
regret the explosion of any nuclear device, even for peaceful purposes, outside the context of 
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the NPT.”26 Foreign Secretary Callaghan—a man committed to re-emphasising the trans-
Atlantic relationship after the relative stagnation of the Heath years—stated that this event 
demonstrated the need for the NPT.27 Thus, from the outset Britain placed the situation 
within a global non-proliferation context. The test provoked Pakistani comment on valuable 
resources being diverted to the Indian nuclear programme when foreign aid was required for 
basic human needs and the Labour government’s response to the test was coloured by the 
fact that financial assistance to India amounted to nearly twenty-per cent of the UK foreign 
aid budget.28 The Wilson government wished to avoid entangling the two issues.29 The UK 
was far less concerned about the influence on Pakistan when compared to the test’s impact 
on the global non-proliferation environment, reflecting Callaghan’s and the parliamentary 
Labour party’s pragmatic internationalism that emphasised global co-operation, the 
strengthening of international institutions, and multilateral disarmament.30 There was also 
the fact that while the Cabinet had to deal with global nuclear issues, there were popular and 
vocal anti-nuclear elements in the wider party, typified by Members of Parliament (MPs) 
Frank Allaun and Tam Dalyell, who would both come to prominence as the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons programme became a major public issue in the late 1970s. Pakistani 
Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi’s ominous statement that, “A qualitatively new situation has 
thus arisen, a situation full of menace to the security of India’s immediate neighbours. The 
barrier to nuclear proliferation interposed by the NPT has been demolished. A precedent has 
been set” gave the Wilson government’s concerns increased salience 31 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) advised Callaghan—in Washington 
for a meeting of Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) foreign ministers due to take place 
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on May 22—that the NPT’s status was paramount and that the Indian explosion represented 
a tipping point that threatened to lead to a proliferation cascade. The FCO, like Kissinger, 
cautioned restraint, but for quite different reasons, arguing along Callaghan’s lines that: 
 
 We do not wish to take a strong line against the Indian government. 
A) because as a nuclear weapon state such a posture might appear hypocritical and 
B) because any appearance of taking sides between India and Pakistan would 
certainly adversely affect our own position in the sub-continent. 
Nor should we wish to commit ourselves to any kind of open-ended guarantee of the 
kind which Mr Bhutto appears to envisage.32 
 
The FCO articulated much more ephemeral anxieties than those voiced by Kissinger and 
Iklé. The essential hypocrisy of the nuclear weapon states when it came to nuclear 
development, especially in the developing world, and lingering British loyalty to its former 
colonies came to the fore. Furthermore, Britain was reluctant to acquiesce to Bhutto’s 
demands for nuclear security assurances. The main tool for reassuring India’s neighbour, the 
FCO argued, should be the NPT and the security assurances it guaranteed.33 Informed 
observers at the British Embassy in Islamabad suggested a great intensity of feeling in 
Pakistan about the nuclear security question and, more specifically, argued that if the Wilson 
government did not take a strong stance, British interests in the country would suffer.34 
Despite this warning and despite couching their entire response within the framework of the 
NPT, the government delayed, choosing to sit and watch the unfolding superpower 
reactions.35 
 As the impact of the test was absorbed, officials in Washington and London sought 
to evaluate each other’s views on the test. The assessment from the US Embassy in London 
offered a mixed outlook, characterising the Wilson government as being in a conflicted 
situation, torn between its commitment to international disarmament and its need to maintain 
a close friendship with India. US officials saw Wilson and his cabinet as more likely to base 
their actions around wider NPT concerns, rather than making direct points to the Indians 
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about the impact of their nuclear actions.36 In addition, nuclear questions began to tie into 
questions of conventional arms supplies to the sub-continent. Britain was liable to come 
under increasing pressure from Pakistan (then labouring under a United States arms embargo 
put in place by the Johnson administration during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war) to sell 
advanced aircraft.37 The Americans were unsure which way the UK would jump, but felt that 
the US stance on arms sales would be a major contributing factor in any British decision.38 
US consular officials correctly assessed that Britain placed a greater emphasis on the NPT, 
as opposed to the sub-continental implications.39 Communicating from Washington, Sir 
Peter Ramsbotham (British ambassador to the United States) noted three days after the test 
that the Americans had not yet formulated a definitive view on the issue. Speaking to the 
ambassador, Dennis Kux, the State Department’s Indian section chief, had placed Pakistan at 
the top of the priority list, suggesting that the explosion would send a “shiver down their 
spines.” It would take time, Ramsbotham suggested, for the various departments of the US 
government to determine the full impact on Pakistan and on the wider non-proliferation 
environment.40 
 
In Washington on May 22, American, British, and Pakistani representatives came together 
face-to-face at the pre-arranged CENTO foreign ministers meeting.41 CENTO had been a 
source of disappointment for Pakistan, with the other treaty countries—the UK, Iran, Iraq, 
and Turkey—refusing to involve themselves in the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971. 
The crux of Pakistan’s disappointment rested upon a misunderstanding of the organisation’s 
nature: Islamabad imagined CENTO standing against the USSR and India, while the other 
nations—in particular Britain—saw it as a purely anti-Soviet measure. Nixon argued that 
Pakistani security in the wake of the Indian nuclear test was of prime importance and 
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characterised the US-UK position as having a “restraining influence on those who might be 
tempted -- to go under or over a border to destroy a country's independence.” Nixon 
suggested that if the US went so far as to re-establish dialogue with India, it would be to 
encourage Indian restraint.42 Aziz Ahmed, Pakistani Minister of State for Defense and 
Foreign Affairs, attempted to pressure the nuclear weapon states into adopting a tone more 
critical of India, to no avail. Ahmed’s pleas that the USSR was abusing détente to infiltrate 
Afghanistan, India, and Iraq likewise fell on deaf ears.43 
Despite Ahmed’s entreaties being ignored, reassuring Pakistan was key to a private 
meeting between Nixon and his Pakistani guest. Although US policy was broadly supportive 
of Pakistan, prior to the meeting the State Department suggested that at this stage little could 
be done by the administration other than offer bland commitment to do something once the 
test’s full implications had been assessed.44 The Pakistani diplomat—drawing on the treaty 
of friendship between India and the Soviet Union and what Islamabad now realised was 
CENTO’s true nature—portrayed the Indian test as part of a wider Soviet scheme to gain 
influence in South Asia. Ahmed actively sought two things from Nixon: conventional arms 
to defend Pakistan from further attack and nuclear security assurances to “reduce the 
incentive [for Pakistan] to get nuclear weapons.”45 Although Ahmed was speaking in general 
terms, this was a hint of the direction in which Pakistan was heading. Ahmed also presaged 
the much more explicit hints given by Pakistani officials in future meetings that insufficient 
US help would force Pakistan down the nuclear path. Nixon agreed in principle to Ahmed’s 
requests, but commented that nothing could really be done at this stage. The President noted 
that he would make the US commitment to Pakistan clear to the Soviets and, if possible, 
encourage restraint in Moscow. Nuclear security guarantees were a complex area that, 
although agreeable to Nixon, was difficult to implement. The President thought it would be 
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difficult to put such guarantees into a treaty, harking back to his and Kissinger’s lack of faith 
in the credibility of nuclear-based commitments.46 
 
Following these face-to-face meetings, letters sent by Bhutto to Nixon and Wilson on May 
24 gave the strongest hint yet that Pakistan desired nuclear capability. These letters formed 
part of a major Pakistani diplomatic campaign, with similarly worded missives sent to scores 
of world leaders.47 Disparaging the Indian claim that the test was a “peaceful nuclear 
explosion,” Bhutto argued that the detonation would provoke many more national nuclear 
weapons programmes. The Pakistani Prime Minister portrayed his country as the victim of 
continual Indian aggression and emphasised his attempts at cross-border compromise. On the 
letter’s last page, Bhutto stated, “Pakistan will do its utmost to resist pressures toward a 
nuclear option. But these pressures will increase if there is no credible political insurance 
against nuclear blackmail.”48 Here the leader of the country most affected by the Indian 
explosion made a barely veiled threat to pursue a nuclear weapons programme if Pakistan 
was not offered adequate protection. This should not have come as any great surprise; Bhutto 
had signposted his intentions as far back as 1965 when he made his famous statement that 
Pakistanis would “eat grass” in order to match any future Indian nuclear capability.49 
Bhutto’s 1965 comments—well publicised in the aftermath of the Indian test—led Agha 
Shahi to state that Pakistan could not bear the costs of a nuclear weapons programme, but 
(echoing his Prime Minister’s letters to Nixon) the internal pressures might be too much to 
resist.50 
 Wilson, influenced by the FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department’s 
(ACDD) thinking on the test’s implications, attempted to mollify Bhutto by agreeing with 
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many of his remarks and sharing his concerns about international peace and security.51 
Wilson was less alarmist than his Pakistani counterpart about the impact on the NPT, trying 
to cajole Bhutto into signing up to the treaty by emphasising the inherent security guarantees 
and the greater need for treaty signatories in the test’s wake. Wilson stated that, in relation to 
the bold statement about “resisting pressure” for a Pakistani nuclear weapons programme, he 
was heartened to hear that Bhutto would do his best to avoid that route and continued to sell 
him on the benefits of the NPT.52 Still, for British policymakers, the most pressing concern 
resulting from the test was ensuring the non-proliferation regime’s survival, rather than “sub-
continental rivalry or the security concerns of any particular country.”53 
 With more worrisome developments at home to consider, the Nixon White House 
offered a far more succinct reply than Wilson’s friendly cajoling. The President offered to 
carefully consider nuclear security assurances via the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) and expressed his continued sympathy for the situation in which Pakistan found 
itself. Nixon assured Bhutto that the independence and security of Pakistan was “a 
cornerstone of American policy.”54 
The Indian test also gave added impetus to a study that was under way to prepare the 
United States for the 1975 NPT Review Conference. National Security Study Memorandum-
202 (NSSM-202) had been “limping along” before the May explosion, mostly because of the 
uncooperative head of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Dixy Lee Ray.55 The study 
was wide-ranging, but was also specifically considered whether the US should press for 
renewed support for the NPT by existing signatories and for accession to the treaty by those 
who had not yet signed up, a category that included Pakistan.56 By the end of 1974, the 
NSSM-202 study’s results had been presented to the Ford administration. The report struck a 
demoralised tone, bemoaning the loss of US primacy in the field of international nuclear 
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sales. This loss of dominance could have dire effects on proliferation, as would-be nuclear 
states turned for supplies to other nations with much less rigorous controls on sensitive 
materials, and technology.57 NSSM-202, however, failed to answer crucial questions of 
technology transfer and the risks of a plutonium-based nuclear economy.58 
  In their initial reactions to the test, therefore, the American and British governments 
reacted in in subtly different ways. Britain, by immediately placing the test within the global 
context of the NPT, took the more global stance. The American reaction—fundamentally 
that of Kissinger—was founded in fatalism about proliferation and an emphasis on regional 
issues. Where the two states came together was in their assessment that the test could well be 
a tipping point that led to further proliferation. The prospect of a proliferation cascade was 
something that threaded its way through discussions of the now invigorated Pakistani 
programme over the next five years. In the test’s immediate aftermath, America and Britain 
offered Pakistan little more than vague reassurance. Through the rest of 1974 and into 1975, 
Bhutto would demand—and receive—more concrete signifiers of Western commitment to 
Pakistani security. Most notably, the issue of arms sales to the sub-continent came to the fore 
as a means for retarding Pakistani nuclear development and a factor pushing Bhutto’s 
country towards the atomic option. 
 
Arms Sales and the Nuclear Issue 
Conventional arms sales were tied to the nuclear issue in Pakistan from the very instant of 
the Indian test. Not only did America attempt to use weapons sales as a means of 
discouraging the Pakistani drive towards nuclear capability, Britain also found itself mired in 
the issue through its long-running efforts to sell advanced aircraft to India. However, there 
were stark differences in the reasons for, and effects of, conventional arms sales to the sub-
continental neighbours. American offers of arms for Pakistan were an anti-proliferation 
measure, designed—through their provision or withdrawal—to bribe or coerce Islamabad 
into abandoning its nuclear ambitions. British arms sales to India were founded in the 
“unparalleled economic crisis” of the mid-1970s, a situation where the Wilson and 
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Callaghan governments saw the British aircraft industry as an essential revenue generator.59 
The 1970s were a particularly lean time for Britain’s aerospace industry, having been a 
successful exporter for the previous two decades. Manufacturers found themselves in a 
position where potential purchasers would not consider replacing their equipment until the 
1980s.60 Any major sales opportunity was, therefore, vital. In the case of British sales to 
India, then, advanced weapons were only ever an impediment to non-proliferation policy. 
Firstly, British reluctance to abandon sales to India affected the US-UK relationship. 
Secondly, Britain’s potential arming of India with advanced new weapons created alarm in 
Islamabad and contributed to Pakistan’s desire for nuclear capability. The British 
government was also caught up in internal wrangles, with different departments and sub-
departments arguing for and against arms sales. The entire issue of arms sales was 
emblematic of the tension between non-proliferation and commercial interests. The issue of 
arms—in particular warplane—sales drove a wedge between the US and the UK when, as 
the decade progressed, Britain refused to give up on strike aircraft sales to India, despite the 
effects on Pakistani nuclear ambitions. This demonstrates a division between a 
‘comprehensive’ view of the arms sales and nuclear issues, where the two are explicitly 
connected, and a ‘compartmentalised’ approach that sought to place a hard line between the 
two issues. 
 
The test’s immediate aftermath saw senior Pakistani government officials request that the 
United States ease the 1965 arms embargo in order that they may defend themselves from—
as Pakistan saw it—an aggressive, nuclear armed India. Having fought three major wars with 
India since Partition in 1947, Pakistani fears were understandable. However, US officials 
later argued that Bhutto, Ahmed, and others were dramatically over-playing the situation in 
the hope of getting the embargo lifted. Aziz Ahmed, in his very first post-test meetings with 
Nixon and Kissinger, had already brought up the subject. Ahmed continued with this theme 
in early June when he again met with Kissinger. The spectre of Soviet involvement in the 
Indian nuclear programme was raised once more by the Pakistani representative who then 
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immediately segued into a request for “defensive” weapons: anti-aircraft and anti-tank 
missiles, RADAR systems, and submarines. Ahmed pressed Kissinger for an immediate 
announcement on this, to which the Secretary of State demurred. Kissinger blamed Congress 
for his inability to do anything in the near term stating, “I’ve always believed in military 
supply for Pakistan. It's absurd that the Soviets can arm India while our hands are tied. It's а 
massive problem, but I don't believe the Congress would let us do it.”61 
 In the face of Kissinger’s dissembling on arms supplies, Ahmed sought nuclear 
security assurances from friendly powers. Britain was viewed as uncertain, due to 
Commonwealth ties (which Pakistan had withdrawn from in 1972) and perceived British 
sensitivity about India.62 Kissinger offered to make a statement supporting “Pakistan's 
independence and territorial integrity” and making clear that “the use of nuclear weapons 
against Pakistan would be a very grave matter.” This was a bold statement that Ahmed 
interpreted as including the threat of use and not simply use, but fell far short of the nuclear 
assurances he sought. Kissinger reiterated that he would probe Congress on military aid, 
even though his advisers suggested that any change in arms supply policy came with 
unbearable Congressional costs.63 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, US ambassador to India, voiced 
further objections to changes in arms supply to Pakistan, contending that to supply weapons 
to Pakistan would result in the immediate failure of US non-proliferation policy on the sub-
continent.64 Moynihan’s counterpart in Islamabad, Henry Byroade opposed this view, 
arguing that arms sales would actually reassure Bhutto and improve the chances of 
normalization in Indo-Pakistani relations.65 
 As the Pakistanis attempted to gain military supplies from the United States, officials 
within the Wilson government assessed British arms sales policy on the sub-continent. Sales 
to both Pakistan and India were of “immediate concern,” although in the long run it was 
sales to the latter that were the most problematic and introduced the greatest complexity into 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Memcon, Ahmed, Yaqub-Khan, Sober, Constable, ‘Military Supply for Pakistan,’ June 3, 1974, FRUS 69-76, 
Vol.E8, Doc.166, 3-4. 
62 Pakistan left the Commonwealth in 1972 over the organisation’s recognition of Bangladesh. 
63 Memcon, June 3, 1974, 7-8; Sober to Kissinger, ‘Military Supply for Pakistan,’ June 4, 1974,  Declassified 
Documents Reference System (hereafter DDRS), DDRS-270991-i1-4, 3. 
64 USE New Delhi to State, ‘The Secretary’s Meeting With Aziz Ahmed, June 3,’ June 6, 1974, DDRS, DDRS-
270989-i1-3, 1. 
65 Sober to Kissinger, June 4, 1974, 3. 
! 30!
the non-proliferation effort against Pakistan.66 This situation was not without precedent, for 
successive British governments had faced the challenging task of balancing sales to the two 
regional rivals ever since Partition.67 The FCO South Asia Department (SAD)—with the 
concurrence of ACDD, the Far Eastern Department, and the East European and Soviet 
Department—recognised that the potential British sale of a nuclear-capable strike aircraft 
such as the SEPECAT Jaguar (which had just come into service with the Royal Air Force in 
the tactical nuclear strike role) to India might be regarded by Pakistan with “great 
suspicion.”68 Sir Michael Cary, Chief of Defence Procurement in the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD), argued that the Jaguar was not a new capability for India, which had a fleet of aging 
but serviceable Canberra bombers that could be adapted for nuclear delivery.69 Sir Thomas 
Brimelow, Cary’s opposite number in the FCO, counter-argued that the sale of Jaguar 
aircraft to New Delhi was inconceivable in light of the Indian nuclear test. The Indians 
would require subtle notification so as not to wound their pride, but could be mollified by the 
sale of less controversial equipment such as the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft.70 David 
Summerhays, the ACDD’s head, argued that wider knowledge of British intent to sell 
nuclear delivery systems to India would have a significant, damaging impact on the standing 
of the UK as an anti-proliferation voice.71 Summerhayes’ colleague John Thomson agreed, 
vigorously stating the primacy of non-proliferation policy and arguing, “if ever there was a 
moral cause, it is this.”72 Thus, the battle lines over Jaguar were drawn. Throughout the rest 
of the 1970s, the perception (if not the reality) that Jaguar was a nuclear delivery system 
adversely affected both non-proliferation efforts directed against Pakistan and the Anglo-
American relationship. 
 The peripatetic Aziz Ahmed arrived in London on June 10 for a high-level meeting 
with Harold Wilson. Once again the Pakistani minister characterised the May 18 test as part 
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of an Indo-Soviet attempt to dominate South Asia and called for British nuclear security 
guarantees. Wilson also stuck to a familiar line: sympathising with the Pakistani position, but 
always emphasising Britain’s commitment to the NPT.73 Wilson’s continued calls—made to 
both India and Pakistan—to sign up to the NPT were always destined to fail. As Sumit 
Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur argue, the refusal to join was not based solely on strategic 
considerations, but also on recent colonial history and the lingering view on the sub-
continent that the NPT represented a condescending, possibly even racist, worldview that 
amounted to “nuclear apartheid.”74 On the question of arms sales, Ahmed asked if there was 
any way that Britain could lift its arms embargo, a decision that might have a favourable 
influence on United States thinking. Although Wilson responded that he would see what he 
could do, Ahmed was mistaken in this case. There was no British arms embargo, only a 
requirement that Pakistan must pay cash for any sales. 
 
Following Ahmed’s attempts to have the US arms embargo lifted, Henry Byroade added his 
weight to the June weapons sales debates by noting the “profound shock” in Pakistan over 
the Indian test with recent events exacerbating “chronic feelings of insecurity.”75 Byroade 
argued that the on-going requests to lift the embargo and give security guarantees were not 
just for show. Such requests reflected deep-seated, genuine Pakistani concerns about national 
security. However, the ambassador was firm in his belief that the overriding concern for the 
United States must be the impact of events on the NPT and the global non-proliferation 
regime.76 In public, Bhutto was at this point resisting calls in parliament for an immediate 
Pakistani nuclear weapons programme (despite the fact that he had personally instigated 
such a programme in 1972), arguing that there was no way for the country to build the bomb 
due to technological and economic disadvantages. Byroade noted that Bhutto had foreseen 
American action against Pakistan, the Prime Minister commenting that any public call for a 
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weapons project “could precipitate active efforts on the part of the nuclear powers to obstruct 
Pakistan’s nuclear programme.”77 
When Kissinger made a highly publicised trip to the sub-continent in October, the 
question of arms for Pakistan was a core element of discussions. Before Kissinger’s trip, 
America had suffered its most significant political upheaval of the modern era when Richard 
Nixon resigned the presidency rather than face impeachment over Watergate. The new 
president, Gerald R. Ford, was an amateur in the field of foreign relations and relied heavily 
on his Secretary of State.78 At the same time, the United States had continued to demonstrate 
that the consequences for India of testing a nuclear device were limited, when it proceeded to 
ship an instalment of previously approved uranium fuel for the nuclear reactor at Tarapur.79 
During this transitional period, Ahmed had a series of meetings with Ford and Kissinger to 
again press for an end to the embargo.80 Within the US foreign policy apparatus, Pakistani 
pleas for a change to weapon sales policy were seen as less to do with actual security needs 
and more to do with the psychological pressure of the Indian test and affirmation of a strong 
political relationship with the United States that the “arms pipeline” once implied.81 Bhutto 
also tied conventional arms to the quest for nuclear weapons. A few weeks before the 
Kissinger mission, he told the New York Times, “If security interests are satisfied, if people 
feel secure and if they feel they will not be subject to aggression, they [will] not want to 
squander away limited resources in [the nuclear] direction.”82 
Kissinger utilised the notion of ‘pressures to go nuclear’ in Pakistan when he met 
Indira Gandhi at the end of October. In his report to Ford, he noted, “I made the point that at 
most what was involved were limited cash sales to Pakistan and that she should reflect on the 
risk that, if frustrated on conventional arms purchases, Pakistan would be under even greater 
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pressure to go nuclear.”83 Having been briefed that an Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race was 
a distinct and alarming possibility—to such an extent that the CIA had asserted that Pakistan 
would move ahead with the nuclear programme as rapidly as its limited capabilities 
allowed—Kissinger pressed his Indian hosts over the arms to Pakistan issue.84 The Secretary 
of State challenged the Indian line that any shipments would cause great harm to Indo-
American relations, by stating that the United States had no interest in Indo-Pakistani 
military conflict but that the US had to consider the independence of Pakistan.85 
After Kissinger’s visit to New Delhi, his meeting with Bhutto in Islamabad on 
October 31 was friendly and good-humoured. In typical style, the American joked darkly 
that after seeing India first hand he was, “thinking about supplying nuclear weapons, not 
only conventional arms, to Pakistan and even Bangladesh!”86 The discussions ranged widely, 
from the problems of the Middle East to the perceived hegemonic ambitions of India. The 
two statesmen briefly spoke of arms, Kissinger indicating that it was very much in the 
United States’ interest to ensure the integrity of Pakistan.87 
 
In London, the Wilson government debated the problematic nature of arms sales to India in 
the time between the Byroade telegrams and Kissinger’s visit to the sub-continent. The UK 
was delaying giving a definitive answer to the Indians over Jaguar—using a wrangle over 
credit terms as the excuse—and British officials were dispatched to Washington in an effort 
to understand American thinking.88 How the US handled Pakistani arms requests—where 
weapon sales were a non-proliferation measure—would have significant bearing on the 
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British position regarding India, where arms sales were never anything but an impediment to 
non-proliferation. 
In the test’s aftermath, the Jaguar issue had become the subject of vigorous debate 
within the Wilson government, a government that had—in the words of John Thomson—
taken a “strong and consistent stand” on non-proliferation.89 Internally, non-proliferation was 
a significant factor in arguments over Jaguar, but in Anglo-Indian discussions the concerns 
were all economic. Favouring the sale were Secretary of State for Industry Tony Benn and 
Secretary of Defence Roy Mason. Benn recognised that the explosion was concerning, but 
argued that the sale helped the British aircraft industry.90 On the other side were the 
Treasury—where Indian demands for generous credit terms and not nuclear concerns 
provoked objections—and sub-departments such as the ACDD that emphasised non-
proliferation’s significance. All sides recognised the £300 million-plus deal’s “immense 
benefit to British industry.”91 Such divisions were hardly unexpected. The FCO’s position 
had always been to maintain as many friendly relations as possible, while the Department of 
Industry (and its close partner the Department of Trade) sought to maximise British trade 
links. In representations to India’s government, the economic—not nuclear—sticking points 
were the main topics for discussion.92 
ACDD argued that selling Jaguar to India would have a negative impact on Britain’s 
general non-proliferation efforts, contending that, “[A] British decision to supply Jaguar and 
thus improve India’s nuclear delivery capability would be interpreted on all sides as showing 
that we are not really serious about containing nuclear proliferation and that we give narrow 
commercial and industrial interests a higher priority than this major issue of world 
security.”93 There followed a paper analysing Anglo-Indian relations circulated by 
Brimelow, drafted by the FCO Planning Staff, and approved by Callaghan. The paper made 
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the case that, absent any real chance of significantly moving India away from Soviet arms 
purchases: 
[T]he justification for continued major British arms sales to India must therefore rest 
on the value of such arms sales to our own economy either through the payments 
received for them or through the contribution they make to the workload of certain 
of our own industries.94 
 
Furthermore, analysts downplayed the symbolism of selling allegedly nuclear capable 
aircraft and the impact this might have on Pakistan in favour of stressing the economic 
benefits. Pakistan was, the Planning Staff argued, much less important than India. Pakistani 
objections to the deal were better countered with parallel sales rather than restricting supplies 
to India. Finally, the Planning Staff contended that should India request actual nuclear 
capable aircraft, the government might need to consider a politically motivated embargo.95 
This assessment wilfully ignored the fact that, whether they were or not, the Jaguar 
was already seen in Islamabad and other quarters as a nuclear bomber. Here was an explicit 
recognition – approved at the highest level – that a nuclear capable aircraft was genuinely 
and symbolically different from other arms, although the FCO, MoD, and other departments 
repeatedly emphasised that India would not be offered the nuclear capable version of the 
aircraft. As Jeffrey Engel argues in relation to aircraft sales to the communist world, Britain 
‘consistently downplayed security threats’ whenever the government saw those threats as 
imperilling sales.96 The same pattern can be observed in relation to the Jaguar sale: the 
impact on Pakistan’s security and the symbolism of selling allegedly nuclear-capable aircraft 
was downplayed in favour of stressing the economic benefits to the UK. 
 The Jaguar sale was still primarily viewed by the wider government through the 
lens of economic necessity, as bringing in hundreds of millions of pounds to British industry, 
securing thousands of jobs, boosting the aircraft’s further marketability, and 
counterbalancing Soviet arms sales to India. At this stage, Pakistan was only really 
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considered as possibly desiring equal treatment.97 The British government gave relatively 
little consideration at the highest levels to the impact on the Pakistani drive for nuclear 
weapons of the sale of what was seen as a nuclear-capable strike aircraft to the nation that 
was the catalyst for Pakistani nuclear ambitions. 
This lack of consideration was despite the fact that, at the pinnacle of the British 
government, there was a nagging sense that Pakistan might be heading towards a nuclear 
weapons programme. Wilson, while understanding the reasons why Pakistani requests for 
nuclear security guarantees had so far been declined, feared that under the circumstances the 
Pakistani government may decide to develop its own nuclear capability (an assessment 
backed up by the FCO), putting the NPT under increasing strain.98 Washington shared the 
view that Islamabad had committed to the nuclear option, as State Department officials were 
“convinced that the Pakistanis would make every endeavour to develop a nuclear capability 
in as short a time as possible.”99 The vexed question of Britain potentially selling arms to 
Pakistan as a means of heading off the nuclear quest was mired in misperceptions and 
economic problems. The parlous state of both the British and Pakistani economies and the 
continued defaulting of Pakistan on previous deals meant that Britain preferred to deal in 
cash, not credit, for arms. It was a misunderstanding by the Pakistanis—as articulated by 
Ahmed in June—that there was a UK embargo in place similar to that of the United States, 
thus placing Britain firmly in the same camp as the US. However, the British position on 
arms sales was less to do with high-minded concerns about the sub-continent and everything 
to do with the brutal economic necessities of the time. As long as Britain could maintain a 
good relationship with India, there might be commercial opportunities in relaxing the 
attitude towards Pakistan. As the FCO’s Richard Dales argued, Pakistan would get arms 
somehow and by continuing with this obstructive attitude, Britain was depriving itself of 
further sales.100 
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The arms supply debate continued on both sides of the Atlantic into 1975. The 
invitation to make a state visit to America delighted Bhutto and the discussions that took 
place in the new year resulted in much more concrete and satisfactory outcomes for 
Pakistan.101 In Britain, the debate over selling Jaguar to India and the potential non-
proliferation implications rumbled on for some time, complicating the South Asian non-
proliferation landscape.  
 
The Bhutto Visit 
The drama of the Indian nuclear test and its catalytic effect on Pakistan was felt into 1975. 
During the year, the Ford administration began to consider the putative Pakistani nuclear 
weapons programme in a more systematic way, using bribery and persuasion in an effort to 
lead their South Asian ally from the nuclear path. The British government continued to 
concentrate on global non-proliferation issues while engaging in a spirited internal debate 
over the wisdom of the Indian Jaguar negotiations. Furthermore, 1975 saw the first NPT 
Review Conference, an event that promised much but resulted in very little. 
In the run-up to Bhutto’s visit to the United States in February of 1975, American 
suspicions about a Pakistani bomb programme hardened. Robert Gallucci of the ACDA 
submitted a briefing document arguing that although the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure’s 
current state was not a cause for worry, the intentions of the Pakistani government once it 
gained access to a significant infrastructure did provide cause for concern. Most 
significantly, Pakistan had re-energised its negotiations with France for the purchase of a 
nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, one of the vital components of a complete fuel cycle and a 
source of plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons. Gallucci was definite in his 
assessment of future prospects, “Given their treaty status, their determination to purchase 
critical nuclear facilities, and their near declaratory policy of acquisition following the Indian 
detonation, they [Pakistan] may well have already decided to produce a weapon, and they 
clearly decided to have the capability to build one.” According to the ACDA man, the 
reasons for the Pakistani quest for a bomb were many and complicated. The Indian explosion 
was the defining factor, but Gallucci argued that Bhutto might well use a nuclear explosion 
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as a means of creating national unity, in much the same way as Indira Gandhi had gained a 
brief political boost after the test.102 Gallucci also alluded to the possibility of “Arab 
financing” being available to Pakistan, connecting the Pakistani programme with a non-
Western community tied together by bonds of faith. Finally, he urged a modicum of caution 
on the linkage between arms supply and the nuclear issue. Gallucci argued that although the 
two should not be specifically linked, if it did become clear that Pakistan was aiming for 
nuclear capability, United States policy would be “sensitive to such an important and 
unfortunate turn of events.”103 A few days later, Gallucci’s assertions were backed up in part 
by his boss, Fred Iklé. In a meeting with Ford, Iklé pointed out that France was preparing to 
export reprocessing plants and that Pakistan may be able to divert technically knowledgeable 
scientists and engineers from its nuclear reactor facilities towards a bomb programme.104  
 The perception of Pakistan’s ties with the ‘Arab’ or ‘Islamic’ world, Islamabad’s 
negotiations with France over the reprocessing plant, and the solidifying belief in Bhutto’s 
military nuclear intentions all dominated high-level briefings and discussions in advance of 
Bhutto’s arrival. An American aim in the discussions with the Pakistanis was to extract a 
public statement from Bhutto not to develop nuclear explosives. Briefings were clear that 
Pakistan was clearly trying to develop an independent nuclear fuel cycle and the requisite 
technical expertise to make “the nuclear explosion option” feasible.105 Another briefing 
commented on Bhutto’s exploitation of Pakistan’s Islamic ties, particularly when it came to 
economic aid from fellow Muslim countries in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis. Using 
such ties paid off for Pakistan, as states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran promised $400 million 
in assistance.106 There were significant internal differences of opinion within the Ford 
administration. Unlike the assessments offered by Gallucci and Atherton, in this case the 
State Department characterised Bhutto as being ambivalent about the quest for a nuclear 
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bomb.107 In his final briefing to Ford before the meeting, Kissinger—normally distrustful of 
the ACDA—sided with Gallucci’s viewpoint, informing the President there was 
“considerable evidence that Pakistan is embarking on a program that could in time give it the 
capability of duplicating India’s nuclear explosion last May.”108 
 At the Ford-Bhutto meeting on the morning of February 5, the American side arrived 
having finally decided to lift the embargo. Although Bhutto and Ahmed were mildly 
aggrieved at the initially limited value of arms sales, they recognised that they had gained the 
concessions they had travelled 7,000 miles in the hope of achieving. In order to smooth the 
passage of arms sales through Congress, Kissinger sought an assurance from Bhutto that he 
would make a public statement regarding nuclear restraint. After pressing his hosts to agree 
to substantial food aid and development loans, Bhutto was not exactly forthcoming, stating, 
“I am not enchanted by the grandiose notion that we must explode something, no matter how 
dirty, if our security needs are met. I want to spend the money on something else. We will 
have a nuclear programme, but if our security is assured, we will be reasonable.”109 
 In the afternoon, Kissinger had a further meeting with Bhutto and his key advisers 
where he continued to press for a public statement from the Prime Minister. Kissinger’s aim 
was to obtain non-proliferation assurances from Pakistan in exchange for US arms sales. 
Pakistani Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi claimed that due to pre-existing safeguards 
agreements on nuclear facilities, Pakistan could not clandestinely aim for a nuclear weapons 
option. Kissinger jumped on this morsel, asking if the public statement could be that no 
nuclear development would take place outside of internationally agreed safeguards.110 Bhutto 
glossed over the issue and segued into a discussion of moral objections to the NPT. 
Kissinger steered the conversation back to safeguards, but Bhutto once more diverted into 
comments about PNEs. For the developing countries, Kissinger saw no difference between a 
PNE and a bomb. In response, the Pakistanis sought further US assurances for a South Asian 
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Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SANWFZ), something that Kissinger found problematic due to 
the Cold War imperatives of nuclear defence in Europe. At the end of this back and forth, the 
Pakistanis had what they wanted while the Americans failed to gain assurances from their 
guests not to develop a nuclear weapon.111 
 On February 24, the US government announced that they had lifted the ten-year-old 
arms embargo covering Pakistan and India. Unsurprisingly, the reactions from Islamabad 
and New Delhi were quite different. Bhutto wrote a warm letter of thanks to Ford, in which 
he reaffirmed his commitment to the ‘Simla Process’ negotiations with India and the 
avoidance of a South Asian arms race.112 Although the Indian reaction was relatively 
restrained, External Affairs Minister Yashwantrao Chavan cancelled a pre-arranged trip to 
the United States and Gandhi sharply criticised the United States and Pakistan.113 The lifting 
of the embargo was subject to some limitations. The US government would review sales on a 
case-by-case basis, credit for arms was unavailable, and (at least in the arrangement’s initial 
stages) all weapons sold must be purely ‘defensive.’114 Although logically explicable, it was 
a bitter twist of fate for Indira Gandhi that India’s own act of a setting off a nuclear 
explosion led directly to the delivery of US arms to Pakistan.115 
 
Jaguar, Again 
While the United States was lifting the sub-continental arms embargo, potential warplane 
sales to India and the impact this had on Pakistani perceptions remained a major factor for 
British politicians and civil servants through 1975. Harold Wilson had visited Washington 
just before Bhutto’s arrival, but other than a brief discussion of the plans for the Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Group (NSG) and Wilson’s expression of concern over the issue in general, non-
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proliferation was simply not on an agenda packed with discussions of oil, Anglo-American 
nuclear defence cooperation, the Middle East, and the on-going British defence review.116  
In preparation for Wilson’s visit to America, the British sought to push non-
proliferation on to the agenda, at least in part due to alarming intelligence reports on the 
danger of more nations—including Pakistan—acquiring nuclear weapons. Wilson’s briefing 
noted that the “prospects for a stable environment had deteriorated” in light of the Indian test 
and the Israeli President Ephraim Katzir had recently alluded to his country’s nuclear 
weapons, perhaps driving Arab nations towards nuclear capability. The mantra in London 
was that “only strong international controls universally accepted and applied” could solve 
the proliferation problem.117 Even though Britain was pushing ahead with plans for the 1975 
NPT Review Conference and the NSG, Wilson’s government still saw cooperation with the 
United States as the bedrock of any successful anti-proliferation activity. Wilson hoped that 
the Americans would approve the issue of a major statement on non-proliferation during his 
subsequent visit to Moscow, a visit that at its core was about expanded British-Soviet 
commercial links.118 Part of the American agenda was to re-emphasise to the British 
delegation the UK’s importance as an actor in global affairs, something that obviously 
included non-proliferation affairs. US officials therefore raised no objections to a proposed 
British-Soviet communiqué on disarmament and non-proliferation.119 This statement—
included in the joint declaration that came at the end of the mid-February Anglo-Soviet 
summit and couched in the usual bland goodwill of such events—stressed the significance of 
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moves towards disarmament and the importance of multilateral talks as a means to achieve 
non-proliferation goals.120  
 Notwithstanding the Wilson government’s non-proliferation enthusiasm, Jaguar—
and its place within non-proliferation diplomacy—remained a complicating factor from the 
start of 1975. As ministers and civil servants debated the deal’s financing, MPs posed 
difficult questions in the House of Commons.121 Minister of State for Defence William 
Rodgers glossed over the non-proliferation implications when quizzed in Parliament on 
January 23, preferring to concentrate on the benefits to British industry.122 The British 
government hoped that the Indians would—in light of the upcoming changes to US arms 
sales policy to Pakistan—still agree to purchase the aircraft, despite being denied credit. This 
decision was conveyed to the Indians as one made on purely economic grounds.123 
 Despite the insistence to India that decisions being made about the sale were 
economic, there was an intense debate in Whitehall over the non-proliferation implications 
coupled to mounting realisation that this was a matter of great interest to Pakistan. The SAD 
contended that it was possible that the aircraft would form the core of a small nuclear strike-
force, but that India was too far away from producing a workable bomb for that to be a 
concern. Moreover, if Britain did not sell the aircraft, other competitors such as France or 
Sweden most certainly would.124 Even though the version of Jaguar that the UK proposed for 
India was not—without substantial modification—able to deliver nuclear weapons, the 
Pakistanis would think that the aircraft was adding to Indian nuclear capabilities.125 Despite 
ACDD’s objections, the FCO’s South Asian, Science, and Defence departments all agreed—
with varying degrees of reservation—that the sale should go ahead.126 
 The sale’s most vocal critics were the ACDD, who consistently argued that the non-
proliferation implications were significant and should be given prominence. ACDD’s 
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contention that the sale was incompatible with Britain’s overall non-proliferation stance was 
summarised in a comprehensive submission to ministers. If the sale went ahead, ACDD 
argued, the government would be criticised domestically and internationally as symbolically 
validating India’s nuclear status. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan came into the equation as the 
nation most likely to attack the UK over the sale. Moreover, the Jaguar sale could be 
perceived by non-signatories of the NPT as legitimising their status: currently non-nuclear 
states could go nuclear if they wished, and Britain would still be happy to sell them 
weapons.127 
Senior ministers were now left to make the final decision. The response from 
Callaghan came quickly: “Arms Control are right to put their case, but I think we cannot 
refuse the order.”128 Harold Wilson, despite misgivings about the non-proliferation 
implications, signed off on the deal one week later.129 The British Embassy in Islamabad was 
informed of the decision but London asked them to keep quiet, as the FCO was well aware 
of Pakistan’s interest in the case.130 By the winter of 1975, arms control proponents within 
the FCO were still trying to argue that arms sales to India would negatively affect non-
proliferation. A key contention was the impact on domestic and foreign opinion, with 
Pakistan highlighted as a key element of this. The main non-proliferation objection to the 
sale was based around: 
 
The potential effect on opinion in this country, on opinion amongst the committed 
non-proliferation countries, e.g. the US, USSR, Japan, and on opinion in the 
potential exploders, e.g. Pakistan, Argentina, etc. It is this effect on opinion in these 
areas rather than in India itself which is the core of the non-proliferation 
argument.131 
 
This was only the beginning of an issue that would affect Britain’s non-proliferation 




127 O’Neill to Wilford, ‘Sale of Jaguar Aircraft to India,’ Annex B, June 5, 1975, TNA FCO37/1627. 
128 Dales, ‘Sale of Jaguar Aircraft to India,’ June 9, 1975, TNA FCO37/1627. 
129 Wright to Dales, ‘Sale of Jaguar Aircraft to India,’ June 16, 1975, TNA FCO37/1627. 
130 O’Neill to Imray, ‘Sale of Jaguar to India,’ June 20, 1975, TNA FCO37/1627. 
131 Thomson to Mason, ‘Credit for Export of Jaguars to India,’ October 8, 1975, TNA FCO37/1628. 
! 44!
Multilateral Action 
During 1975—as America used arms sales as a non-proliferation tool and Britain debated the 
implications of its potential weapons deal with India—there were two multilateral meetings 
that carried the potential for significant changes in the non-proliferation landscape. The first 
of these—the NSG’s opening meeting —set in motion export controls that would prove 
problematic for the Pakistani nuclear programme. The second meeting—the NPT’s first 
review conference—was a major disappointment that clearly highlighted the rift between the 
nuclear world’s haves and have-nots. These two international non-proliferation gatherings’ 
initial impact was relatively insignificant. However, the issues considered at the NSG 
meeting and review conference became vastly more significant in future Anglo-American 
attempts to combat the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme.  
During late 1974 and early 1975, the United States began to consult with other 
nuclear supplier nations in the hope of putting together a comprehensive ‘trigger list’ of 
technology not to be supplied to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). This was an expansion 
of the agreement reached in August 1974 by the ‘Zangger Committee’ in an effort to prevent 
a repetition of the Indian test.132 The NSG—made up of the UK, USA, USSR, Canada, 
France, Japan, and West Germany—was itself one of the immediate concrete outcomes of 
the Indian test. Flustered by the ease with which India had used civilian technology to 
produce a nuclear weapon, the Group was created to monitor the export of nuclear materials 
and technology from the advanced nuclear supplier states to other nations. The NSG also 
resulted from divisions within the Ford administration: the ACDA felt that the US should 
take a lead in restricting exports, while Kissinger and others argued that a multilateral 
approach must be taken to avoid harming the domestic nuclear industry.133 The ‘London 
Club’ met in secret, due to French insistence, during April. For informed observers such as 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the NSG’s very existence, and the 
need for even more restrictions beyond the NPT, was an open admission that the treaty had 
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failed.134 More widely, the meeting’s secretive nature boosted the opinion in the developing 
world that the NSG was a conspiracy to prevent less developed states from gaining access to 
nuclear technology.135 Meetings to formulate a list of sensitive items that the nuclear supplier 
states would control the export of took place throughout 1975 and 1976. As a result of these 
meetings, the NSG ‘trigger list’ of sensitive exports was eventually published in 1977.136 The 
Group was not without its tensions and problems. The West German announcement of the 
nuclear “deal of the century” with Brazil just as the NSG was meeting caused considerable 
Congressional and public outcry in the United States.137 The FRG-Brazil deal and the 
Franco-Pakistani reprocessing plant deal were the two major nuclear contracts of the 1970s 
that put the greatest strains on non-proliferation diplomacy. 
In May 1975, the ninety-one states that had acceded to the NPT met in Geneva for 
the first Review Conference. Demands from the NNWS that the nuclear powers take greater 
steps towards disarmament, as they were obligated to do under Article VI of the treaty, 
dominated the event. The conference’s Final Declaration acknowledged this aim in the most 
general and non-committal terms.138 The reaction to the conference was generally gloomy, 
with the US and USSR seen as the major culprits in a lack of progress towards genuine 
nuclear disarmament.139 Britain was seen as less blameworthy because of statements to the 
effect that the UK would not move towards deploying a new generation of nuclear missiles. 
The positive outcomes of the conference were that it once more made non-proliferation a 
major political issue and that it served notice on the superpowers that serious arms control 
negotiations must start moving, and start moving quickly.140 
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 While the immediate impact of these two international non-proliferation meetings 
was small, the issues they addressed became hugely significant in later Anglo-American 
efforts to combat the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. The increased emphasis on 
sensitive nuclear exports—typified by the NSG “trigger list”—narrowed down Pakistani 
options in the nuclear field and drove them towards a diffuse clandestine programme. This in 
turn created significant new non-proliferation challenges for the US and UK. 
 
Nuclear Exports and Arms Deals 
By mid-1975, Pakistani negotiations with France over the supply of the nuclear fuel 
reprocessing plant were well advanced. Related to this, discussions were also taking place 
with the FRG for a heavy water plant. Both facilities were cited as a vital expansion of the 
Pakistani civilian nuclear network in light of vast increases in oil prices. This was part of a 
global trend, with expanded reliance on nuclear power seen as one way to meet the post-
1973 energy predicament.141 France wanted to make profits from nuclear deals with 
developing countries and was happy to enter into negotiations for a reprocessing plant that—
to informed observers—far exceeded possible Pakistan civilian needs.142 The FRG also 
possessed a significant commercial nuclear industry that—like France—“sweetened” its 
offers to developing world countries by adding sensitive fuel cycle technologies to the deal, 
a result of the fierce commercial competition between nuclear supplier states.143 Despite 
these moves, and notwithstanding the warnings of analysts like Gallucci and agencies such 
as the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) who warned that they had 
“hard intelligence” that Bhutto had ordered a PNE to be ready in four years, little was done 
by the US to prevent Pakistan from acquiring these facilities during 1975.144  
 Aziz Ahmed continued to press the issue of Soviet influence in India. At a meeting 
of CENTO ministers in May, five days after the Indian explosion’s first anniversary, he gave 
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a lengthy speech on creeping Soviet involvement in South Asia and the need for CENTO as 
a bulwark against India becoming the Soviet proxy in the region. Kissinger again reiterated 
the US commitment to Pakistan, commenting, “we believe the integrity of Pakistan to be an 
interest of the United States.”145 In private, Kissinger sympathised with Ahmed’s 
characterisation of the Indo-Soviet relationship, encouraging the Pakistani minister to seek 
funds for arms from Iran and Saudi Arabia and making apparent his dislike of India and 
individual Indian politicians.146  
 Gerald Ford was also coming under diplomatic pressure from Pakistan. After the 
CENTO meeting, Bhutto wrote a series of letters to Ford that re-emphasised the points made 
by his Minister and continued to position India as a pawn of Soviet expansionism.147 Ford 
and Kissinger attempted to calm the slightly histrionic nature of Bhutto’s missives by 
pointing out that the United States did indeed have the best interests of Pakistan at heart, 
pointing to the lifting of the arms embargo and the considerable amount of food aid as 
signifiers of this.148  
The various parties discussed arms sales in September during a meeting between 
Kissinger and Ahmed in New York. Uppermost in Ahmed’s thoughts were the purchase of 
advanced A-7 attack aircraft. Kissinger was reticent about the sales of such long-ranged, 
offensive weapons, despite the fact that they were obviously core to Pakistani demands.149 In 
his briefing for a meeting with Ahmed on October 9, Ford was informed by Kissinger that 
interest in the A-7 should be discouraged and the emphasis placed on defensive armaments. 
While recognising legitimate Pakistani security concerns, Kissinger had also assessed that 
the bluster about an imminent, Soviet-backed, Indian attack was a fiction created for the 
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purpose of leveraging more and faster American arms sales.150 In all of these high-level 
discussions, not once was the Pakistani nuclear programme raised, despite the fact that in the 
final months of 1975 Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions became a subject of greater concern for 
the State Department.151  
 Two CIA reports highlighted the significance of Pakistan’s nuclear development and 
raised doubts over the capacity for arms sales to change the Pakistani course. In a follow-up 
to August 1974’s Special National Intelligence Estimate 4-1-74, the CIA suggested that 
lifting the embargo “may have reduced Pakistan’s motivation to develop nuclear weapons, 
but we believe it did not remove it. On balance, we conclude that the Pakistanis still intend 
to try to acquire a nuclear capability.”152 Assuming a quick conclusion to Franco-Pakistani 
wrangling regarding safeguards for the reprocessing plant, it was estimated that Pakistan 
could produce a crude nuclear device as early as 1978. Significantly for what was to come 
with the Pakistani programme, the report gave little attention to uranium enrichment as a 
route to the bomb. Its focus was almost exclusively on plutonium—the product of 
reprocessing—as the means by which Pakistan would gain nuclear capability. Pakistan also 
frequently cropped up in a generally gloomy assessment of the proliferation picture 
‘Managing Nuclear Proliferation: The Politics of Limited Choice.’ This report suggested that 
there was “no hope of preventing proliferation” and that proliferation was very much a 
political phenomenon “strongly influenced by the growing atmosphere of confrontation 
between the developed and less-developed countries.” The CIA argued that the barrier 
between civilian and military nuclear power that had existed before the Indian test had been 
well and truly smashed. Coupled with the desire of nuclear supplier states to make money 
from selling advanced technology to the developing world, this made proliferation more 
likely and more dangerous. The United States’ and Britain’s muted reaction to the Indian test 
had demonstrated the limited political costs of setting off a nuclear explosion.153 
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Furthermore, a new threat had raised its head: that of nuclear terrorism, the “most 
puzzling and extreme aspect of the potential diversification of nuclear actors.” The possible 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-state actors was, argued the CIA, intimately 
connected to developing world proliferation: “The same increasing availability of nuclear 
materials and technology which has made nuclear explosives accessible to developing states 
can also be expected sooner or later to bring them within reach of terrorist groups.”154 Such 
prognostications were not the sole domain of the CIA. The fear of non-state actors gaining 
access of nuclear materials had been on the rise since the early 1970s and would—in part—
serve to provoke the flurry of Congressional non-proliferation legislation in 1976 and 
beyond. Taken together, these reports presented a downbeat picture. The barriers against 
proliferation were perceived as crumbling and in the case of Pakistan, there were obvious 
signs that nuclear weapons capability was high on the national agenda. They also 
demonstrated an institutional blind spot when it came to uranium enrichment as a means to 
gain nuclear weapons capability. This blind spot was not confined to the intelligence 
community. It would plague many functions of government, inhibiting strategies dedicated 
towards stopping the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. 
Such gloomy reporting was part of a trend in proliferation analysis that had existed 
since the earliest days of the atomic age. Ever since the 1950s, the CIA in particular had 
been pessimistic about the about the spread of nuclear weapons.155 As John Mueller has 
pointed out, the pace of proliferation was much, much slower than even the most optimistic 
forecasts of the intelligence community, governments, and think tanks.156 Moeed Yusuf 
makes the valid point that, as—with the cases of India and Pakistan—the “shift from 
developed-world proliferation to developing-world proliferation was accompanied by greater 
alarm regarding the impact of proliferation. It was felt that developing countries were more 
dangerous and irresponsible nuclear states than developed countries.”157 
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 Throughout 1975, American policy had done little—if anything—to prevent 
Pakistan from moving towards nuclear weapons. The lack of interest in the issue shown by 
Ford and Kissinger allowed the Pakistani government to continue their negotiations with 
France and the FRG with little interruption or criticism. This laissez-faire attitude led to the 
gloomy prognostications of December 1975. 
 
Conclusion 
In spite of the dramatic events of May 1974, Britain and America did little to persuade 
Pakistan not to follow its neighbour down the nuclear path. Lack of US and UK criticism of 
India after the nuclear test, Washington’s continued support of the Indian civilian nuclear 
programme, and London’s willingness to sell New Delhi advanced aircraft implied that the 
political ramifications of becoming a member of the ‘nuclear club’ were slight. Faced with 
economic turbulence at home and aware of —but de-prioritising—proliferation 
considerations, Britain still pressed ahead with efforts to sell what were seen as nuclear-
capable strike aircraft to the nation that had pushed Pakistan towards the nuclear option. In 
choosing to pursue the sale of Jaguar, the Wilson government took a compartmentalised 
view of the arms sales and nuclear issues, unwilling to acknowledge the serious impediment 
to non-proliferation created by the Jaguar deal. Ford and Kissinger’s acquiescence to 
Pakistani demands for arms—while gaining nothing in return—demonstrated their belief that 
assuaging regional security concerns through concrete measures such as weapons sales 
would halt South Asian proliferation, despite all the signs that Pakistan was actively 
pursuing a weapons programme. Furthermore, there was little—if any—consideration of the 
deep-seated political and territorial issues that were driving South Asian proliferation. The 
years 1974 and 1975 laid the foundations for the future. In 1976, Washington and London 
fully woke up to the threat of the Pakistani nuclear project. Ford took the issue far more 
seriously when pushed towards an anti-proliferation stance by Congress, public opinion, and 
his presidential rival Jimmy Carter. In London, there were the first inklings that the 
reprocessing plant was not the only way the Pakistanis were trying to get the bomb; that 
there might be a second, more secretive strand to their efforts. 
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Chapter 2: “An End to the First ‘Easy’ Phase” 
January 1976 to January 1977 
 
On April 7, 1976 Henry Byroade, the American ambassador to Pakistan, sent a telegram to 
Henry Kissinger that encapsulated the veteran diplomat’s thoughts about US engagement 
with the Pakistani nuclear problem. Byroade—overcoming a stated reluctance to comment 
on State Department non-proliferation policy—characterised nuclear matters as central to the 
American-Pakistani relationship in the wake of Bhutto’s very public deal to purchase a 
nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France. Most tellingly, the ambassador saw “an end to 
the first ‘easy’ phase of the exercise to lead Pakistan away from the nuclear option path.”1 
Byroade’s comments were both telling and prescient. From his vantage point in Islamabad, 
the ambassador saw that attempts to stop the putative Pakistani nuclear weapons programme 
were only going to become more difficult as the decade progressed. 
  In 1976, the Ford administration radically changed and reassessed its attitude 
towards non-proliferation. The years 1974 and 1975 had been a time of laxity on the non-
proliferation front, with a stark absence of a critical response to the Indian test, Pakistan 
rewarded with a lifting of the US arms embargo despite offering no assurances about nuclear 
intentions, and gloomy prognostications about the prospects for further proliferation. For 
Ford and Kissinger, arms sales to Pakistan were a means of bribing or coercing the 
Pakistanis into abandoning their nuclear aspirations. By 1976 the Ford administration—
realising that Pakistan was stubbornly determined to pursue the nuclear option, pressured by 
Congressional action on proliferation, and influenced by Jimmy Carter’s foregrounding of 
the issue during the presidential election campaign—engaged more directly with the 
proliferation problem. On the other side of the Atlantic, Britain rejected the opportunity to 
profit from the Franco-Pakistani reprocessing plant deal. More significantly for the future of 
British and American engagement with the Pakistani programme, evidence emerged that 
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clandestine Pakistani purchasing networks were feeding into a secret uranium enrichment 
programme.  
 The period from March 1976, when Pakistan and France finally sealed the 
reprocessing plant deal, to January 1977, when Carter assumed the presidency, represents a 
crossroads for non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan. Not only did it represent a bridge 
between the laxity of the Nixon and early Ford years and the non-proliferation determination 
of the Carter years, it was, as ambassador Byroade had succinctly stated, the end of the easy 
phase and a transition to the harder, more bitterly fought times to come. 
 
The Reprocessing Plant 
Henry Kissinger met with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in New York on February 26. However, the 
Secretary of State cut a diminished figure in foreign policy circles in 1976.2 Kissinger 
retained power and influence though, and high on the agenda for his meeting was the 
Pakistani acquisition of a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. The Pakistani-French 
negotiations had been in progress for some time but—as highlighted in Chapter One—there 
had been little in the way of US criticism. Kissinger now attempted to dissuade Bhutto from 
going further along the nuclear path.3 Influenced by intelligence reporting and pushed by 
Congress, the State Department and National Security Council (NSC) had concluded that 
Pakistan might genuinely be aiming for nuclear weapons capability, with dire consequences 
for South Asia. During 1975 and 1976, the United States managed to persuade its allies 
South Korea and Taiwan not to press ahead with their respective nuclear projects. Both of 
these states were dependent on the USA for their security in the face of communist 
‘aggressors,’ giving America considerable leverage.4 In the case of Pakistan—far less of a 
‘client state’ than either South Korea or Taiwan—the US government had considerably less 
leverage and negotiations correspondingly promised to be a lot more difficult. 
 Prior to Kissinger’s meeting with Bhutto, a State Department memo outlined 
concerns about the reprocessing plant. “The reprocessing plant is particularly disturbing,” 
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the memo’s author, Bureau of European Affairs staffer David H. Swartz,!stated, “since there 
can be no present (or, probably, future) economic justification for such a capability.” Swartz 
noted that even if Pakistan acquired many more reactors that could be fuelled by the 
reprocessing facility, it was still not economically viable.5 The inference was, therefore, that 
the only possible reason for the plant was to provide plutonium for nuclear weapons. Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco expressed these concerns to the 
Pakistanis in a meeting with Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, Pakistani ambassador to the United 
States. Sisco had already made these points to Kissinger, reflecting on the need to talk with 
the Pakistanis and the French, and noting that intransigence over the nuclear issue could 
jeopardise the entire US-Pakistani relationship.6 Sisco spoke to Yaqub-Khan about the 
reprocessing plant purchase and the potential deal with the FRG for a heavy water plant. 
Although the US had welcomed Bhutto’s 1975 assurances that Pakistan was not pursuing a 
nuclear weapons programme, the Under Secretary noted mounting concern in America—and 
worldwide—over the spread of reprocessing facilities and their impact on proliferation.7 
Sisco did not intend these comments to cast aspersions on the assurances given by Bhutto, 
but the Under Secretary could see little economic reason for the purchasing of reprocessing 
and heavy water plants. Congressional pressure over the issue, Sisco added, could very well 
complicate bilateral arrangements—such as arms sales—between the US and Pakistan. 
Yaqub-Khan stuck to Islamabad’s official line that, although there was no immediate need 
for the facilities, future power and development requirements necessitated nuclear 
expansion.8 
 In Kissinger’s February 26 meeting with the Pakistani Prime Minister, the Secretary 
of State re-emphasised to Bhutto the points made by his subordinates about the danger of 
national reprocessing facilities and held out the prospect of enhanced arms supplies in 
exchange for Pakistani acquiescence to American non-proliferation demands. Bhutto 
reiterated the centrality of his request for the modern, long-range A-7 attack aircraft and—as 
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was the case with the Ford-Kissinger-Ahmed meetings of late 1975—Kissinger demurred, 
unwilling to sponsor a high technology arms race on the sub-continent. The Secretary of 
State was sympathetic to the Prime Minister’s appeal, but asserted that a combination of 
election year attacks on Ford’s foreign policy from within the Republican Party, 
Congressional disquiet over lifting the arms embargo, and concerns that the reprocessing 
plant might constitute part of a bomb programme militated against a more forthcoming 
response. Sisco commented that the Ford administration was moving as fast as it could, 
“consistent with what Congressional and public opinion will bear.”9 Once again, Bhutto 
argued that, if given strong enough conventional defences, Pakistan would not have to go 
down the nuclear route.10 Kissinger, Ford, and their subordinates found themselves caught in 
a situation not unlike that of Captain John Yossarian in Joseph Heller’s Catch-22. In order to 
try to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear, conventional arms sales would be used to 
enhance Pakistani security and demonstrate US commitment. However, that drive for 
nuclear capability meant that Congress was reluctant to allow the very arms sales that would 
allegedly ameliorate the sense of insecurity at the heart of the Pakistani quest for the bomb. 
There were also moves to utilise the trilateral relationship between the United States, 
Pakistan, and Iran—an NPT signatory—to persuade Islamabad to agree to a joint Iranian-
Pakistani regional reprocessing plant that would bring the resultant plutonium under rigorous 
safeguards.11 Although this eventually came to naught, early 1976 saw some false hopes 
engendered by the over-enthusiastic Aziz Ahmed that such a solution—where two issues 
could be dealt with at once—might be workable.12 Finally, Kissinger brought diplomatic 
pressure to bear on France and the FRG, with mixed results. The West Germans—already 
under serious pressure from the US over their nuclear deal with Brazil—were happy to adopt 
a ‘wait and see’ attitude towards the heavy water plant’s sale. The French were far more 
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intransigent and in his response to Kissinger, French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues 
made it abundantly clear that there was no going back.13 
 These early days of engagement with the reprocessing plant issue made it plain that 
the United States possessed little leverage where it really mattered. The hope that 
conventional arms shipments would shift Pakistan away from the nuclear path proved ill 
founded. Despite Bhutto’s claims to the contrary, the Pakistanis themselves were unwilling 
to set aside their nuclear ambitions.14 Additionally, the internal costs—in terms of intra-
governmental friction, Congressional resistance to changes in arms supply policies, and 
election year public opinion—appeared to be substantial. France was also resisting pressure 
to cancel the reprocessing plant contract, but at the same time quietly offering the Pakistanis 
various options on the facility that Paris hoped would ensure it was only used for peaceful 
purposes. Islamabad refused, believing that the French were only acting under intense 
pressure from the United States.15 From the American point of view, though, it seemed that 
there was little that could be done to persuade a nation that had been happy to sell nuclear 
technology to apartheid South Africa not to sell equipment to Pakistan. 
Domestically, Henry Kissinger found Congress to be one of the most important 
factors inhibiting his freedom of action on Pakistan. Kissinger also used Congress as a 
means to shift the blame for a lack of aid to Pakistan away from the administration. As the 
Secretary noted to Bhutto, “It is important that we manage affairs so that Congress does not 
pass resolutions on arms sales which would inhibit us from doing the things we want to do.” 
Kissinger’s pungent turn of phrase and opinionated manner came to the fore: ”One of our 
problems,” he suggested, “is that we have some maniacs in Congress. They are violent anti-
communists but at the same time reluctant to give arms to friends.”16 The President was also 
in a difficult position due to the on-going Republican presidential primaries. With Ford 
facing a challenge for the Republican presidential candidacy from Ronald Reagan, taking a 
firm stand against Congress—and thus potentially alienating key allies—was impossible 
until Ford was sure of his nomination. The primaries had become increasingly bitter during 
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1976, with Reagan attacking the Presidency over Ford’s perceived weakness on foreign 
policy and stating that if he became president, Kissinger would be “sent packing.”17 Thus, 
the domestic context of an increasingly anti-proliferationist Congress coupled to a bitter 
election campaign significantly influenced wider non-proliferation policy. 
It had been the domestic and foreign events of 1974 and 1975 that had provoked 
Congress into dramatic action on non-proliferation. Numerous colliding factors triggered this 
flurry of legislation. The Indian nuclear test, a growing awareness of the dangers posed by 
the spread of reprocessing plants, and the realisation that civilian nuclear programmes could 
be turned to military purposes were three key reasons. The perceived laxity of domestic 
nuclear security and rising concerns about the potential for nuclear terrorism also prompted 
Congressional concern.18 As Michael J. Brenner notes, “Congressional discovery that 
proliferation might be an imminent danger, and one encouraged by a less-than-vigilant U.S. 
government, prompted activists in both houses to make a lunge for the tail of the horse they 
visualized cantering out the open stable door. The action was frenetic, heroic in intention, 
and not always well-aimed, and it often sent the rescuers tripping over one another’s feet.”19 
Wrangling over non-proliferation between the legislature and the executive truly began in 
1975 with the Export Reorganization Bill’s introduction. Drafted by Senators Charles Percy 
(R-IL), Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT), and John Glenn (D-OH), the bill had a tortuous 
legislative history and would—after numerous alterations—finally be passed into law in 
1978. The crucial questions that the bill posed—who had authority to make determinations 
over nuclear exports and what standards should govern those decisions—lay at the heart of 
Congressional interest in the proliferation problem and challenged the role of the executive 
branch in making foreign policy in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.20 Ribicoff was a vocal 
critic of existing proliferation policy and the decision by so-called US allies to sell sensitive 
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technology. Reflecting on the situation, Ribicoff characterised the French and German sales 
as a “direct threat to world peace.”21 
The Congressional measures that ultimately affected the US-Pakistani relationship 
most significantly were the Symington Amendment to the International Security Assistance 
Act and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and its sibling, the Glenn Amendment, both 
influenced by the Franco-Pakistani deal. The June 1976 Symington Amendment banned US 
economic and military assistance to countries that delivered, received or acquired nuclear 
enrichment technology outside of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
regulations.22 The Glenn Amendment—passed in 1977—was a companion piece, covering 
reprocessing.23 The full impact of these measures— exactly the type of legislation that would 
“inhibit us from doing the things we want to do”—were not felt until well after Ford and 
Kissinger had departed, but they demonstrated that American lawmakers now fully 
appreciated the blurred line between civilian and military nuclear power illustrated by the 
Indian test of 1974. 
Regarding the commercial arrangement that was influencing action taken by 
Congress, French and Pakistani officials finally signed off on the reprocessing plant deal at a 
meeting in Paris on March 17. Efforts at dissuading Bhutto had, rather obviously, been 
unsuccessful. Gerald Ford attempted to directly address this major proliferation issue with a 
letter to the Pakistani Prime Minister. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft had 
advised Ford that Bhutto had rebuffed Kissinger’s overtures in February and argued that 
Pakistan was pursuing the nuclear weapons option.24 Prompted by Kissinger, Ford attempted 
to use the example of South Korea as a point of leverage with Bhutto and dwelt upon 
perception, rather than reality. “My concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your 
Government,” he wrote, “It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear facilities under 
national control inevitably gives rise to perceptions in many quarters that, under 
circumstances which perhaps cannot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful uses may be 
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contemplated.”25 Despite the President’s entreaties, Bhutto refused to postpone or cancel any 
aspects of the nuclear programme. The Prime Minister’s response, received by Kissinger in 
mid-April, was to repeat his previous assurances that nuclear facilities were for peaceful 
purposes only and to emphasise the stringent IAEA safeguards that applied to the facilities.26 
Turning to the necessity for the reprocessing plant, Bhutto played on Western fears about 
energy security in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis by reminding Ford that Pakistan was poor 
in terms of indigenous resources and could barely afford to keep up with the vast increases in 
oil prices that had been a global problem since 1973. Concluding, he attempted to reassure 
the President by mentioning his discussions with the Shah of Iran on regional reprocessing, 
but could not resist pointing out the fact that India had exploded a nuclear device and 
received little diplomatic criticism.27 The lack of a stern response to the Indian test was 
coming back to haunt the US government in the form of Pakistani recalcitrance and 
Congressional determination. 
One month later, Byroade submitted his ‘easy phase’ report to Kissinger. The 
ambassador saw the US as unable to shift Bhutto from his present course. Persistent US 
pressure, especially of a negative sort, could potentially do more harm than good to US-
Pakistani relations. Byroade argued that bribery through conventional arms sales was 
pointless and it would take more than a “couple of squadrons of A-7s” to buy Bhutto off.28 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Roy Atherton described the 
Byroade telegram as “thoughtful.”29 Despite this thoughtfulness, Byroade never received a 
response from Kissinger as Bhutto’s letter to Ford and the Prime Minister’s hints to the 
media about a Pakistani nuclear weapons programme usurped the ambassador’s missive.30 
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Byroade was reduced months later to plaintively enquiring if his “very important message” 
ever reached Kissinger.31 
 
The Regional Dimension and Internal Dissent 
The prospects for a regional reprocessing plant involving Iran and Pakistan, which had been 
raised in the early part of 1976, formed part of the continuing diplomatic efforts to persuade 
Pakistan not to develop a national reprocessing facility. Ford administration hopes that 
Bhutto could be brought round steadily diminished, despite the ‘carrot’ of arms supply—in 
particular the advanced A-7—being held out to the Pakistani Prime Minister. Within the US 
government, the Pakistani issue led to friction between Kissinger and his subordinates, 
especially the ACDA, who were vehemently opposed to any concessions to Pakistan while 
the reprocessing plant issue remained unresolved. 
 The suggestion that the Shah could be co-opted as a partner in preventing Pakistan 
from acquiring its own reprocessing plant was taken extremely seriously at the top level. The 
Iranian Atomic Energy Agency chief, Dr. Akbar Etemad, had visited the United States in 
April and confided to his hosts his suspicions over Pakistani nuclear intentions. Etemad 
noted that while the Shah was against a joint plant located in Pakistan (due to his personal 
suspicions about a Pakistani bomb programme and his desire not to associate Iran with such 
a venture), the Iranian ruler was willing to at least discuss some form of plant based in his 
country.32 
Kissinger, however, was suspicious of, and doubtful about, the idea of a regional 
reprocessing centre. Not only did he repeatedly argue that the Pakistanis and Iranians could 
collude to divert nuclear material from a co-operated plant no matter where the plant was 
located, he characterised the entire endeavour as a “fraud.”33 Kissinger claimed to find the 
entire idea baffling, stating, “We are the only country which is fanatical and unrealistic 
enough to do things which are contrary to our national interests. The Europeans are not so 
illogical. If you go around the world, where can you find a region where the multinational 
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concept would apply?”34 The situation was made all the more urgent because Congress had 
approved the Symington Amendment only the day before. Kissinger thought that it was “a 
bit rough” to expect Pakistan to adhere to the Amendment’s requirements when India was 
expected to do no such thing, despite having already tested a nuclear device. Atherton added 
another factor to the discussion by noting that recent intelligence reports suggested that 
Libya had agreed to partially finance Pakistan’s reprocessing plant in exchange for some 
unspecified future nuclear cooperation.35 This in itself was a fearful prospect due to the 
blustering pan-Arabism and anti-Americanism of Muammar al-Gaddafi.36 Persuaded by the 
need to avoid having the new Symington Amendment damage US-Pakistani relations and 
despite his doubts about the wisdom of the regional option, Kissinger approved the sending 
of a telegram to the US ambassador in Tehran, former CIA director Richard Helms.37 
 Kissinger instructed Helms to gain an audience with the Shah and press the case for 
a regional reprocessing venture, given that the Pakistani arguments for purchasing a 
reprocessing plant were simply not convincing. Kissinger also opined that the Symington 
Amendment’s passage might well affect close cooperation between Pakistan and the United 
States in non-nuclear areas such as arms supply.38 Helms reacted quickly, speaking with the 
Shah on May 15. The Iranian ruler agreed with the assessment that there was no economic 
justification for the Pakistani plant, even going so far as to state that the French had told him 
so when he recently visited Paris. The Shah mildly disparaged US efforts with Pakistan so 
far, “You give them a few TOW missiles and odds and ends of defensive weapons but no A-
7 aircraft which they badly need. Pakistan has no air force. Do they really care if your 
Congress gets mad at them? Suppose I do put pressure on Bhutto. What will he say? It seems 
clear that he is determined to obtain a reprocessing facility.”39 Regarding the regional 
reprocessing option, the Shah was more in favour of an Iranian-based multinational plant 
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than a purely Pakistani-Iranian one. Nevertheless, there was an element of self-interest. As 
Helms stated, “The successful outcome of the current negotiations between USG [United 
States Government] and GOI [Government of Iran] on arrangements to build American 
nuclear power plants in Iran would seem to be a sine qua non if we expect any useful 
assistance from the Shah in dissuading Pakistan from its drive to obtain reprocessing 
facilities.”40 
 Henry Byroade, despite his confusion over whether or not his message on the 
Pakistani nuclear situation ever reached Kissinger, was instructed by the Secretary of State to 
make Bhutto aware of discussions with the Shah.41 In his discussions with the Prime 
Minister where he “played the role of personal friend,” Byroade correctly surmised that there 
was no way to force Bhutto to publicly renounce the reprocessing plant.42 The plant—and by 
extension Pakistan’s wider nuclear programme (both in its civilian and in its undeclared 
military guises)—had become a crucial part of political and public debate in Pakistan. For 
Bhutto especially, the entire programme was deeply connected to the morale and confidence 
of the Pakistani people, factors that were especially important to him in the run-up to 
national elections.43 Byroade's aim was to stress the increasing pressure from Congress and 
other domestic interests and to emphasise that the Symington Amendment was symptomatic 
of significant changes in Congressional attitudes towards proliferation.44 Responding to 
Bhutto’s questioning, the ambassador expressed fears that the nuclear issue may well affect 
the entire bilateral relationship. Bhutto was aggrieved at the American stance, suggesting 
once more that India had suffered little from its nuclear test and that Pakistan was being 
discriminated against. Byroade suggested that the increased emphasis on Pakistan was as a 
direct result of the Indian test and that, given the region’s troubled history, it was only to be 
expected. Why, Bhutto asked, had the US not raised the reprocessing plant issue before 
1976? To back down now would be a political disaster for him. Byroade was in agreement 
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with Bhutto on this and made his feelings known to Kissinger in the strongest possible 
terms.45 
 The response to the Byroade-Bhutto dialogue was a return telegram that stressed that 
the United States was not discriminating against Pakistan or attempting to retard its 
development. Kissinger couched his remarks in terms of the global non-proliferation 
situation, a stark change from his attitude in May 1974. Pakistani acquisition of “sensitive 
facilities” could harm the good relationship between the United States and Pakistan, mainly 
because of the intense Congressional and public pressure on the administration. While the 
reprocessing plant was still on the table it would, Kissinger argued, be impossible to consider 
arms exports.46  
  
While the Iranian connection was being explored, the administration continued its attempts 
to use arms sales to coerce Bhutto into abandoning the French deal. Internal divisions—
particularly between Kissinger and the ACDA—and Pakistani demands for advanced 
weapons made this a fraught process. Nominally, the ACDA was tasked with formulating 
and advocating for arms control and non-proliferation policies. During the Kissinger years, 
the agency was effectively sidelined and bypassed due to the centralisation of responsibility 
for foreign policy in the offices of the President and National Security Adviser.47 On April 7, 
the ACDA demanded a halt to all decisions concerning arms transfers—from two Gearing 
class naval destroyers to anti-tank missiles—to Pakistan until the reprocessing and heavy 
water plant situations were resolved. “Such acquisitions [the reprocessing and heavy water 
plants] would clearly contribute to nuclear proliferation,” stated William L. Stearman, “a 
matter of major arms control concern.”48 The May 13 State Department reaction to ACDA 
demands was one of barely contained fury. Kissinger and the State Department saw the 
agency as attempting to impose its desired outcomes onto the executive and State 
Department. George Vest (Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs) characterised 
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the ACDA refusal to authorise arms transfers to Pakistan as “usurping the function of the 
Secretary of State to determine U.S. foreign policy.” Furthermore, the “ACDA’s arbitrary 
intervention in this matter can only complicate our diplomatic efforts to bring about in an 
orderly manner the result which we all wish to achieve, i.e., the cancellation of the Pakistani 
reprocessing plant.”49 Matters reached the stage where senior NSC staffer Robert Oakley 
urged Scowcroft to contact Iklé and suggest that the destroyer sale would be passed to 
Congress over the ACDA’s objections with the hope that the Director respected the 
administration’s decision.50 
By coincidence, presumptive Democratic Party presidential candidate Jimmy Carter 
laid out his non-proliferation platform on the same day that George Vest criticised the 
ACDA. The candidate-in-waiting argued that nuclear energy posed a dual threat to the 
world, through hazardous waste and the spread of weapons technology, dramatically 
referring to reprocessing plants as “bomb factories.”51 Carter called for an immediate, 
worldwide moratorium on the purchase and sale of reprocessing and uranium enrichment 
plants, even going so far as to suggest the under-construction US reprocessing plant at 
Barnwell, North Carolina become the first multinational facility under the auspices of the 
IAEA.52 Carter made a tough stance on proliferation a plank of his presidential campaign.53 
The triple threat of Congressional pressure, Carter’s campaigning, and public 
opinion forced the Ford administration to conduct a hurried—but considered—study that 
became known as the Fri Report, after the study leader, the ERDA Deputy Administrator 
Robert W. Fri. Carter’s pronouncements certainly encouraged the review, but as Michael 
Brenner argues, the Ford administration “did not need a political fire set under it to feel the 
need for a strategic rethinking of proliferation policy.”54 As well as Carter’s foregrounding 
of the issue, the report reacted to an already combative Congress where “the atmosphere on 
the Hill is still punitive as regards nuclear export policy and there is suspicion of the 
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administration’s dedication to nuclear non-proliferation.” It also related to a broader public 
perception that the President and his administration were weak on proliferation issues, a 
perception that was leading many states of the union to enact prohibitive nuclear 
legislation.55 Numerous bills and draft acts were flying around Capitol Hill long before 
Carter took the stage, many of which the State Department and ERDA thought diminished, 
rather than strengthened, the United States’ position as a non-proliferation actor. A proposed 
amendment to the ERDA Authorization Bill that required Congressional review of nuclear 
exports to non-NPT states was a stark example of this. According to the State Department 
and ERDA, success in non-proliferation stemmed from global perceptions of the United 
States as a stable and reliable nuclear supply partner. Only by maintaining such a position—
and thus discouraging potential purchasers from looking to other supplier states such as 
France and the FRG—could the US maintain its influence in the nuclear and non-
proliferation fields.56  
ERDA Director Robert C. Seamans pushed Ford for a major review, arguing, “I 
believe there is an opportunity and a need for the United States to take a major initiative to 
resolve uncertainties that now exist in the nuclear fuel cycle and to reduce the risk of 
international proliferation of special nuclear materials.”57 Not only was the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons an issue, but the spectre of terrorists gaining access to plutonium through 
diversion from national reprocessing plants in the developing world—a point raised by the 
CIA in the ‘Politics of Limited Choice’ paper at the end of 1975—appeared on the scene. In 
conclusion, Seamans urged the president to take the initiative and permit the formulation of a 
new non-proliferation policy.58 All of this input contributed to Ford’s decision—encouraged 
by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft—to authorise a major, inter-agency study that 
the administration hoped would take the initiative, domestic and foreign, back from Ford’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Evening Report (Scientific Affairs), ‘Possible Presidential Message on Non-Proliferation and U.S. Nuclear 
Export Policy,’ June 17, 1976, GRFPL, NSAF, Situation Room, Evening Reports from the NSC Staff: June 
1976–January 1977, Box 1, June 17, 1976; Scowcroft and Cannon to Ford, ‘Possible Presidential Statement and 
New U.S. Initiatives to Reduce Proliferation Due to Commercial Nuclear Power Activities,’ June 22, 1976, 
GRFPL, James M. Cannon Files, 1975-1977, Box 24, Nuclear Policy Statement June–July 1976. 
56 ‘Proposed Amendment to the ERDA Authorization Bill Requiring Congressional Review of Nuclear Exports to 
States Not Party to the NPT,’ May 25, 1976, GRFPL, Glenn R. Schleede Files, Box 27, Nuclear Policy, 1976: 
Exports, January-May, 1-2. 
57 Seamans to Ford, Letter, June 9, 1976, GRFPL, Philip W. Buchen Files, 1974-1977, Box 35, Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (2), 1. 
58 Ibid, 3-4. 
! 65!
political opponents in Congress and the Presidential race.59 Therefore, it was a combination 
of Congressional pressure, public opinion, and the exigencies of a Presidential election 
campaign that in concert drove the Ford administration towards a re-assessment of its non-
proliferation policy. 
In the midst of all of this debate over a new initiative to combat proliferation, 
Kissinger’s anger with the obstacles that his subordinates were erecting against arms 
transfers to Pakistan came to a head on July 9 when he gave a furious dressing-down to 
Alfred Atherton and Fred Iklé. After expressing increasing disillusionment with the proposed 
Pakistan-Iran reprocessing plant, Kissinger said that he had “some sympathy for Bhutto in 
this. We are doing nothing to help him on conventional arms, we are going ahead and selling 
nuclear fuel to India even after they exploded a bomb and then for this little project, we are 
coming down on him like a ton of bricks.”60 Iklé argued that there were significant 
differences between the Indian and Pakistani nuclear projects. India had an extensive nuclear 
power network for which a reprocessing plant made sense. In the case of Pakistan, it made 
neither economic nor logical sense to purchase a reprocessing plant at this stage of its 
nuclear development.61 Regarding engaging in discussions with the Pakistanis over the 
economic and technical details surrounding the plant, Kissinger argued that Bhutto knew the 
technological details and knew what he wanted, to which Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs Philip Habib responded, “That’s right. And what he wants is to build a 
bomb.” Once again, Kissinger’s fatalistic opinion of the potential for, and risks of, nuclear 
proliferation rose to the surface: the Secretary of State had sympathy for the Pakistani leader; 
“If you were in his place, you would do the same thing.”62  
It was on arms sales that Kissinger launched into his most vitriolic attack on the 
State Department and the ACDA. Reflecting on his discussion with the Yaqub-Khan, he 
commented that the way in which arms sales to a valued ally were being held up was 
“indecent.” Iklé attempted to justify his position with reference to the Symington 
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Amendment, but Kissinger refused to agree: while A-7s were not the totality of what should 
be offered, they must be included in the package, as it was perfectly possible that the 
Pakistanis could go to Britain or France to buy equivalent machinery. Similar to Kissinger’s 
reaction to the Indian test, non-proliferation was not the only objective in this case. His main 
concern was regional political stability. The Secretary did not want the US to be party to 
creating an imbalance of power that dramatically favoured India, a nation whose leader he 
harboured an intense dislike for. In the end, Kissinger concluded that Franco-American—as 
well as Pakistani-American—relations would need to be considered. “We have to find a 
package which is conceivably acceptable to France, such as substituting a reactor sale for the 
reprocessing plant.” he stated, “If we give Bhutto A-7's in return for giving up the 
reprocessing plant, there would be unshirted hell to pay in France. If we can get them to 
switch a reactor for reprocessing, this could be completed with an overall agreement like that 
between the FRG and Iran.”63 
 The NSC contended that Kissinger was giving mixed messages about proliferation. 
The NSC staff pointed out that the Secretary had approved a deal whereby the FRG and Iran 
would jointly operate a reprocessing plant constructed after a certain number of reactors 
were in operation. Writing to Scowcroft, NSC staffers David Elliot and Robert Oakley 
wondered if there was there an opportunity to persuade France and Pakistan to accede to a 
similar deal? To “sweeten the deal,” Elliot and Oakley suggested Kissinger could offer the 
sought-after A-7s to Bhutto in order to gain his agreement.64 The NSC staffers concluded: 
 
It is not clear that this new approach will offer the French and the Paks enough of a 
carrot (i.e., USG agreement to facilitate early reactor sales, withdraw our objection to 
eventual reprocessing along the lines of the FRG/Iran agreement, and A- 7 s) or a stick 
(i.e., withhold approval for the A- 7, though continuing with other military equipment) 
to modify their present agreement on an early reprocessing facility. Pakistan clearly 
wants to have, in the near term, a nuclear capability comparable to that of India, 
including the possibility of making a nuclear explosive device.65 
 
The fact that Kissinger was broadly against an Iranian-Pakistani joint reprocessing plant but 
in favour of a German-Iranian facility speaks of the existence of the Secretary of State’s 
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known attitudes about the developing world. Developing world nations were susceptible to 
unstable regimes and too likely—according to that vision—to cheat, lie and divert to make 
inter-state nuclear cooperation a viable option. 
 
Kissinger in Pakistan, a Presidential announcement, and the End of the Line 
Under Congressional and Democratic party pressure to show that the administration was 
doing something to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear, Kissinger flew to Lahore in August 
to personally attempt to persuade Bhutto to abandon the reprocessing plant, carrying with 
him a package of pressures and inducements.66 Byroade briefed the Secretary of State before 
his arrival, noting that the Prime Minister was in something of a troubled mood. Any effort 
at further persuasion on the reprocessing plant front would, the ambassador suggested, come 
up against Bhutto’s personal involvement in the deal. Not only did Bhutto believe that his 
handshake with French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing constituted a binding agreement 
between two statesmen, but that there was no way he could admit to his people that he had 
made a mistake. The only way out was to get a package that could be positioned as an 
alternative, but still highly beneficial, deal for Pakistan.67 The strategy that Kissinger took 
with him to Pakistan was, as Dennis Kux points out, a combination of ‘carrots and sticks.’ 
Kissinger planned to offer the long-awaited A-7s as the carrot, and the stick was the 
suggestion that if Jimmy Carter won the upcoming election, the incoming president might 
well decide to make an example of Pakistan.68 
Kissinger and Bhutto met privately on August 9 to discuss the nuclear issue. 
According to Kissinger aide Robert Oakley, the Secretary informed Bhutto he ran the risk of 
suffering far harsher treatment at the hands of Carter than if he agreed with the Ford 
administration proposals.69 Bhutto refused to back down, but in the coming months his 
diplomatic representatives strove to get Kissinger and Ford to adopt a compartmentalised 
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approach, de-linking the A-7s from the nuclear issue.70  Indeed, subsequent diplomatic 
contacts in Washington emphasised the deep-seated commitment to the reprocessing plant in 
Pakistan. “Once the agreement [with France] had been signed, however,” stated ambassador 
Yaqub-Khan, “the GOP [Government of Pakistan] was locked in not only with France, but 
with third world public opinion.”71 Kissinger gave a press conference at Lahore airport 
before his departure from Pakistan where he reflected on his discussions with Bhutto. In the 
manner of such events, the Secretary said as little as possible. Proliferation was not a 
Pakistan-focused issue, but a global issue, there was no dichotomy in the treatment of India 
and Pakistan, and the US was not blackmailing Pakistan regarding arms sales.72 The press 
reported that Kissinger seemed unconvinced by Pakistani claims that they were buying the 
reprocessing plant with peaceful intent, but he later explained his visit as an attempt to 
inform the Pakistanis about the Symington Amendment’s implications.73 While Kissinger 
was on his way back to the United States, Scowcroft approved the sale of a range of military 
equipment such as armoured personnel carriers, missiles, and small arms—but not the A-
7s—to Pakistan.74 And when Kissinger finally arrived back in Washington, he expressed his 
regret to Ford over his demands on Bhutto but was cognisant of the good it would do for 
Ford’s public standing on the non-proliferation issue: “I had to take Bhutto on on the non-
proliferation issue. It was too bad to do that to him, but if we didn’t take a stand, it would get 
out of control. Actually it should be good for you for me to have been tough on it.”75 
Toughness aside, the American stance was creating waves in France, touching on deeply 
held ideas of sovereignty and independence. Outgoing French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac 
sharply criticised the perceived “hegemonic tendencies” of the United States and the French 
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press almost universally condemned Kissinger for trying to ride roughshod over French 
independence and credibility.76 
 By mid-September, things were coming to a head for the Ford administration. With 
Carter confirmed as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate and Fri having submitted 
his findings, Ford needed to make major decisions about the proliferation issue. Fri argued 
that the oil crisis of the 1970s had created a wider global interest in—and market for—
nuclear power. Coupled to this were a range of nuclear supplier states, not all of whom the 
US was in agreement with. Furthermore, this increased choice of nuclear technology 
suppliers coincided with a loss of US influence in the market because of restrictive domestic 
legislation. Reprocessing, Fri contended, was a central issue. It was both a substantive issue 
in that the plutonium fuel cycle raised genuine proliferation worries, but it was also hugely 
symbolic. In light of these factors, US policy must devise more rigorous international 
controls over plutonium inventories, establish more effective safeguards against theft and 
diversion, try to persuade states to foreswear reprocessing, and be prepared to invoke 
sanctions should the rules be broken.77 Fri offered a graduated range of policy outlines, from 
‘business as usual,’ through the acceptance of reprocessing as a fact of life, to a conservative 
stance that reprocessing should not go ahead until it was judged to be safe to do so, to a 
“very tough line” that positioned reprocessing as a serious danger to world peace.78 
In the wake of Fri’s report, there were still serious divisions over what the eventual 
policy should be. Unsurprisingly, ACDA wanted the administration to make the strongest 
possible stand against domestic and foreign nuclear reprocessing. The State Department, 
ERDA, and the Department of Defense (DoD) all opted for a less confrontational option 
where reprocessing could proceed as long as appropriately stringent safeguards accompanied 
it.79 Kissinger had pre-empted these departmental views by submitting his own thoughts to 
Ford the day before Fri sent his memo to the President announcing the review’s completion. 
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Kissinger sought to place his own personal stamp on matters, in particular regarding 
relationships with allies. In addition to advising advanced consultation with Canada, France, 
the FRG, Japan, the UK, and the USSR, he cautioned against statements that might place the 
US in a serious strategic dilemma. Kissinger noted, “It should be recognized that if the 
[nuclear] suppliers, many of whom are also our allies, do not wish to follow a U.S. initiative 
voluntarily, then we will either have to coerce them or jeopardize our non-proliferation 
policy. Clearly, we should not select a strategy which could so easily trap us in such a 
dilemma.”80 The corollary to this potential strategic dilemma was obviously that non-
supplier allies could pose the same problems. Pakistan was a case in point. Either Bhutto 
would have to be coerced into conforming or the on-going situation would pose a serious 
challenge to non-proliferation. To head off such potential problems, Kissinger advised a 
policy that forced “sensitive facilities” such as reprocessing plants to be located only in 
supplier countries, all of which were developed world states.81  
Presidential candidate Carter pre-empted Ford’s nuclear policy announcement by 
amplifying and expanding his position on non-proliferation. Ford, Carter contended, was 
“failing miserably” to set an example that would encourage other nations not to seek nuclear 
weapons.82 In light of Carter’s stance, Ford’s advisers began suggesting to the press that the 
President was about to make a major announcement on nuclear policy. The Washington Post 
believed that Ford intended these suggestions to reduce Carter’s advantage in the upcoming 
debate between the candidates on foreign policy.83 That debate saw Ford and Carter clash 
over a range of issues. Carter was particularly scathing on non-proliferation, arguing, “only 
with the election approaching has Ford taken an interest” and citing the cases of Pakistan and 
Brazil as particularly alarming. If the Ford policy was continued, the Georgian contended in 
an alarmist tone, twenty new nuclear weapon states would emerge by 1985 or 1990.84 
 The reprocessing plant, the upcoming election, and arms sales were all problems that 
collided in the last meeting between Kissinger, Aziz Ahmed, and Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Kissinger to Ford, ‘Nuclear Policy Review and Non-Proliferation Initiatives,’ September 6, 1976, GRFPL, 
Glenn R. Schleede Files, Box 27, Nuclear Policy, 1976: Agency Comments on Fri Report, 3. 
81 Ibid, 4. 
82 Bill Richards, ‘Carter: Sharp Criticism of Atom Policy,’ WP, September 26, 1976, A1. 
83 Don Oberdorfer, ‘Ford Plans Strict Curbs on Atom Fuel,’ WP, October 3, 1976, 1. 
84 Anon., ‘Transcript of Foreign Affairs Debate Between Ford and Carter,’ NYT, October 7, 1976, 36-37. 
! 71!
before Ford’s major nuclear policy statement. Kissinger had convinced the Pakistanis that 
should Carter win the election, the new president would make an example of them. 
Furthermore, Yaqub-Khan tacitly admitted that a nuclear weapons programme was, at least 
in part, the reason for the reprocessing plant deal. Kissinger had stated, “But I don’t think he 
[Bhutto] would need reprocessing now if he had only the intention of peaceful uses,” to 
which Yaqub-Khan responded, “Your understanding of the Prime Minister’s attitude was 
correct. I was wrong. The Prime Minister confirmed the understanding was as you had stated 
it.”85 This dramatic revelation, which contradicted all Bhutto’s statements that his intentions 
were purely peaceful, led Kissinger into a discussion of the strategic dilemma he had 
outlined in his September 6 memo to Ford. Kissinger argued that he was against much of the 
Congressional legislation on proliferation because it harmed allies more than hurt enemies, 
and the more punitive action the United States took, the more proliferation would take 
place.86 Finally, Kissinger stressed that he was doing what he could over the A-7 issue, even 
though he was fighting a “reluctant bureaucracy” and Congress, both of which took a dim 
view of advanced weapon sales to South Asia.87 In the face of a tacit admission that Pakistan 
was seeking the A-bomb, Kissinger stuck to his vision of security—not any of the other 
reasons that might be driving Pakistan towards nuclear capability—being paramount.  
On October 28, four days before the presidential election, Ford made his long-
awaited statement on nuclear policy, a statement that was the most extensive and detailed 
review of nuclear energy and proliferation policy yet made by a US president.88 The 
statement was in itself groundbreaking and reflected many of the recommendations made in 
the Fri Report, in particular the ‘conservative’ option on reprocessing. For the first time the 
chief executive acknowledged the fundamental links between domestic and foreign nuclear 
policy, the United States needing to be seen to lead the way on non-proliferation and nuclear 
safety.89 Ford explicitly stated that this was not just a US responsibility, but also a 
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responsibility of the “world community.”90 The spread of reprocessing plants and their 
production of plutonium, a resource for power and weapons, must be arrested until the 
global community could guarantee the safety and security of both the process and the 
product. However, core to nuclear policy must also be an understanding of the developed 
and developing world’s energy needs, “For unless we comprehend their real needs, we 
cannot expect to find ways of working with them to ensure satisfaction of both our and their 
legitimate concerns.”91 In order to achieve the lofty goals set out in the statement, the United 
States needed to maintain its position as a reliable supplier of nuclear technology and 
resources. US plutonium-producing reprocessing efforts would be placed on hold for three 
years but balanced by an expansion of uranium enrichment facilities in order ensure reliable 
global supplies.92 The statements that potentially had the greatest impact on Pakistan were 
contained within the section on export policies. Although adherence to the NPT was the 
favoured option, there were a number of get-out clauses. The United States would look 
favourably upon non-NPT states adhering to full safeguards on their nuclear fuel cycle and 
foregoing or postponing national reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities.93 At the 
same time as Ford was outlining his plans, British officials from the ACDD—under the aegis 
of ambassador Ramsbotham—were meeting with Carter supporters to discuss non-
proliferation issues.94 The brave new world of non-proliferation outlined by Ford never came 
into being under his control. Four days later, he lost the presidential fight and the former 
nuclear engineer, peanut farmer, and Georgia governor Jimmy Carter became President-
elect. 
 In the interregnum between the election and Carter’s inauguration on January 20, 
1977, Ford’s outgoing administration continued to work on the Pakistani issue. By the 
middle of December, the French government had committed not to sell any more 
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reprocessing plants, but remained wedded to the Pakistani contract and the Canadian 
government suspended all nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.95 Kissinger was determined to 
make a watertight arrangement to deliver the A-7s regardless of the future Carter 
administration’s desires, if Bhutto would even postpone the reprocessing plant. Kissinger 
promised to speak to incoming Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in an effort to ensure 
Pakistani arms supplies.96 The outgoing Secretary of State later suggested that Vance would 
have “six heart attacks” when he saw the proposed arms package for Pakistan. Despite this, 
Kissinger displayed a misplaced confidence that he could persuade the new administration 
that the A-7s for reprocessing deal was valid and valuable.97 
Thirteen days after Kissinger expressed confidence that he could bring the incoming 
administration round to his position, Jimmy Carter was inaugurated and took charge of 
United States policy. Bhutto was still stubbornly adamant that he must have the reprocessing 
plant and the promised A-7s. The issue was far from dead but, as administrations were 
transitioning in the United States, junior officials in the British government made a startling 
discovery that placed the Pakistani situation in a whole new light. 
 The Ford administration was never at any point wholly committed to a non-
proliferation strategy. Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger only adopted a non-proliferation 
stance when Congressional, electoral, and public pressure made it unwise to ignore the issue 
and even then, Kissinger’s response lacked clarity, often blaming Congress for the 
problematic nature of proliferation policy. His lack of commitment concerning Pakistan is 
amply demonstrated by the continued efforts to supply A-7s, even when it became apparent 
that the nuclear programme was military in nature and that Bhutto was unlikely to give up 
the reprocessing plant. The Ford administration—like many other governments the world 
over—viewed proliferation through a realist lens, seeing Pakistani ambitions as solely driven 
by the imperatives of national security. If Pakistan were reassured—so the thinking went—
then Bhutto would cast aside his nuclear ambitions. However, as Jacques Hymans and Peter 
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Lavoy contend, insecurity is never the sole driver in the quest for the bomb.98 Domestic 
politics, the ephemeral notion of ‘prestige,’ and the proclivities of individual leaders all feed 
into a complex network of factors.99 The administrations’—and particularly Kissinger’s—
attitude towards Pakistan was informed by a view of the developing world that had evolved 
during the Nixon years. As Michael Hunt argues, “Washington continued to see it [the 
developing world] as a collection of nations that were backward, plagued by turbulence, and 
led by touchy, stubborn men.”100 Few developing world leaders could be as touchy and 
stubborn as Bhutto, especially when it came to the nuclear issue. 
  
Britain, Reprocessing, and Jaguar (again) 
Direct British involvement with Pakistani nuclear affairs in 1976 was—in comparison to the 
United States—limited. However, the economic situation in Great Britain continued to be an 
issue that significantly influenced non-proliferation relations with the sub-continent. It was 
also a time of political tumult when Harold Wilson announced his resignation on March 16 
and the contest to succeed him as Prime Minister began.101 Wilson’s resignation took place, 
as Ben Pimlott observes, at a time of gathering crisis brought on by the plummeting value of 
sterling from early March onwards.102 James Callaghan—considered by senior civil servants 
in the FCO to be very astute on foreign policy matters—won the leadership contest and 
moved from the FCO to Downing Street.103 His choice as Foreign Secretary was Anthony 
Crosland, a heavyweight intellectual of the Labour party, who remained in the job for a mere 
ten months before his death in February 1977.104 
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British reactions to the French-Pakistani deal’s signing were of a markedly different 
nature to those of the US government. Some quarters saw the contract as a potential 
opportunity for British industry, despite misgivings about the nuclear programme’s true 
nature. The Americans had informed their British allies about the forthcoming February 26 
Kissinger-Bhutto meeting, suggesting that there was “a 20% chance” of persuading the 
Pakistanis to back away from the deal.105 In the aftermath, communications from the British 
Embassy in Washington re-emphasised American concerns about the potential use of a 
reprocessing plant as part of a nuclear weapons programme. This had enough of an impact 
on British officials to make them think twice about potentially providing reprocessing 
technology to allies such as Iran.106 Information collected by the Cabinet-controlled Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) accurately assessed that the Pakistanis had embarked upon a 
nuclear weapons programme before India’s test, New Delhi’s actions merely reinforcing the 
Pakistani decision.107 Like American assessments in January, the JIC argued that there was 
absolutely no economic need for the reprocessing plant, even in the long term, and its only 
purpose was to extract plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, although this was an almost 
impossible task due to Pakistani acceptance of international safeguards on the plant and 
reactor facilities.108 In the final analysis, the reprocessing plant was seen more as a means of 
accessing technology and gaining expertise, rather than a direct route to the bomb. However, 
in the long term, Pakistan might well repudiate safeguards agreements and make use of the 
French plant to produce weapons-grade material.109 Within the report were seeds of what 
was to come. Although the intelligence analysts could not possibly have known, their 
comments on natural uranium reserves and the potential for a Pakistani uranium refining 
plant hinted at the clandestine uranium enrichment programme discovered at the end of the 
year.  
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British commercial interest was truly piqued when world wide concern about the 
reprocessing plant’s seemingly unnecessary nature caused Islamabad to announce a raft of 
new nuclear investment. This led to a remarkable British discussion of the potential for UK 
companies to profit from Pakistan’s new-found nuclear largesse. Dr. Munir Ahmad Khan of 
the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) held a press conference on March 22 
where he outlined plans for twenty-four new nuclear power stations in Pakistan by the end of 
the 1990s. The British Embassy in the Pakistani capital noted that that this announcement 
was obviously linked to the reprocessing plant issue and was intended for international, 
rather than domestic, consumption.110 Commercial Secretary Harry Turner of the Islamabad 
embassy sought out Khan in order to quiz him in more detail about the massive nuclear 
power expansion plan. Khan appealed to his visitor’s commercial instincts by outlining the 
opportunities available for British business in the expanding world of Pakistani atomic 
power. British interest in tendering for parts of the reprocessing plant and the new power 
reactor at Chashma would, Khan suggested, be welcomed.111 Turner handed the matter over 
to the Department of Trade (DoT) in Whitehall with the recommendation that the state-
owned British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) contact Khan to express interest in exploratory 
meetings.112 As expected, the FCO were immediately involved and wrote to Turner about 
potential constraints on British involvement in the nuclear power programme, enclosing a 
recent statement from the Foreign Secretary. Callaghan had given a written answer to a 
question in the House of Commons emphasising that when considering the export of 
sensitive technology, non-proliferation issues must always be a top priority for the British 
government and senior figures in the diplomatic service viewed Britain as having a key 
influence in Pakistan.113 
Other elements can be linked to British reticence to involve itself too deeply in 
dissuading Pakistan at this stage. The Labour government was in the midst of secretly 
undertaking a reversal of its previous policy not to develop new weapons. As the United 
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States was pressuring the Pakistanis, the British government authorised the conversion of 
Chapel Cross nuclear power station in Dumfriesshire to a tritium production plant for a new 
generation of nuclear warheads. This, and the improvements to the Polaris missile system 
being planned under the codename Chevaline, was hidden from parliamentary scrutiny by 
disguising the new developments as ‘maintenance.’114 
Not only were upgraded nuclear weapons under development, but also plans were in 
train to build a massive new reprocessing plant—which became known as the Thermal 
Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP)—at Windscale in Cumbria. The apparently casual 
disregard for the wider implications of this new facility was challenged in the House of 
Commons in late 1976. The reasons for objections were many and varied, from the risk of 
radioactive pollution to the competence of the planning officers who judged the application 
to build the facility.115 The Conservative MP Nigel Forman, in a speech lambasting the 
British desire for a reprocessing plant, linked the Pakistani situation directly to Western 
commercial desires, stating: 
 
[T]here is the distinct danger that this lethal technology will spread to Brazil and 
Pakistan, unless steps can be taken at the highest international level to undo the 
damage already done by cut-throat commercial competition with its ruthless disregard 
for the long-term survival chances of mankind—and I put it no lower than that. All 
this adds up to a disturbing picture of a world drunk on the prospect of nuclear power 
and desperate for a slice of the Faustian bargain so thoughtlessly entered into by the 
Americans, the British and the Canadians more than 30 years ago.116 
 
This questioning by MPs eventually led to a lengthy public enquiry and, in 1977, collision 
with the new Carter administration’s non-proliferation policy objectives.117 Western double 
standards came round repeatedly in the relationship with Pakistan, as did the specific case of 
British hypocrisy regarding reprocessing, a hypocrisy rooted in the conflict between wider 
political and narrower commercial interests. 
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By the end of May, the question of whether or not Britain should, or could, 
participate in the Pakistani reprocessing plant led to a vigorous debate between the FCO, 
DoT, and the Department of Energy (DoE) that lasted until the end of the year. The DoE 
argued that it was doubtful whether Britain had anything to sell the Pakistanis anyway.118 
The FCO challenged this assertion, but pointed out that it was the political difficulties of 
selling nuclear equipment and services to Pakistan that were the main issue.119 Finally, 
officials at the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) pointed out that Pakistan’s 
balance of payments with the UK and her substantial debt were not conducive to Islamabad 
spending even more money on nuclear equipment.120 
Michael Wilmshurst of the FCO Joint Nuclear Section (JNS) also contacted 
Christopher ‘Kit’ Burdess at the embassy in Islamabad. As the resident nuclear expert and a 
colleague of Harry Turner, who had started the ball rolling with his March and April 
missives, Burdess was asked to keep a close eye on the embassy’s commercial department 
and to make sure his consular colleagues were aware of the situation’s many political 
implications.121 Wilmshurst recognised the potential importance of British nuclear sales, but 
the non-adherence to the NPT by Pakistan created something of a problem. Moreover, he 
added: 
Our doubts about the peaceful intentions of the Pakistan nuclear programme must 
make us very wary of any cooperation. Should the Pakistan programme at a later 
stage become blatantly directed at achieving a military nuclear capability, even if 
our contribution had not in practice assisted this, we should be liable to embarrassing 
allegations of collaboration and irresponsibility. Regional considerations too dictate 
a policy of caution towards nuclear cooperation with Pakistan; we must be careful to 
consider possible repercussions, not only in India but also, for example, in Iran.122 
 
By July, Pakistani representatives were enquiring with BNFL about “projected plans for 
Pakistan” but it was Kit Burdess in Islamabad who concisely encapsulated the problems in 
the first of two letters he submitted on July 13.123 He boiled the situation down to three 
questions: what was politically acceptable for Britain to export; what would UK suppliers 
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actually be able to physically provide; what credit terms could the UK offer to Pakistan?124 
In his second letter, much less widely circulated around government departments, the 
diplomat went into more detail about intelligence that pointed to Pakistani nuclear ambitions. 
Burdess did not want the situation to evolve the same way as the embarrassing Pakistani 
interest in British warplanes, where the Pakistanis felt they had been encouraged while 
Britain had little intention of actually allowing them to purchase the aircraft.125 
Spurred on by Anglo-Indian wrangling over the Jaguar deal and seemingly barred 
from purchasing the sought-after A-7 from the United States, Pakistani ministers had turned 
a speculative eye towards a Jaguar deal of their own. It was an issue bound up in rumour and 
misunderstanding. Agha Shahi—labouring under the convenient misapprehension that India 
was being offered generous credit terms for its potential purchase—had boldly asked for 
£100 million of credit to purchase the aircraft. British representatives in Islamabad quite 
angrily rejected the Pakistani request for credit.126 Despite Whitehall officials having to 
speak “firmly” to Pakistani representatives in London, there was, the FCO noted, no political 
reason why the aircraft could not be sold to Pakistan as well as to India, but both sales must 
be on equal but far from generous terms.127 By May the Pakistanis were still interested in 
Jaguar but with Indira Gandhi mired in a ‘state of emergency’ and her ministers repeatedly 
modifying their requirements and failing to make a decision on the British, Swedish, or 
French option and the British government unwilling or unable to offer more generous credit 
terms, Foreign Secretary Crosland did not pursue the potential Pakistani deal with any 
enthusiasm.128 Here was a stark example of the radically different ways America and Britain 
viewed conventional arms sales. For the US, conventional arms were either a stick or carrot 
to push Pakistan away from the nuclear option. In London, conventional arms sales were 
only ever a commercial matter. Indeed, the Indian Jaguar negotiations were only ever an 
impediment to non-proliferation, rather than a means of positively influencing nuclear 
attitudes. 
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The second Burdess letter contained ominous speculation about Pakistani intentions. 
There was the chance that if ostensibly civilian equipment was offered and then withdrawn, 
there could be considerable—and highly public—political embarrassment.129 There were 
also rumours, expressed to Burdess by one of his Australian counterparts that Britain had 
already assisted in the design and construction of a very small reprocessing facility in 
Pakistan. It was later confirmed that this facility dated from the 1960s and Britain had only 
contributed some consultancy for an “active chemistry” laboratory.130 Burdess’s Australian 
source also volunteered the information that D.A.V. Fischer, the Director of External 
Relations at the IAEA, had suggested that Pakistan’s motives were “clearly 
dishonourable.”131 All of this pointed to a murky and complicated picture of what was 
actually happening on the sub-continent. In response to this, Michael Wilmshurst reiterated 
the centrality to British non-proliferation policy of the March 31 statement by Callaghan. In 
light of this policy, it was vital that unrealistic expectations must not be raised in 
Islamabad.132 Indeed, the Callaghan statement became the “basic political framework for our 
nuclear exports to all countries.”133 
The MoD had also weighed into the debate over exports to Pakistan, suggesting that 
the possibility of Pakistan reaching for nuclear weapons “cannot be discounted.” There was 
minimal scope for any nuclear exports to Pakistan, especially with the looming shadow of 
the French reprocessing plant deal. “If this deal comes off,” argued the MoD’s Dennis 
Fakley, “it is difficult to see how any significant nuclear co-operation with Pakistan could be 
politically justifiable. Safeguards apart, Pakistan will have an indigenous capability to 
produce plutonium for explosive device purposes and I do not believe we should help them 
with this capability by, for example, providing fuel fabrication services.”134 
Regardless of how justifiable participation in the Pakistani nuclear programme was, 
there was a scramble amongst European nuclear suppliers to carry out feasibility studies to 
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see if they could profit from Bhutto’s nuclear bonanza.135 There was the problem that Britain 
had nothing to sell. Back home on leave from Islamabad, Harry Turner was summoned to 
the FCO and after a briefing on nuclear matters agreed that pressing for nuclear business in 
Pakistan was pointless.136 There was also the matter of Pakistani enquiries via a third party 
(presumed to be the Belgian company Belgonucléaire) about CANDU-type reactor fuel.137 
The Canadians, who had originally supplied the reactor and its fuel, were engaged in heated 
discussions with the Pakistanis about safeguards, discussions that ended with the complete 
suspension of Canadian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan in December of 1976. After 
lengthy discussions, it was decided that BNFL should not respond to further enquiries for 
reactor fuel from Pakistan.138  
In the end, the decision not to participate in the Pakistani nuclear programme was, 
for Britain, a complex network of Callaghan’s stated non-proliferation ideals, suspicion 
about Pakistan intentions, fear of a loss of international credibility, and the bald fact that 
British industry had little to sell Islamabad. By October, the FCO was advising Burdess that 
London strongly suspected Pakistan wished to acquire a nuclear explosive capability. 
Furthermore, Pakistan was seen as such a bad economic risk that sales must be declined on 
those grounds as well. That aside, Martin Bourke concluded, “Even if these difficulties did 
not exist we would be reluctant on proliferation grounds to sell anything but the most 
innocuous items to the Pakistanis.”139 Despite some further desultory back and forth, this 
missive represented a final decision on British involvement in the reprocessing plant, 
coinciding as it did with Ford’s policy statement on October 28. What Bourke, Burdess, and 
their colleagues could not possibly know was that just over a month later, it was “innocuous 
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Discovering the Clandestine Programme 
Late 1976 and early 1977 saw increasing awareness within the British government that the 
reprocessing plant was not the only route to the bomb the Pakistanis were following. 
Seemingly innocent electrical components ordered by West German engineering consultants 
indicated that Pakistan was also pursuing a uranium enrichment strategy. The discovery was 
the cause of much debate and, significantly, the United States was not involved until many 
months later. 
 The first indications of a clandestine uranium enrichment programme came when 
BNFL contacted the DoE to inquire if there were any non-proliferation issues regarding 
items called ‘inverters.’140 Inverters (sometimes referred to as “power inverters”) are 
electrical components used as part of the controlling machinery for high-speed alternating-
current (AC) electric motors. In this case, BNFL had received an inquiry from E.S. Harris, 
the managing director of Emerson Electric Industrial Controls Limited (EEIC) in Swindon, 
Wiltshire. Harris had himself been contacted by TEAM Industries of Leonberg, West 
Germany, a company working as consultants on behalf of the government ordnance factory 
in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.141 Harris was under the impression that the inverters were for use in 
controlling a centrifuge system, although TEAM had not confirmed this to him.142 In his 
submissions to BNFL and the DoE, Harris had flagged up the point that his was a small 
company and such a contract provided £400,000 worth of badly needed business, thus 
preventing redundancies. Michael James, the official in the DoE’s Atomic Energy Division 
tasked with dealing with the situation, was convinced that the most likely use for the 
inverters was in a centrifuge system “with military purposes in mind.” It was suggested, 
however, that getting hold of such equipment was not that difficult and if EEIC did not 
supply them, someone else somewhere in Europe would.143 The FCO’s Michael Wilmshurst 
had already set out to make urgent enquiries with Bonn to see if FRG non-proliferation 
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restrictions prevented the export of these items from Germany to Pakistan and it was 
suggested that ministers be informed of the new developments in the Pakistani saga.144  
 This first-ever indication of the Pakistani enrichment programme set off a debate 
that brought together BNFL, the DoE, DoT, FCO, and MoD. It was assumed that BNFL was 
the best judge of whether or not these inverters were of a type suitable for a gas centrifuge, 
having purchased similar items from EEIC in the past. Other officials within the DoE urged 
that the case be taken “very seriously unless or until we are reassured by the information as 
to end use.”145 Not all government departments shared this view, however. Denis Fakley was 
less convinced that there were sinister implications to the inverter order. Although he agreed 
with the enquiries being made in West Germany, he suggested that it could be the case that 
“this affair is wholly innocent” and that Michael James had made more of the available 
evidence than was warranted.146 James responded by noting that it was the managing director 
of EEIC himself who had made the link between the Pakistani order and uranium enrichment 
centrifuges and that, after examining the specifications given to the government in 
confidence by Harris, BNFL agreed that their only use could be in a centrifuge (and 
expressed some disbelief that nothing could be done to address the export issue).147 
Responding to this, Fakley agreed that action should be taken if it were shown that TEAM 
Industries were involved in helping to build a uranium enrichment plant for Pakistan.148 
 James gave an update to the situation—and a scathing assessment of the British 
intelligence community—on December 20. He reiterated that BNFL had verbally confirmed 
that the inverters were of a type specifically intended for a centrifuge power supply and the 
DoT had informed him such products would come under the Export of Goods (Control) 
Order when it was revised in two or three months’ time. At the moment, however, little 
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could be done. Any further action should be taken at the ministerial level and the political 
consequences of such action must be assessed very carefully.149 James then went on to 
comment, “I find it very strange if the Pakistanis really are building a centrifuge plant with 
military intentions in Rawalpindi, this is the first we have heard about it. Do we not have 
some sort of Intelligence Service or are they all writing spy novels?” In concluding, the DoE 
was already preparing to assign blame elsewhere if the entire fracas turned out to be nothing 
more than a mistake: “We should look pretty silly if we prevented the export of these 
invertors on our present assumptions, only to find they really had been intended for a paper 
mill or something equally innocent and that BNFL had got the story wrong.”150 Though a 
seemingly throwaway comment, this particular statement is significant. It illustrates the 
confusion over inverters and—at least in part—explains why it took so long for the British 
government to take serious action against the Pakistani enrichment programme. As will be 
demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, it took almost two years for sustained diplomatic 
action to take place. This was mostly due to the situation’s opacity—James described the 
situation as confused, noting that, “we are not clear what is going on”—and an unwillingness 
to suffer public embarrassment by creating a diplomatic ‘scene.’151 
 During his visit to Pakistan in January of 1977, Callaghan hardly mentioned the 
nuclear issue and certainly did not touch on British suspicions about the enrichment 
programme. Agha Shahi was interested in discussing the issue of nuclear security guarantees 
for Pakistan, a topic that still had currency even though two and a half years had passed since 
the Indian test. In his discussions with Callaghan, the Pakistani Army chief, General 
Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, had seemingly expressed a vague willingness to adhere to the NPT 
and there were suggestions that Pakistani officials might visit London to discuss 
disarmament and security issues.152 
 In the new year, Ian Cromartie at the British Embassy in Bonn finally got back to 
Michael Wilmshurst regarding the situation’s German component. Cromartie urged that the 
British government be as full and open as possible in order that his discussions with the 
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Auswärtiges Amt (the West German foreign ministry) could be structured in order to avoid 
any future bad feeling about matters.153 Cromartie was instructed to proceed in his discussion 
with the West Germans in as open and informative a manner as possible.154 The position of 
inverters as regards the NSG and Zangger Committee ‘trigger lists’ started to come to the 
fore, with the assertion that if the items were on the list, the strictures applied to the FRG just 
as much as they did to the UK.155 Even more evidence came to light when information from 
a British employee at the multi-national Urenco uranium enrichment plant at Almelo in the 
Netherlands indicated that the Pakistanis had requested ten kilogrammes of uranium 
hexafluoride (the form of uranium used in the enrichment process) and had been buying 
substantial quantities of hexafluoride-resistant valves from a Swiss firm.156 On the day that 
Jimmy Carter was being inaugurated as president of the United States, Cromartie wrote back 
to Wilmshurst confirming that his West German counterparts would get back to him with all 
possible speed.157 
 Although taking place below the ministerial level and involving a collection of civil 
servants, junior diplomats, and businesspeople, this brief episode from early December 1976 
to January 1977 is hugely significant in the story of British, and more widely American, 
involvement with the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. Connecting to the agreement 
that Pakistan was pursuing the nuclear weapons option, it demonstrated there were two 
strands directed at obtaining materials to make a nuclear bomb. It also illustrates the 
situation’s confusion and murkiness at this stage. Many works on the subject have—without 
having access to these newly declassified documents—suggested incompetence or 
conspiracy (and at times a combination of the two) as the reasons for Western inaction over 
the Pakistani enrichment programme.158 In reality, the reasons for a lack of real action on the 
Pakistani nuclear issue were multifaceted and multi-layered. Domestic politics, the brutal 
economic environment of the 1970s, inter-departmental political squabbles, fear of public 
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embarrassment, and the outlooks of individual policymakers all contributed to the lack of 
immediate response. Suggesting—as, for example, Levy and Scott-Clark do—that there was 




The months from the signing of the French-Pakistani nuclear processing plant deal to the 
inauguration of Jimmy Carter were a period of confusion and change. The complexity of 
international nuclear diplomacy and the difficulty of reconciling the needs of American and 
Pakistani domestic and foreign policy made it an intensely complicated time for 
policymakers. Electoral and Congressional pressure forced Ford and Kissinger to reassess 
US non-proliferation policy, as perceptions in Washington and London hardened around the 
belief that Pakistan was pursuing the nuclear weapons option. Yet, there was little practical 
communication between the US and UK on ways and means to combat the problem. The 
Americans unsuccessfully attempted to bribe or coerce Bhutto with arms sales. Britain 
stubbornly pursued the Indian Jaguar deal, but chose not to seek commercial advantage from 
the Pakistani reprocessing plant deal when it became apparent that any involvement in 
nuclear exports to Islamabad would be politically untenable and limited in profitability. The 
period was also revelatory in that with remarkable suddenness, it became apparent to British 
officials that they were dealing with two Pakistani efforts to acquire fissile materials. For the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan, 1976 was indeed the end of the “first 
‘easy’ phase” and the beginning of what promised to be an intensely challenging period in 
international nuclear relations. 
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Chapter 3: “The omens are scarcely encouraging” 
February 1977 to March 1978 
 
By the middle of 1977, things were looking bleak for American and British efforts to 
discourage Pakistan’s quest for nuclear capability. Robin Fearn—British chargé d’affaires in 
Islamabad—commented, regarding efforts to restrain Pakistani nuclear ambitions, that, “the 
omens are scarcely encouraging.”1 Fearn’s take on the situation was prescient, as US-
Pakistani relations dropped to their lowest ebb and British efforts to exercise influence came 
to naught. The year 1977 was one of change in political leadership in the US, the UK, and 
Pakistan. Despite personnel changes, these thirteen months are a story of continuity in policy 
rather than dramatic transformation. 
 Jimmy Carter had come to the presidency promising to address the problems of 
human rights violations, the superpower arms race, conventional arms sales, and nuclear 
proliferation. Carter’s stance on proliferation created tensions between the United States and 
its European allies that were less to do with a change in policy—Carter’s pronouncements 
from the Oval Office were little different from his predecessor’s late-period change of heart 
on non-proliferation—but rather more to do with what William Glenn Gray describes as a 
“jarring change in style.”2 Carter’s far-reaching, global policies affected the foreign and 
domestic nuclear interests of states such as the UK, the FRG, and France with little intra-
alliance consultation. 
 In the case of Pakistan, efforts to halt or retard the nuclear programme faced 
numerous barriers. Although the UK and US hoped that a change of government in 
Islamabad might usher in a regime more pliable on nuclear issues, the switch from civilian 
rule under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to military rule under General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq saw 
continuity in the Pakistani nuclear quest. In attempting to balance non-proliferation and 
conventional arms control policies, Carter only succeeded in driving Pakistan further away 
from the United States. The one partial non-proliferation success was the French acceptance 
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that non-proliferation mattered more than the reprocessing plant contract with Bhutto. This 
was also mired in problems, as Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s government displayed a marked 
unwillingness to go public with its decision or to definitively break their contract with 
Pakistan. 
 Carter’s non-proliferation strategy and its interactions with Pakistan faced a British 
government struggling to understand and react to discoveries about nuclear arms and the 
sub-continent. British policy also demonstrated that domestic interests could influence 
responses to the proliferation problem. Even though James Callaghan’s government had a 
greater commitment to non-proliferation than other Western European states—such as the 
FRG—arms sales and the avowed British requirement for a commercially lucrative domestic 
nuclear reprocessing industry were the most prominent examples of economic imperatives 
interfering with non-proliferation policy. The Callaghan government’s attitude towards 
British domestic reprocessing starkly illustrated a division between the nuclear ‘haves’ and 
have nots’, as David Owen justified the THORP on the grounds of economic and energy 
needs—identical justifications to those emanating from Islamabad. 
 Significantly for the future of non-proliferation policy against Pakistan, new 
evidence came to light about the late 1976 discovery of a clandestine Pakistani purchasing 
programme supplying a uranium enrichment project. Callaghan’s government—in particular 
the new Foreign Secretary David Owen—did not lack willingness to tackle this issue even 
though it would affect British businesses. It is important to emphasise that this economic 
impact was several orders of magnitude smaller than the effect of abandoning arms sales or 
domestic reprocessing. However, British efforts to combat the clandestine purchasing 
programme were hampered by the incomplete nature of existing proliferation controls, the 
dubious legal basis of action to prevent suspicious exports, and the recalcitrance of fellow 
nuclear technology supplier states. 
 By March 1978, the “omens” for future anti-proliferation activities focused on the 
sub-continent were “scarcely encouraging.” The evidence of a well planned, skilfully 
executed clandestine purchasing programme by Pakistan was mounting and efforts to halt 
Pakistani nuclear development had broadly failed. Although there would be some hope 





Jimmy Carter came to the Presidency having positioned non-proliferation as a key plank of 
his foreign policy platform. A devout Southern Baptist possessed of a strong Christian 
conscience, the new President sought to bring morality and humanitarianism—qualities 
notably lacking during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years—back to the centre of US foreign 
policy.3 In an inaugural address involving George Washington’s bible and frequent 
quotations from scripture, Carter vouchsafed that his ultimate goal was “the elimination of 
all nuclear weapons from this Earth.”4 As Andrew Preston has pointed out, Carter attempted 
to govern as both a moralist and a realist.5 Carter identified, as Betty Glad argues, US 
national interests with moral righteousness.6 Unlike late-period Ford, driven towards non-
proliferation by a combination of Congressional and electoral pressure, Carter founded his 
passion for non-proliferation in a vision of a moral foreign policy driven by a personal 
commitment to human rights. Human rights, arms control, conventional arms sales, and non-
proliferation were all tied together. Spending on conventional arms and nuclear weapons 
meant less for states to spend on curing social ills such as poverty, which in turn led to 
frustration and instability. Reducing expenditure on arms and preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons would result in a safer and more peaceful world with more money to spend 
on combating societal problems.7 Reflecting on the 1974 Indian nuclear test, Carter noted in 
his memoirs that he “wanted to do everything possible to prevent this capability from 
spreading to any additional nations.”8 While the motivations for Carter’s policy may have 
been different from those of Ford, the ends and means were broadly similar. The 
fundamentals of the Carter proliferation policy were little different from the Fri Report and 
Ford’s October 1976 statement: a halt to domestic reprocessing, increased pressure on other 
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states—such as Pakistan—to halt their own reprocessing plans, greater international 
discussion of the nuclear fuel cycle, and closer attention to multinational means of curbing 
access to sensitive technologies. However, the emphasis on morality and humanitarianism 
created more problems than it solved, with human rights and nuclear proliferation issues 
antagonising enemies and allies alike.9 
Although Carter drove the non-proliferation policy agenda, he was surrounded by 
advisers—such as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Energy and Energy 
Technology Affairs Louis V. Nosenzo—who had been sidelined during the Nixon and Ford 
years, but who now found themselves working for a President espousing genuine enthusiasm 
for non-proliferation.10 Problems that plagued Carter’s time in office arose from the 
administration’s very start. Disorganisation in decision-making, a managerial style that often 
initiated policies without a full understanding of their ramifications, and the increasingly 
rancorous relationship between his two key foreign policy advisers—Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski—led to confusion, 
misunderstanding, and in some cases, disaster.11 
 
With explicit focus on non-proliferation as a policy objective, Pakistan was on Carter’s 
agenda from day one, but there was little change from the Ford approach during the first 
three months of the new administration. The twin measures of exerting pressure on France to 
renege on the reprocessing plant deal and using conventional arms sales to persuade Bhutto 
to give up his nuclear ambitions remained in place as Carter’s administration formulated 
broader non-proliferation strategies. However, the use of conventional arms as an 
inducement for Bhutto not to pursue his nuclear aspirations represented a major flaw in 
Carter’s human rights-led policy platform. The administration wanted to prevent 
proliferation and reduce sales of advanced weapons to the developing world. In the case of 
Pakistan, either non-proliferation would have to subordinate itself to arms sales restraint or 
vice versa. Lucy Benson (Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance) made the point 
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to her British counterparts that the new administration was making an effort to 
compartmentalise the issues of the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme and conventional 
arms supplies, but it was unclear how to achieve this difficult aim.12 The State Department 
favoured an early approach to Bhutto, before the March Pakistani elections.13 In the end, 
Vance took the decision to wait until it was clear whether Bhutto would remain in charge or 
if the Americans would have to deal with a new Pakistani leader.14  
On Pakistan’s attempt to purchase the core of a nuclear fuel cycle, Vance’s 
subordinates viewed the French reprocessing plant deal’s completion as increasingly 
unlikely, and argued that the emphasis should be on how to mollify Bhutto and persuade him 
that he would never have the facilities.15 The French government bore much of the 
responsibility for this reduced chance of completion, having concluded that the proliferation 
risks of the deal were too great.16 Giscard had commented that the entire deal was a “bad 
mistake” but did not want to lose ‘face’ by appearing to succumb to American pressure.17 
Giscard feared that Washington would state publicly that a French policy change was the 
result of American pressure on Paris, affecting his domestic political standing at a critical 
time. 18 
Vance wrote to his French counterpart Louis de Guiringaud in February, seeking 
confirmation of the deal’s cancellation. Not only would cancellation be a major step forward 
for sub-continental non-proliferation efforts, it would also boost the chances of stopping the 
huge FRG-Brazil nuclear deal.19 Paul C. Warnke, Vance’s appointee as ACDA Director, also 
pointed out to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher the connections between the 
two nuclear deals, stating that, “unless we obtain some kind of gain [on the FRG-Brazil 
deal], our prospects of obtaining success will be substantially reduced in Pakistan (where, 
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unlike Brazil, the evidence on current weapons intentions is unambiguous).”20 The problem 
was not that the French were unwilling to cancel the deal—Giscard had made his feelings 
plain in private—but that such were French and Pakistani sensitivities that the final 
cancellation required circumspect, discreet handling. French ministers had publicly and 
repeatedly emphasised the sanctity of a contract made in good faith and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
had—with equal vigour—publicly underscored his commitment to the reprocessing plant. 
However, the disputed March elections in Pakistan caused Bhutto—at least in his 
diplomatic communications—to adopt an attitude more amenable to negotiation over the 
nuclear issue, prompting discussions within the Carter administration regarding the Ford-era 
offer of advanced A-7 attack aircraft to Pakistan.21 The Pakistani elections had become 
mired in accusations of vote rigging, religious intolerance, and political violence. Bhutto 
reached out to the powerful conservative clerical leader of the multi-party Pakistan National 
Alliance (PNA), Maulana Mufti Mahmood, in an attempt to avert strikes and violent protests 
in the streets.22 In a move aimed at quelling the calls for change emanating from the more 
radical Islamic elements of Pakistani society, the embattled Prime Minister announced the 
enforcement of Sharia law and declared prohibitions on alcohol and gambling.23 While 
Bhutto was in this vulnerable position, Brzezinski criticised a State Department plan for a 
wide-ranging package of economic and military incentives—including substituting the 
advanced A-7s for lightweight, far less capable F-5E fighters and perhaps a few aging A-4 
fighter-bombers—as threatening Carter’s policies on arms sales and South Asia. 
Furthermore, the National Security Adviser contended that rewarding Pakistan would set a 
“tempting precedent” for other proliferators. However, an overly tough stand with Bhutto 
might well cause him to adopt an even more “strident nuclear policy,” damaging Carter’s 
wider non-proliferation objectives. Brzezinski recommended entering into negotiations 
demanding restraint in the Pakistani nuclear programme, gradually offering incentives and 
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only if it became apparent that Bhutto “would not fold.”24 Carter favoured the stance 
suggested by his hawkish National Security Adviser, a stance that coincided with the 
President’s views on arms sales, proliferation, and human rights. Responding to suggestions 
made by Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Carter wanted a minimal arms 
package, opposed the substantial aid programme suggested by the State Department, and 
questioned Christopher’s suggestion that the US could finance the Pakistani purchase of a 
French nuclear reactor.25 
 
While the State Department and NSC were getting to grips with the Pakistani situation, 
Carter unveiled his non-proliferation policy. Carter made his announcement on April 7, 
arguing that while nuclear power was a vital resource—particularly against the background 
of the 1970s oil crises—there were dangerous consequences to the spread of certain 
technologies. Carter called for an international effort to curb the spread of plutonium 
(created through reprocessing) and uranium enrichment technology (although the focus was 
very firmly on the former), recognising that the United States could not act unilaterally. 
Where Ford had opted for a three-year moratorium on US reprocessing, Carter announced an 
indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing in the United States, an expansion of enriched 
uranium production to meet expected global needs, legislative steps to permit foreign nuclear 
fuel supply contracts that would remove the requirement for other countries to reprocess, and 
continued international discussions on energy needs. The President carefully pointed out that 
he was in no way attempting to impose his will on France, Japan, the UK, and West 
Germany, which had already embarked on extensive reprocessing projects and which did not 
have the ready access to domestic supplies of oil similar to the US. This approval of 
European and Japanese reprocessing came as a surprise to Carter’s advisers, whom the 
President had not informed about this aspect of his speech. Finally, Carter called for the 
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establishment of an evaluation programme looking at all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, a 
call that eventually led to the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program 
(INFCE).26 
Carter’s dramatic emphasis on reprocessing implicitly made the situation in Pakistan 
part of a major, very public US policy announcement. The post-speech press conference 
confirmed this when a journalist pointedly asked if “some of the smaller nations that are now 
seeking reprocessing technology are doing so in order to attain nuclear weapon capability as 
well as or in addition to meeting their legitimate energy needs?” Carter was circumspect, 
reiterating that his policies were aimed at stopping a situation similar to that of India, where 
civilian atomic supplies had been used to create a nuclear explosive. The Carter presumption 
was that if the global community only used light water reactors and low-enriched uranium 
fuel, coupled with restrictions on breeder reactor and reprocessing technology, it would be 
much harder to divert nuclear facilities and materials to military nuclear projects.27 
Furthermore, the President—whether he intended to or not—had broadened the debate from 
a discussion of nuclear exports to fundamental energy strategies, thus confronting a far 
greater number of potentially interested parties.28 Confusion ensued when Robert Fri and 
Joseph Nye held a press conference to ‘clarify’ the President’s statements. Contrary to the 
impression given by Carter, Fri and Nye claimed that the President’s statement referred only 
to domestic considerations, the international aspects not having been fully agreed. Their 
answers did anything but clarify, producing further confusion and consternation amongst 
foreign observers who were attempting to decipher the meaning of Carter’s policy.29 
 Further consternation was provoked when Carter exhibited what became a hallmark 
of his presidency. After placating other nuclear suppliers by his willingness to allow 
continued reprocessing in those countries that already had facilities, he executed something 
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of a volte-face on April 27 with the first draft of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy Act 
(NNPA.) The core of the controversy was the proposal that the United States should be able 
to renegotiate existing nuclear supply contracts and retain the right of approval over foreign 
reprocessing of spent US-origin fuel.30 This placed commercial reprocessing facilities—such 
as the proposed British THORP and French UP3 facilities—in danger, as reprocessing 
contracts had been entered into with nations using US-supplied fuel when there was now no 
guarantee that the Americans would permit the transfer of that fuel for recycling. Indeed, the 
primary reason for the proposed construction of the controversial THORP was to reprocess 
foreign spent fuels and thus operate as a revenue earner.31 The reservation by the United 
States of the dramatic powers of intervention enshrined in the NNPA posed a direct threat to 
British economic and energy policy. 
 The first three months of the Carter administration’s non-proliferation activity 
highlight several factors that became hallmarks of the President’s time in office. The tension 
between the State Department and the National Security Adviser was already becoming 
apparent as Carter adopted Brzezinski’s tougher line on negotiations with Pakistan. More 
broadly, relative foreign enthusiasm for the new non-proliferation initiatives foundered on 
the rocks of the sudden and jarring shift outlined in the proposed NNPA. One of the 
countries most worried by the proposals was America’s closest ally in dealing with the 
Pakistani proliferation problem–the United Kingdom. 
 
The UK and Pakistani Reprocessing 
The FCO was undergoing a smaller transition of its own as the United States moved from 
Ford to Carter. On February 13, Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland suffered a massive 
stroke and died in hospital six days later. The surprising choice as Crosland’s replacement 
was David Owen, a committed Atlanticist from the right of the party, and at thirty-eight the 
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youngest foreign secretary since Anthony Eden in 1935.32 Superiors, colleagues, and friends 
saw him as energetic, imaginative and full of initiative, but imperious and difficult to work 
with.33 Christopher Mallaby, ACDD chief during Owen’s time at the FCO, recalled that 
Owen displayed great enthusiasm for arms control and non-proliferation matters, issues that 
the new Foreign Secretary saw as vote winners for Labour and a means of increasing his 
own popularity and standing. 34 In particular, Owen was deeply concerned about 
proliferation, particularly in the cases of Pakistan and South Africa.35 By 1977, British public 
activism on nuclear matters was reinvigorated after languishing in the doldrums for most of 
the early 1970s, with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) calling attention to the 
dangers of proliferation and Friends of the Earth protesting against the THORP.36 There 
were inherent tensions in Owen’s stance, including the matter of balancing popular arms 
control measures and the demands of the developing world signatories of the NPT for 
genuine progress in arms reduction, with the requirements of British defence and foreign 
policy. This fine balancing act would be apparent in the British approach to the Pakistani 
proliferation problem, where UK domestic, commercial, and foreign policies were in 
constant tension.  
 After Carter’s inauguration, several US delegations travelled to London. Vance, 
Warnke, and Vice President Walter Mondale all journeyed across the Atlantic to meet with 
Callaghan and his ministers to discuss non-proliferation matters. 37 Mondale homed in on the 
Pakistani and Brazilian situations as the immediate problems, stating that the United States 
would be willing to give up commercial advantage in order to combat the proliferation 
problem. Callaghan was well aware of this position from Carter’s campaign speeches and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Vickers, 112; Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979 (London: Penguin, 
2013), 644. 
33 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), 448; Paul Lever, interview by Malcolm McBain, 
November 7, 2011, BDOHP, www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Lever.pdf (accessed on July 10, 
2013), 8; David Gillmore, interview by Jane Barder, March 17, 1996, BDOHP, 
www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Gillmore.pdf (accessed on July 10, 2013), 11; Contained 
within the many interviews of the BDOHP are references too numerous to list attesting to the difficult 
relationship many officials had with the Foreign Secretary. 
34 Christopher Mallaby, interview by John Hutson, December 17, 1997, BDOHP, 
www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Mallaby.pdf (accessed on July 10, 2013), 11-12. 
35 David Owen, Time To Declare (London: Penguin, 1992), 336. 
36 Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Volume 3: Toward Nuclear Abolition (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 22. 
37 John C. Edmonds, interview by Malcolm McBain, May 21, 2009, BDOHP, 
www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Edmonds.pdf (accessed on May 3, 2013), 25-26. 
! 97!
shared the American viewpoint. The Prime Minister was “frankly terrified about what was 
happening on nuclear proliferation.” Mondale agreed and noted Carter’s great interest in 
following through on his early non-proliferation comments.38 
 As the new administration in Washington was putting its campaign promises into 
action, London was still dealing with the intertwined issues of the French reprocessing plant, 
inverter exports, and Jaguar sales to India. The ACDD briefed Owen on the Pakistani and 
Brazilian situations during his first day in office, suggesting that Britain should offer support 
for the US, while being careful not to offend any of the four main parties involved in the 
Pakistan and Brazilian nuclear deals. Regardless of the public or private nature of the 
diplomacy, the fundamental UK interest was that the reprocessing plant not be supplied to 
Pakistan.39 
 British unwillingness to become overtly involved in the reprocessing plant problem 
was a constant throughout 1977 and into 1978. Despite a flood of information, the UK 
preferred to let the US continue to take the lead. British ambassador to the United States 
Peter Ramsbotham (who was immensely popular and respected amongst the American 
government) made it clear to Warren Christopher that although US and UK non-proliferation 
policies were in alignment, he preferred that secret contacts between London, Paris, and 
Bonn not become public.40 Meanwhile, Michael Wilmshurst of the FCO’s JNS opined that 
leaking suspicions about Pakistani nuclear weapons intentions might persuade the French 
(perceived as having no compelling commercial reasons for pursuing the reprocessing plant) 
to finally cancel the contract.41 
 Information from Islamabad indicated that the cancellation of the reprocessing plant 
could benefit British commercial interests in Pakistan. The FCO’s SAD was curious about 
connections between the reprocessing plant deal and the building of a huge truck 
manufacturing facility by the French company Saviem that might threaten the British firm 
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Bedford, which made large sums of money from exports to Pakistan.42 The disquieting news 
from the British Embassy in Paris was that the French government had agreed to part-fund 
the construction of the vast new production plant. John Macrae in Paris doubted that there 
was a direct tie-up between the nuclear and automotive facilities, but believed that the 
reprocessing plant was generally beneficial to French commercial interests in Pakistan. The 
cancelling of the reprocessing plant could, Macrae suggested, negatively influence wider 
French interests in Pakistan.43 Thus, there was a specific British interest in the cancellation 
of the reprocessing plant contract in order to preserve markets for UK manufacturers. 
 Despite this obvious self-interest in France’s abrogation of the reprocessing 
agreement, several factors caused a lack of British government action on the issue. From 
within Pakistan, Bhutto showed no signs of giving up on acquiring the facilities, while in 
London the FCO worried that Islamabad might view overt attempts by Britain to intercede as 
the UK merely acting on behalf of the Americans. Kit Burdess at the British Embassy in 
Islamabad contended that Bhutto had done nothing to alter the Pakistani population’s belief 
that the reprocessing plant was intimately associated with a national nuclear weapons 
programme.44 Burdess also argued that the long-term political consequences of the nuclear 
effort for Pakistan were unclear, although pressure from the Western powers over the nuclear 
issue could tilt Pakistan more towards the ‘Islamic world’ and China.45 The Pakistani press 
reported that the French government had committed to honouring the reprocessing plant 
contract, while in the aftermath of the disputed March elections, Bhutto reiterated his pledge 
to the nuclear programme but indicated a willingness to discuss matters with the United 
States and France.46 US diplomats gave such reports credence, suggesting that Bhutto would 
do anything to keep the plant. This information prompted the FCO to question exactly 
what—other than sophisticated military equipment—would persuade Bhutto to give up his 
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nuclear ambitions.47 Diplomats also worried about the UK getting too involved in the 
reprocessing plant fracas, with Robin Fearn arguing that any overt British efforts to intervene 
would simply be seen as “a stalking horse for the Americans and [the Pakistani government] 
would be disinclined to treat us as serious interlocutors.”48 Fearn doubted that the UK could 
exert any leverage on Pakistan and endorsed the overall FCO position that efforts should be 
left to the Americans or to the NSG.49 Indo-US relations were also warming in the wake of 
the defeat of Indira Gandhi and the lifting of the state of emergency.50 Kit Burdess claimed 
that this return by India to the status of ‘world’s largest democracy’ might make it difficult to 
overlook human rights and other violations in Pakistan.51 Confusing messages were 
emanating from Paris, making the situation even more opaque. Diplomatic discussions failed 
to show a change in French attitudes towards the Pakistani deal as staff at the Quai d’Orsay 
argued that, despite the nuclear weapons implications, the Pakistanis were justified in buying 
the facility.52 Burdess speculated that the Carter administration was delaying taking any 
decision due to the deteriorating situation in Pakistan, suggesting that a change of regime 
might be on the cards and that the Americans may be waiting for a more pliable 
administration to come to power.53 
 
The UK and the Carter Agenda 
While the FCO attempted to formulate a policy regarding the Pakistani nuclear programme, 
the government as a whole strove to understand the implications for Britain of Carter’s stand 
on non-proliferation. Callaghan instructed Owen to form a high-level ministerial group to 
assess non-proliferation issues as indications of the new turn in non-proliferation policy 
made their way across the Atlantic. The Prime Minister instructed the group—which 
included Owen and the Secretaries of State for Energy, Industry, Environment, and 
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Defence—“to keep under review problems arising from the transfer of civil nuclear plant 
and technology, to consider their implications including the need to avoid the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, and to report to the Ministerial Committee on Energy (ENM).”54 The first 
task of the new ‘GEN 74’ committee was to evaluate the potential policy from Washington 
and provide feedback on Carter’s upcoming nuclear statement. 
 GEN 74 examined the likely outcomes of Carter’s review, briefed by an inter-
departmental committee of advisers on the commonality of non-proliferation concern 
between the US and UK and the major differences between the two nations. The FCO 
argued that because of British energy needs, environmental concerns, the technical aspects of 
Britain’s nuclear power programme, and worries that a general moratorium on reprocessing 
would drive further proliferation, any policy that attacked the UK’s existing reprocessing 
programme could not receive wholehearted British support.55 For one, the fuel element 
design of the British Magnox nuclear power stations meant that reprocessing or safe disposal 
would have to take place within a few years of removing the elements from the reactors. 
GEN 74 also contended that the transfer of reprocessing technology to Brazil and Pakistan 
dominated American thinking.56 
Shortly after GEN 74’s formation, the State Department gave the British, French, 
and West German governments three days to respond to a draft of Carter’s nuclear policy 
statement.57 This sudden request for input was not entirely surprising to the British 
government, as Carter had warned Callaghan that it might be on the horizon during the 
Prime Minister’s visit to the US in early March.58 The West Germans refused to comment on 
such a short timescale and hurried through the dispatch of key blueprints to Brazil before the 
United States could impose a moratorium on reprocessing plant exports.59 
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The British government’s most serious worry was that American efforts to curb 
reprocessing could have economically damaging effects on the British nuclear industry and 
public opinion. If Carter were to ban the reprocessing of US-origin nuclear fuels, this would 
destroy the commercial basis for the THORP. Not only that, but the on-going public enquiry 
into the plant was at a delicate stage and an American announcement regarding reprocessing 
could seriously affect British public opinion.60 The UK sought to move the United States 
away from what Owen and his cabinet colleagues saw as a very rigid stance on reprocessing. 
This was not simply a domestic issue for Britain, and it was pointed out to Carter’s people 
that in the 1960s the USA had raised expectations in the developing world about the benefits 
of nuclear technology. These expectations required careful management lest Carter’s 
changes in policy accelerate, rather than retard, proliferation by reducing access to 
reprocessing services (such as those potentially provided by the UK), thus forcing states that 
had invested in nuclear power to set up their own reprocessing facilities.61 
The British reaction to Carter’s April 7 speech involved welcoming the new policy 
while protecting UK interests. The official public response articulated broad support for the 
new US non-proliferation policy, while the ‘off-the-record’ elements expressed more doubt. 
Officially, the UK would play an “active and constructive” role in global non-proliferation 
activity and press comment stated that the government “intends to give non-proliferation 
consideration [sic] their full weight, together with commercial considerations.”62 Off the 
record, the policy required further study.63 The government argued there were strong non-
proliferation, economic, and environmental reasons for offering reprocessing services, 
statements that must be seen in the context of the massive THORP project.64 Callaghan 
wanted a more in-depth analysis of how far the UK could identify itself “with all or any 
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aspects of President Carter’s policy without endangering our commercial interests and, in so 
far as our commercial interests are endangered, what is at stake for us.”65  
GEN 74 meetings and briefings emphasised the fissures between the US and UK. 
Ministers had hoped that ground had been gained after the feedback to the Carter 
administration before the April 7 announcement, but after Carter’s confusing introduction of 
the draft NNPA on April 27 statement, GEN 74 participants felt such optimism was 
groundless. FCO analysts saw the upcoming May 7-8 Group of Seven industrialised nations 
(G7) summit in London as a forum for engaging with Carter for the purposes of persuading 
him to change tack.66 British analysts argued—presciently as it turned out in the case of 
Pakistan—that it was the cheaper, smaller, and easier to build gas centrifuge uranium 
enrichment technology that posed the greater global proliferation risk, contrary to the 
American position where reprocessing was the bête noire of a proliferation-free world.67 R. 
Scott Kemp argues that it was centrifuge-based enrichment and not giant, industrial scale 
processes such as gaseous diffusion or reprocessing, that invalidated the technology-based 
non-proliferation controls that were the foundation of the NPT, NSG, and Carter’s new anti-
proliferation strategy.68 A centrifuge plant was exactly the kind of nuclear facility that the 
more junior figures in the British government suspected Pakistan was attempting to build. 
Owen suggested a negotiating strategy that was predicated on British commercial interests, 
but couched within a framework of supporting non-proliferation. Rather than emphasising 
economic interests, Owen suggested, “we might point out that the provision of reprocessing 
services by nuclear weapons states could have the non-proliferation benefit of reducing the 
incentives for non-nuclear weapons states to acquire this capability.”69 With the THORP in 
the pipeline, the nuclear weapon states in question obviously included Britain.  
Behind the veil of non-proliferation, reprocessing had serious commercial 
implications, thus British attitudes towards reprocessing in general—and the Pakistani case 
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in particular—were based on a strategy designed not to prejudice wider British economic 
interests. Aside from the fact that British analysts suggested that reprocessing technology 
was “a door that was already jammed open,” US plans to have oversight over the 
reprocessing of US-origin fuel threatened the entire THORP programme. If the THORP did 
not go ahead, the economic implications were vast: loss of a multi-million pound Japanese 
contract; loss of future contracts; loss of wider infrastructural investment; loss of thousands 
of new jobs; and irretrievable damage to BNFL’s financial situation.70 This was to inform 
Callaghan’s position at the G7 summit.71 The Prime Minister was briefed to display a 
positive attitude towards Carter’s non-proliferation agenda while still making it clear that 
further study of both the proposals and their underlying assumptions was required. The FCO 
argued that a small, expert group should undertake such a study before the organising of 
INFCE even got underway.72 
Carter arrived in the UK on May 6.73 Callaghan saw the new President as a man 
whom he could get on with, in part because of their shared naval experience and Baptist 
upbringings. The Prime Minister believed that Carter was a neophyte in foreign policy who 
would need to turn to a wiser, more experienced head of state for advice.74 Callaghan hoped, 
somewhat parochially, that he could use this rapport to act as an intermediary between the 
American President and other European leaders, particularly the West German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt, whose relationship with Carter became increasingly difficult as the 1970s 
progressed.75 Callaghan had, with the consent of Giscard and Schmidt, persuaded Carter to 
add non-proliferation to the summit’s agenda. Before the summit, the State Department 
extensively briefed Carter on the appropriate approach to his fellow leaders, appealing to 
Carter the pragmatic politician rather than Carter the moralist, urging him to see the British, 
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French, West German, and Japanese points of view.76 However, the President still saw 
European anger over reprocessing as rooted in ruffled national pride over perceived US 
intrusion into their domestic and economic affairs.77 In viewing the allied positions through 
this particular lens, Carter failed to recognise that states such as Britain might have a genuine 
economic and physical need for reprocessing. However, the State Department appeals to 
reason prevailed and Carter was accommodating, reasonable, and pragmatic during the 
summit. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the summit’s non-proliferation session, 
where European leaders attacked Carter’s policy.78   
After testy exchanges between Schmidt, Giscard, and Canadian Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau, the British delegation finally offered their views. Owen supported the 
INFCE project but formally called for the prior investigation by a small group of experts that 
had been suggested before the summit, and reiterated the distinct problems Britain faced in 
dealing with spent nuclear fuel.79 Callaghan observed that negative perceptions of Carter's 
policies stemming from America’s wealthy, energy-rich status and not from concerns about 
non-proliferation made the President’s position more difficult. Of course, Callaghan noted, 
he fully accepted that the President founded his stand in a deep concern about nuclear 
proliferation. It was important, however, not to give the appearance of attempting to deprive 
other countries of the full benefits of nuclear technology.80 On the margins of the meeting, 
Patrick Moberly of the FCO spoke to Joe Nye, and the American had worried that a non-
proliferation communiqué from the summit might make it look to the rest of the world that 
INFCE was being ‘fixed’ by a cartel of the advanced nuclear supplier nations.81  
Notwithstanding the fractious nature of the debate, the overall outcome of the non-
proliferation discussions at the summit was positive. Callaghan recounted in his memoirs 
that despite the meeting’s at times acrimonious nature, it eased bilateral difficulties, lessened 
misunderstandings, and found “a useful method of carrying forward policy on a matter of 
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vital importance to the world’s future.”82 INFCE had been broadly agreed upon and the 
proposal for a smaller, two-month preparatory study was welcomed. What was particularly 
apparent were the differing perceptions of what posed the greater proliferation danger. In 
Carter’s eyes reprocessing and the plutonium economy were the main proliferation threats. 
For Britain, more heavily invested in reprocessing for domestic needs and as a source of 
revenue, centrifuge-based uranium enrichment programmes were far more dangerous in non-
proliferation terms. The GEN 74 pre-summit briefings also starkly illustrated the point made 
by British analysts: that giant industrial reprocessing mega-projects such as the THORP were 
not the way forward for states seeking weapons-grade fissile material. It was because of 
centrifuge-based enrichment that countries such as the People’s Republic of China and 
Pakistan could pursue (and in both cases successfully gain) nuclear capability. The Carter 
administration’s near obsession with reprocessing as a source of weapons-usable fissile 
material would—over the coming eighteen months—cause mounting evidence of the 
clandestine Pakistani enrichment programme to be sidelined, even when allies in London 
pointed out the existence of that programme. Britain’s discoveries about inverters pointed at 
the real direction in which Pakistan was heading to obtain the bomb. However, there was 
also a British interest in de-prioritising reprocessing because of the economically important 
THORP. 
 
The Transition from Bhutto to Zia 
One month after the G7 meetings took place in London, on July 5, the Pakistani military 
under the command of army Chief of Staff General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq ousted Bhutto, 
promising to hold new elections within ninety days. Military rule eventually lasted eleven 
years. Zia was a different sort of leader to Bhutto, seen by some British diplomats as taking 
action because of the corruption of the incumbent government.83 Like Carter, Zia was a man 
of profound religious faith, envisaging Pakistan as an ideological state founded on Islamic 
principles where the Muslim religion was a key part of civil and political life. He dreamt of 
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Pakistan holding a leadership position within the Islamic world, a dream that would come to 
encompass the nuclear weapons programme.84 
 Before Bhutto’s ousting, there had been further American efforts to gain concessions 
on the reprocessing plant. Despite indications by Bhutto that he would be willing to take part 
in constructive negotiations, US-Pakistani relations were sliding towards their lowest ebb 
yet. Bhutto accused the United States of conspiring against him by interfering in the recent 
election and argued once more that the Soviets were attempting to penetrate South Asia.85 
Although Bhutto made conciliatory noises in late May, Peter Constable—chargé d’affaires 
at the US embassy in Islamabad—expressed doubts about his sincerity.86 Such doubts were 
proved right in a meeting on the margins of the May Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation (CIEC) in Paris, when Vance avoided open confrontation with Aziz Ahmed 
over the nuclear issue. Ahmed, briefed extensively by Bhutto, again accused the Americans 
of electoral interference, of lacking commitment to Pakistan, and of discriminating against 
his nation’s nuclear energy programme. Vance backed away from the allegation of electoral 
interference, but sought to emphasise that the United States had itself chosen to forego 
reprocessing in favour of “less dangerous alternatives.”87 Consequently, Joe Nye was 
anxious not to give the impression that any French decision—should such a decision have 
been taken—was the result of American pressure. The Quai d’Orsay was conspicuously 
quiet, even going so far as to rebuff British enquiries about the status of the reprocessing 
plant deal.88 The contradictory messages coming from Paris and the Pakistani accusations of 
electoral interference all amounted to a continuation of the confusing situation surrounding 
the reprocessing plant. 
 Relations between Washington and Islamabad were deteriorating because of several 
factors. The two main contributors to this decline were mounting US suspicions that the 
Pakistanis had military intentions for their nuclear programme and Bhutto’s belief that 
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America was conspiring with his political opponents to remove him from power. By the 
beginning of June, Carter caused outrage in Pakistan by rescinding the Ford-era offer of A-7 
attack aircraft. The withdrawal of the offer came about because of mounting evidence that 
Pakistan was purchasing the reprocessing plant as part of a nuclear weapons programme and 
Carter’s evolving policies on conventional arms sales. These policies were given concrete 
form by Presidential Directive 13 (PD-13), which established a policy of conventional arms 
sales restraint and—significantly for the Pakistan situation—stated, “[T]he United States will 
not be the first supplier to introduce into a region an advanced weapons system which 
creates a new or significantly higher combat capability.”89 The A-7 announcement caused a 
furore not only because of its nature, but also because of the exceptionally poor handling of 
the information release. Carter had made the decision on April 9 in a marginal note for 
Brzezinski. The National Security Adviser had held onto the information for over a month. 
There was, it transpired, never any formal Presidential notification of the decision and leaks 
to the media forced the official announcement out of the administration.90 Carter demanded 
that Vance explain how the debacle had occurred and it transpired that a State Department 
press officer released the information before any official decision on the date of the 
announcement from the DoD and NSC.91 
 The withdrawal of the A-7 offer was a strand of a much harder-line stance on the 
Pakistani nuclear programme that attempted to tread a fine line between a lack of action and 
the imposition of Congressionally mandated sanctions. There was, however, considerable 
confusion over the application of various legal restrictions on aid to near-nuclear nations. 
Newspapers had recently carried stories about technology transfers from France to Pakistan, 
giving rise to administration worries about a run-in with Congressional representatives who 
asked why the administration had not applied the Symington Amendment, terminating all 
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economic assistance.92 Government legal advisers had stated that the Amendment need not 
be applied, due to “negotiations in good faith” being conducted by the US, France, and 
Pakistan.93 The State Department wanted to discuss the issue with key Congressional figures 
to avoid an immediate and damaging imposition of the Symington Amendment.94 
Vance decided to wait for six to eight weeks before making a decision on the 
Symington Amendment, to quietly brief key Congressional figures on the situation, and to 
try and obtain concessions from the new military government in Pakistan.95 Vance argued 
that over-enthusiasm in the application of the law—which Pakistan would interpret as a 
“slap” at the new government—could retard efforts to successfully conclude the nuclear 
negotiations with Islamabad.96 Intelligence indicated that Pakistan might be attempting to 
obtain nuclear raw material and technology supplies from China, Niger (who, as a majority 
Islamic country, would become more prominent in 1979), and South Africa.97 It was clear to 
Vance that Pakistan would be able to do nothing with uranium supplies unless it had access 
to fuel fabrication services, services that the French had declined to offer. Here was a key 
pressure point in the non-proliferation campaign: “By constraining Pakistani access to 
nuclear fuel services wherever possible, pressure can be built up to encourage Pakistan to 
adopt and follow responsible non-proliferation policies, including cancellation or indefinite 
deferral of its reprocessing project.”98 Vance argued that, in a climate of warming Sino-US 
relations, the PRC could be a useful ally in Pakistani-focused non-proliferation activity.99 
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When Vance visited Beijing, the Secretary of State noted that the nuclear issue was the main 
obstacle to continued good relations with Pakistan. The hope was that a new government 
would finally set aside reprocessing ambitions in favour of a nuclear fuel supply agreement 
with the US.100 Despite all of this, the President had agreed to authorise in principle the cash 
sale of 40 F-5E fighter aircraft to Pakistan, a move intended to dampen Pakistani demands 
for the much more powerful and advanced A-7.101 
 Joe Nye was dispatched to Islamabad at the end of July to engage in a two-pronged 
assault on Pakistani nuclear ambitions: to try and get at least a delay in the reprocessing plant 
deal; and to get Pakistan to join the inaugural INFCE meeting due to take place on October 
19-21.102 Nye’s mission used coercion, rather than bribery, but with little expectation of 
demonstrable results.103 Like Kissinger before him, Nye hid behind Congress, telling Agha 
Shahi and Munir Khan that unless they withdrew from the reprocessing plant deal, the US 
would have no option but to cut off all economic assistance under the terms of the 
Symington or Glenn Amendments. As Dennis Kux contends, the fact that Pakistan had 
agreed to special international safeguards on its nuclear facilities made little impression on 
the US nuclear specialists. Shahi and Khan informed Nye that the reprocessing plant would 
go ahead and the American left Islamabad with nothing to show for his efforts.104 Robin 
Fearn reflected on Nye’s sojourn and Pakistani recalcitrance surrounding the reprocessing 
plant. “On the evidence of the Nye visit, there is little scope for further US pressure until 
after October [the proposed timing of Pakistani elections],” he noted “But the omens are 
scarcely encouraging.”105 
 With these discouraging omens hanging in the air, Carter decided in September to 
cut off economic aid without invoking the Symington or Glenn Amendments, a decision that 
was an outcome of Nye’s fruitless July mission. The CIA had argued that success in 
obtaining conventional military aid or gaining nuclear capability might reduce Pakistan’s 
determination to acquire the other. However, the administration’s non-proliferation and 
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conventional arms control policies mutually frustrated both objectives simultaneously. Thus, 
the Carter administration seriously undermined its own ‘sticks and carrots.’ The intelligence 
agency suggested that Pakistani anger might translate into encouragement—within limits 
necessary to maintain the support of friendly Muslim states—for the more outspoken 
developing world nations to reject the whole spectrum of US policies, including human 
rights.106 The US government cut off of aid was enforced without any formal announcement 
in the hope that the diplomatic fallout could be minimised. This was a forlorn hope as US-
Pakistani relations reached their lowest ebb. 
In light of this collapse in relations, Arthur Hummel in Islamabad argued that, after 
Zia’s postponement of elections, the US needed to re-think its Pakistan strategy. The 
ambassador asked permission to engage in private, backchannel discussions with the 
Pakistani military leader.107 Hummel also called for the lifting of the aid embargo as the 
French government was attempting to work out how it could gracefully and finally back out 
of the reprocessing contract. For Hummel, this represented the “virtual achievement of our 
objective of assuring that the existing contract for a reprocessing plant in Pakistan will not be 
carried out.”108 Hummel argued that there had been no violation of the appropriate US 
legislation and that to perpetuate a tough stance on aid only served to further damage US-
Pakistani relations.109 In Paris, Hummel’s counterpart Arthur Hartman expressed serious 
reservations about an early end to the aid cut-off, arguing that it would send the wrong 
message and make it appear to the French that the administration was not genuinely serious 
about non-proliferation. Hartman argued there would also be a negative domestic impact, 
with Congress assuming that a French decision had been made on the reprocessing plant that 
tallied with US objectives when that was clearly not the case.110 
While Washington digested the Hummel and Hartman telegrams, it was clear that 
the Pakistani military government had lost none of the Bhutto-era desire for the nuclear 
option. Brzezinski observed that Pakistani diplomats were trying to reduce the impact of the 
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upcoming inaugural INFCE organising conference that Pakistan saw as a “vehicle to threaten 
the agreement [between France and Pakistan].” Furthermore, Brzezinski argued that the 
Pakistani government had been making it clear that “the issue has become one of national 
sovereignty and honor, making it impossible for any Pakistani leader government or leader 
to give up the plant or to acquiesce in non-implementation of the agreement with France.”111 
Pakistan had been reticent to get involved in the INFCE discussions, claiming that the 
‘interim’ government could not take any major decisions on the nuclear issue.112 Because of 
the lack of progress on the reprocessing front, Zia was under pressure from Bhutto’s 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). While Bhutto languished in a Rawalpindi jail, his party 
claimed that the Martial Law Administrator had secretly “knuckled under” to the Americans. 
This was, Foreign Secretary Shahanawaz stated, a major reason why the Pakistani 
government could not participate in INFCE at this time, despite the fact that Pakistan was the 
only country that had replied in the negative.113 Pakistani refusal to attend the opening 
INFCE meetings was, for the British Embassy in Islamabad, not entirely unexpected. The 
Pakistanis were seen as making political capital from the reprocessing plant and INFCE 
situations, claiming that “industrialised countries are intent on hindering third world 
development” and that the way to control proliferation lay in “negotiated and enlightened 
self-restraint rather than manipulating or withholding nuclear technology.”114  
 In the meantime, Pakistan had rejected a French proposal to restructure the 
reprocessing plant, making its output useless for weapons production—so-called ‘co-
processing.’ This confirmed to US observers that the plant was primarily a component of a 
nuclear weapons programme. This turn of events was also persuasive for the French, who 
promised not to supply any further “sensitive” components to their customer and were 
seeking ways to abrogate the contract. According to the State Department’s Alfred Atherton 
and George Vest, it was vital, if for nothing more than French domestic stability, that news 
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of this change in posture not be leaked.115 The Pakistani domestic situation was also volatile, 
making it difficult for the Zia administration to renege on the deal. Likewise, for the State 
Department, immediate discussions with Congress on a resumption of aid were impossible 
because of the publicly stated intentions of France and Pakistan to go through with the deal. 
Such was Carter’s desire to pass the NNPA that anything that could harm the fragile 
relationship between administration and Congress must be kept under wraps.116 Because of 
this, Vance instructed Hummel to open a channel to Zia in order to maintain good relations, 
but observed that nothing could be done on aid for at least two to three weeks. Hummel was 
also asked to emphasise sensitivity to Pakistani security concerns, express support of a South 
Asian joint declaration on nuclear weapons, explain the ramifications of US laws (such as 
the Symington and Glenn Amendments) to Zia, and to reiterate the domestic context of the 
US position.117 Vance instructed Hartman to keep pressure on the French, and to remind 
Giscard’s government of the statements that, if Pakistan rejected the restructuring offer, 
France would quit the contract.118 
 
While Pakistan was kept under pressure, Carter was about to inaugurate one of the 
cornerstones of his wider anti-proliferation policy: the INFCE conference. American 
scrutiny of British nuclear policy before the INFCE meeting highlights the contours of 
agreement and disagreement between the US and UK on non-proliferation. The US embassy 
in London argued that Callaghan’s government were a good deal more sceptical about the 
usefulness of technological solutions to the proliferation problem and comfortable with far 
more ambiguity in non-proliferation policy. A key factor was the importance that Britain 
attached to reprocessing—typified by the THORP—as a vital part of both its energy and 
economic plans. Despite all of this, US diplomats in London did not question Britain’s 
dedication to the cause of non-proliferation and contended that the UK was ready to act with 
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the USA as long as its national interests were not threatened.119 Three weeks after the 
submission of this report, Callaghan admitted to visiting Congressmen that UK signals on 
reprocessing might be confusing. According to the recollections of Callaghan’s American 
guests, the Prime Minister stressed that he “would be ready to meet with the US if UK 
actions seemed to stand in the way of arrangements following from INFCE,” but he also 
firmly believed that there was plenty of time to ensure that non-proliferation took hold.120 
In advance of the INFCE conference, British ministers and officials were expressing 
concerns about both the conference and non-proliferation in general. David Owen’s view 
was that the US non-proliferation gaze was almost wholly focused on INFCE, an 
undertaking that the United Kingdom must not passively allow the USA to dominate.121 
Owen outlined the British government’s non-proliferation stance in a warmly praised speech 
to the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Speaking before a receptive audience, the 
Foreign Secretary argued that Britain had a major voice, significant standing, and a duty to 
be involved in international nuclear affairs.122 Using a memorable turn of phrase, Owen 
stated that when it came to nuclear proliferation, “there are savage risks in doing nothing.”123 
In a move deliberately calculated to publicise British commercial interests, Owen also made 
the case for a strong, well-regulated reprocessing industry, an industry that would, of course, 
be dominated by countries such as Britain and France.124 For the GEN 74 meeting on May 
20, FCO analysts made clear that the government should use the fuel cycle evaluation 
discussions as a means to defend British commercial interests by ensuring it could enter into 
international reprocessing contracts. Just like France and its Pakistani contract, British 
officials had concluded that selling reprocessing services was more profitable than selling 
the technology itself. Furthermore, if the UK were to join INFCE, then the discussions 
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should be based on the UK view of the reality of the nuclear world, rather than US theorising 
about it.125  
The inaugural INFCE conference finally took place on October 19-21 in 
Washington, Carter opening the discussions with a broad reflection on its aims, purposes, 
and his hopes for a productive—although doubtless argumentative—discussion on the global 
dimensions of the nuclear fuel cycle, including those who were “unfortunately” nuclear 
weapon states.126 Joe Nye, writing for the journal Foreign Affairs in 1978, explained the 
purpose of INFCE as an environment where “the supplier countries and the consumer 
countries [can] come together to study the technical and institutional problems of organizing 
the nuclear fuel cycle in ways which provide energy without providing weapons.”127 The 
final communiqué of the first meeting noted that non-proliferation action should be taken 
without jeopardising international energy supplies and that special consideration must be 
given to the needs of developing nations.128 In the wake of the conference, Pakistan finally 
acceded to US demands and joined INFCE on a limited basis.129 
 
Britain: Reprocessing, Inverters, and Jaguars 
Concurrent with the American wrangling over the reprocessing plant, arms sales, and 
Pakistan’s involvement in INFCE, Britain’s government maintained roles in combating and 
encouraging the Pakistani nuclear programme. In terms of combating the nuclear 
programme, there were on-going British efforts to ascertain the nature of the inverter order 
and its connections to a clandestine Pakistani enrichment programme. A constellation of 
problems meant that British efforts to hinder Pakistani purchasing actually achieved little 
during this period. Additionally, the ongoing British attempts to gain massive arms contracts 
from the sub-continent and the continuing debates over the THORP exerted a negative 
influence on non-proliferation efforts. These two strands were the mainstay of UK 
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involvement in the Pakistani nuclear problem through the second half of 1977 and into 1978. 
Arms sales and domestic reprocessing highlight the level at which British commercial 
interests superseded non-proliferation interests. 
 The main British worry throughout this period remained the EEIC inverter order. 
Discussions continued about the possible Pakistani uranium enrichment programme while 
the UK stayed in the background of the reprocessing plant fracas. Ian Cromartie’s belief that 
the West German government would shortly get back to him on the issue of inverters being 
funnelled to Pakistan by a West German consultancy was tragically optimistic. By the end of 
February the Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office) and the Bundesministerium für 
Forschung und Technologie (Federal Ministry of Research and Technology) had made vague 
assertions that there were no grounds for believing the inverters were intended for a 
centrifuge enrichment plant.130 The confusion and inertia surrounding the inverter sale meant 
that the British government took no action by the time Islamabad accepted the EEIC tender 
in the middle of March.131 The FCO thought that stopping the export was impossible, but all 
the interested departments thought it worthwhile getting Cromartie in Bonn to again contact 
the Auswärtiges Amt.132 
Throughout April and May Cromartie kept pressure on the West German 
government with the aim of getting a final decision on whether or not the inverters fell under 
German export restrictions.133 By June, Cromartie had lost patience with Georg-Heinrich von 
Neubronner (his contact in the Auswärtiges Amt) whom he described as “stonewalling”, and 
took advantage of an absence to approach Werner Rouget, Neubronner’s head of department, 
who appeared to take the case far more seriously.134 Despite this approach, Cromartie was 
now pessimistic about a speedy answer from the Germans.135 
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By September, the Bundesamt für Gewerbliche Wirtschaft (BAGW, Federal Office 
for Industrial Economics–the department that made decisions on whether German goods 
were permitted to be exported) had informed Cromartie that, although they believed the 
inverters were indeed for use in a enrichment centrifuge facility, the inverters in question 
were not covered by German export laws because they were produced and exported by a 
British company.136 Although the FRG had, in the words of Ian Cromartie, “put the ball 
firmly back in our court,” the Germans still felt that the British had discovered a loophole in 
the nuclear suppliers guidelines that required discussing in the near future.137  
After a hiatus of nearly nine months, German disavowal of any responsibility for the 
inverter order re-invigorated debate in London. The export of the first shipment of inverters 
was due to take place in September, placing the government in a legal quandary. If the 
inverters were “trigger listable”, the export should be stopped, an action that would leave the 
government open to a compensation claim from EEIC.138 The government’s legal advisors 
regarded the entire situation as opaque, both in terms of the chain of export and in the 
inverters’ relationship to the NSG trigger list.139 Legal advice was inconclusive and the 
corresponding adviser suggested obtaining more technical expertise from BNFL and the 
DoE.140 
 By September 30, the DoE were determined to have the export stopped, while 
leaving EEIC “in the best possible position” to make a claim for compensation to the 
Pakistani, rather than the British, government.141 However, the export went through, 
determination to prevent the dispatch of inverters to Pakistan hamstrung by a dubious legal 
case and the inadequate nature of the NSG trigger list. By this stage, EEIC had shipped the 
first batch of inverters to Rawalpindi, with the next batch due to go sometime towards the 
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end of November. The DoE wondered about asking the Pakistanis about end-uses, although 
this could result in a situation where the government must either believe the Pakistanis’ 
statement that the inverters were not for enrichment centrifuges, or create a diplomatic 
incident by accusing Islamabad of lying.142 A situation where EEIC might have a moral or 
legal claim for compensation from the British government was also something best avoided, 
even if TEAM Industries turned out to be “men of straw.”143 In opposition to the DoE stance, 
the DoT was sceptical about the end use of the inverters, but the consensus between the 
interested parties of the FCO, MoD, DoE, and BNFL was that they could be used to drive 
uranium enrichment centrifuges.144 If the view was taken that the inverters were not covered 
by the NSG trigger list, the FRG government would need to be informed and was thought 
likely to blame the UK for not stopping the export. An interdepartmental meeting suggested 
that the ideal rejoinder would be to remind the West Germans that their failure to respond to 
British enquiries for nine months left “insufficient time for mutual consideration of the 
trigger list definition, and for executive action here if the export was to be prevented.”145 The 
eventual decision was that there were very poor grounds for stopping the export because of 
an insufficient legal basis and the FCO opinion that inverters were not on the NSG trigger 
list. A cross-departmental decision was taken to look at modifying export controls to catch 
such items in the future, to inform the FRG, and to inform the British Embassy in Islamabad 
of the background, asking consular officials to report any information that might come to 
light on the end use of the inverters.146 Here, the British government found itself caught 
between an obvious case of proliferation, a dubious legal case for stopping an export, and the 
inadequacies of existing international non-proliferation agreements. In this instance, the 
government erred on the side of caution. However, this was only just the beginning. Over the 
next few years, Britain—unlike other supplier states such as West Germany—would take a 
strong stance on the export of ‘grey area’ technology, repeatedly upgrade export restrictions, 
and place considerable diplomatic pressure on other nuclear technology supplier states. 
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 The conclusions reached in September did not curtail further discussion. The UK 
informed the US for the first time about the suspected clandestine Pakistani enrichment 
efforts. Over dinner in Vienna, Michael Wilmshurst informally acquainted a surprised Lou 
Nosenzo with the case as an example of the complexities inherent in interpreting the NSG 
trigger list. Nosenzo claimed this was the first time he had heard suggestions that Pakistan 
had embarked on a centrifuge programme, and advised Wilmshurst that he would investigate 
further upon his return to Washington and pass on any US information.147 This dinner 
conversation is doubly significant. As noted, it is the first documentary evidence showing 
British communication with the United States on the issue of the clandestine programme. 
More importantly, archival research has not revealed evidence of American reaction to the 
news. Indeed, US officials would not react to the Pakistani uranium enrichment programme 
until the late summer of 1978.  
 The late September decisions also bore little fruit in terms of further retarding the 
export of inverters to Pakistan. The West German government was adamant that Germany 
held no responsibility for the export and that British arguments in favour of new restrictions 
would have to be particularly convincing. Michael Wilmshurst angrily noted on the dispatch 
from Bonn “Indeed—the FRG kept us waiting 9 months for an answer!”148 By this point, the 
MoD had made further expert enquiries and had concluded that the only possible use for the 
inverters was in a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment programme. MoD analysts believed 
that each inverter was able to control a cascade of 1,000 centrifuges, with the total order able 
to drive enough of the machines to produce enriched uranium for ten or more nuclear 
weapons per year. Reflecting on long-held suspicions that Pakistan was aiming for nuclear 
weapons capability, Dr. M. H. Dean of the MoD stated, “We regard this development as a 
most disturbing one. Our advice is to stop the export if at all possible.”149 Dean’s advice was 
too little, too late.  
 There were further inconclusive exchanges between the FCO and DoE centred on an 
exchange of “suppliers notes”—essentially written assurances as to the end uses of the 
inverters—with the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis might well lie about the end uses of the 
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inverters, the FCO’s Martin Bourke noted, but at least their response would be on record, 
hedging against future embarrassment.150 Michael James of the DoE supported an exchange 
of suppliers’ notes, but argued that such action should only be taken if it was possible to 
prevent exports.151 James put the ball back in the FCO’s court, causing confusion for Bourke, 
who noted, “Surely it is D/En [Department of Energy] who make the policy decision on 
whether or not to export[?]”152 Wilmshurst argued that although stopping the export would 
be nearly impossible, “that is not really the point of my suggestion that we try such an 
Exchange of Notes; the point is that if we propose such an exchange and the Pakistanis 
accepted, our requirements would be met; if they refused, we should then have good grounds 
for informing the Nuclear Suppliers Group that the refusal suggests that the Pakistanis might 
be building an illicit enrichment plant.”153 
 After this exchange, discussion of the inverter problem petered out until it 
dramatically resurfaced in March 1978. The entire episode—from discovery of the order in 
late 1976 to the failure to prevent the export one year later—is hugely significant for the 
story of British and American attempts to frustrate Pakistani nuclear aspirations. The widely 
accepted narrative on the Pakistani enrichment programme popularised in the work of 
Armstrong and Trento, Frantz and Collins, Weissman and Krosney, and others posits that 
Pakistan was able to build its enrichment facilities due to the incompetence, blindness, or 
willingness to allow Pakistani nuclear weapons development on the part of the United 
Kingdom and the United States.154 This narrative does not benefit from the evidence that the 
British government was deeply concerned about a Pakistani uranium enrichment programme 
and took the prospect extremely seriously. The issues in play were not incompetence, 
blindness, or an obscure desire to permit nuclear proliferation, but the confused and 
incomplete nature of the NSG trigger list, the complexities of international diplomacy 
regarding such a sensitive subject as proliferation, fear of being blamed for damaging the 
economic prospects of British companies (even though the government accepted that some 
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economic sacrifices would have to be made), and the difficulty of being absolutely certain of 
the end uses of the inverters. All of this made for a situation where the British government 
found itself in an extremely difficult position and largely had little success in its attempts to 
hinder the clandestine Pakistani programme. The difficulty would not ease as more evidence 
of clandestine Pakistani purchasing came to light. However, Britain would take a leading 
role in diplomatically combating the Pakistani enrichment programme but—as had been the 
case in 1977 and early 1978—would find itself hampered by the non-proliferation stances of 
other states and the complexities of maintaining a relationship with Islamabad while secretly 
trying to frustrate Pakistan’s national nuclear ambitions. 
 
Britain continued its attempts to juggle commercial and non-proliferation priorities when 
reinvigorated Jaguar negotiations came under increasing pressure from the United States. 
Discussions at the British High Commission in New Delhi underscored that there was 
potential for a Jaguar sale to India and Pakistan. Although the Indians had repeatedly 
delayed negotiations, Britain saw them as the better commercial prospect. British diplomats 
who discussed the issue in New Delhi argued that efforts to stimulate Pakistani interest, 
limited as it was, should be concealed from the Indians.155 During Anglo-American 
discussions in Islamabad that covered arms sales and the nuclear issue, Hummel attempted to 
pressure the British delegation into not selling Jaguar to either India or Pakistan. The British 
side, knowing the stipulations of the Carter position on conventional arms sales, argued that 
Jaguar was not an improvement on weapons already in the region.156 When Vance briefed 
Carter for an upcoming visit to India, British arms sales loomed large on the agenda. 
Following on from the US policy of restraint in arms sales to South Asia—typified by the A-
7 decision—Vance urged Carter to request that India show similar restraint in its own arms 
purchases. Tacitly, this meant Jaguar.157  
 In a meeting on December 2 in Washington, the issues of the Pakistani nuclear 
programme and British arms sales collided again when American officials implied that the 
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British sale of Jaguar to India would push Pakistan even further down the nuclear path.158 
Richard Ericsson (of the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs) outlined the 
difficult American decision to halt the A-7 sale and the serious domestic consequences this 
entailed for the administration and the manufacturer. Jaguar, the Americans argued, was 
qualitatively superior to any other aircraft in the region and an Indian purchase could 
provoke Pakistan to “escalation and an arms race.”159 Back in London, the SAD outlined the 
compelling reasons for ignoring the US protestations: if the sale did not go ahead, aircraft 
production lines may have to close and Britain’s overall aircraft sales strategy would suffer a 
setback. In terms of foreign affairs, India would perceive this as a judgement on them and 
more widely, it would appear as if the British government had capitulated in the face of  
American demands.160 
As the State Department maintained pressure on the FCO, Donald Murray, the 
leader of the British delegation, questioned the American assertion that selling Jaguar to 
India would push Pakistan further towards the nuclear option and challenged the US view 
that Jaguar represented a vast improvement in Indian capabilities. Murray characterised US 
opposition as being within the context of an outmoded view of the sub-continent and because 
of the A-7 manufacturers’ fury at the cancellation. There was also a European dimension. If 
Britain pulled out, Murray considered it likely that “the unscrupulous French” would pick up 
the contract with their Mirage aircraft.161 If Britain withdrew from the competition, someone 
else was bound to pick up the sale. The government would therefore be depriving the 
country of valuable export earnings while doing nothing to alter the situation on the sub-
continent.162 David Owen accepted the arguments in favour of the sale and on December 21, 
he dispatched a note to his subordinates: “I agree completely. Push ahead with this sale. If 
we can land it, I will be pleased.”163 The US State Department was most certainly not 
pleased. On the very last day of December 1977, it was noted that the Indian purchase of 
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Jaguar would “cause considerable alarm in Pakistan and could set off an arms race in South 
Asia.”164 
The Indian Jaguar contract and its connections to the Pakistani nuclear programme 
provide an illustrative case of British willingness to participate in non-proliferation activity 
coming up against the hard realities of an economy in crisis. Given David Owen’s personal 
liking for arms-control and non-proliferation policies, the case demonstrates that the 
economic and political need for commercial gains could override anti-nuclear 
considerations. When major British commercial interests remained unthreatened—as with 
the inverter situation—the UK was strongly anti-proliferation. Where commercial 
considerations above a certain magnitude were concerned—such as the THORP or the 
Jaguar contract—the UK government subordinated non-proliferation to the wellbeing of the 
British economy. The Jaguar case in particular also illustrates the quite different perceptions 
of the situation in London and Washington. The State Department firmly believed that 
selling a supposedly nuclear-capable, advanced strike aircraft to India would alarm the 
Pakistanis so much that they would be even more determined to gain nuclear capability as a 
hedge against increased Indian military superiority. The FCO, from Owen on down, was 
unconvinced by this argument and—because of what were fundamentally economic 
imperatives—compartmentalised arms sales to India and the Pakistani nuclear problem. 
Furthermore, this also demonstrates the lack of influence that the United States could bring 
to bear on its key ally when hundreds of millions of pounds of foreign investment were at 
stake. The situation would continue to evolve in 1978 and 1979 and, as will be demonstrated 
in subsequent chapters, became a source of increasing frustration for the United States and 
the cause of British resentment at American interference in its commercial affairs. 
 
The US and Pakistan After the INFCE Meeting 
In the wake of the first INFCE meeting and Pakistan’s decision to have a limited part in 
future discussions, there were significant further developments. Brzezinski agreed to a US 
abstention from a UN General Assembly (UNGA) vote on a SANWFZ proposal by Pakistan, 
a proposal that the Pakistanis had been pushing since the Indian test in 1974. Brzezinski’s 
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staff believed that the proposal was simply a Pakistani political ploy and a positive US vote 
could seriously damage the warming US-Indian relationship and, furthermore, unless China 
was party to the SANWFZ, India would have nothing to do with it.165 There was, however, a 
later shift in attitude during a further round of voting, when both the US and UK voted in 
favour of the SANWFZ proposal, a move that was enthusiastically welcomed in 
Islamabad.166  
 By the end of 1977, the French government had—it appeared—finally agreed to 
abandon the Pakistani reprocessing deal. The situation was problematic for all concerned. 
Even though France had informed Pakistan and the US that the deal was now off, the French 
did not want the news made public due to the adverse effect it might have on the Giscard 
government’s chances in the March 1978 legislative elections. This placed the Carter 
administration in a difficult situation: the US government could now resume aid to Pakistan 
and patch up relations with Zia but to do so would mean explaining the French cancellation 
to Congress, an action that would automatically mean that the information would become 
public.167 Joe Nye opined that such an eventuality might come to pass anyway, as the 
Pakistanis were apparently briefing their domestic press to expect an unfavourable French 
announcement.168 The French decision was a victory of sorts for the United States. Even 
though the change in attitude could not be announced or used overtly, it was a worthwhile 
outcome to months of often painful and protracted diplomacy.  
 Just past the first anniversary of Carter’s inauguration, Vance submitted a lengthy 
report on proliferation, asking the question, “where are we after the first year?”169 There 
were some successes to reflect upon: the final publication of the NSG trigger list in January; 
the welcome given to INFCE; and most importantly, the increased prominence of non-
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proliferation as an international issue.170 On the negative side, Vance expressed doubt about 
the firmness of the French decision on Pakistan and reflected upon the lack of progress 
regarding the FRG-Brazil nuclear deal. The Secretary of State contended that the new non-
proliferation policy had left the US relatively isolated, arguing, 
We must recognise, however, that while we have sensitized the international 
community to the dangers of proliferation, we remain essentially isolated (with 
Canada and Australia) among the major industrialized states in questioning the 
inevitability of moving toward reprocessing and early commercialization of breeder 
technology. The prevailing attitude remains that non-proliferation goals can be 
pursued without conflict with perceived energy needs if reliance is placed on 
political and safeguards arrangements rather than limits on technology. The success 
of our policy will depend to a great extent on our ability to reconcile these 
differences.171 
 
Again, a key figure in the Carter administration had failed to note the genuine economic 
concerns expressed by the UK and others surrounding abandoning reprocessing. Likewise, 
the focus remained on reprocessing and plutonium as the primary proliferation route. Once 
again, centrifuge-based programmes went unremarked. However, Vance’s scepticism about 
the reprocessing plant was well founded. The issue would rumble on into 1978 as Pakistan 
attempted to keep the deal alive. 
By early March, after being passed by overwhelming majorities in both houses, 
Carter signed into law the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 with the intent of bringing 
to a halt “the spread of nuclear weapons capability while preserving the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy.”172 The NNPA placed strict criteria on US nuclear exports and required the 
renegotiation of existing agreements to bring them into line with the new policy. Any 
countries embarking on a nuclear weapons programme, assisting others to do so, or failing to 
submit to full-scope safeguards inspections would have all US cooperation terminated.173 As 
J. Samuel Walker has noted, the NNPA enshrined distrust of foreign countries when it came 
to non-proliferation matters.174 In an extreme interpretation, the Act served warning to the 
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nuclear-exporting states of Europe to bring their own nuclear export activities into line with 
those of the United States or face the consequences. For Britain, the NNPA could 
theoretically precipitate an economic disaster by destroying the basis for the THORP. 
  
Britain, Pakistan, and the Reprocessing Issue After the INFCE Meeting 
Irrespective of Britain’s own reprocessing ambitions, Callaghan’s government—less well 
informed than the Americans about evolving French thinking—continued in its attempts to 
wheedle information on the Pakistani reprocessing plant out of the Quai d’Orsay. 
Callaghan’s impending visit to India and Pakistan necessitated more detailed information, 
even though the British Embassy in Paris had previously advised the FCO not to press the 
French government too hard on the reprocessing plant issue. With Zia having now 
consolidated his power in Pakistan, Whitehall wanted to know more about the Pakistani 
leader’s attitudes towards the reprocessing plant and the French stance on the issue in order 
to assess how much scope Callaghan had for influencing Zia’s position.175 Responding to 
British enquiries, the French were coy. According to the Quai d’Orsay, the reprocessing deal 
was—by early December—in a state of “pause,” but from the French point of view, there 
was little diminution in Pakistani determination to go ahead with the reprocessing facility 
and little hope for Pakistani acceptance of full fuel cycle safeguards.176 In private, French 
officials admitted to British diplomats that they found themselves in something of an 
embarrassing position, having decided that the reprocessing plant contract was a bad idea but 
not wanting to lose credibility by appearing to cave in to American pressure.177 British 
consular officials in Paris believed that the French were doing their best to frustrate the 
contract, while in public Giscard’s government was still committed to the deal and expressed 
faith in Pakistani assurances that the plant would not be used for military purposes.178 From 
Islamabad, Kit Burdess commented that US diplomats seemed resigned to the fact that there 
was no moving the Zia government on the reprocessing issue. French reluctance to take 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 Cortazzi to James, ‘Pakistan Nuclear: French Reprocessing Plant,’ November 30, 1977, TNA FCO37/2066. 
176 James to Cortazzi, ‘Pakistan Nuclear: French Reprocessing Plant,’ December 11, 1977, TNA FCO37/2066, 1-
2. 
177 UKE Paris to FCO, ‘French Sale of Nuclear Reprocessing Plant to Pakistan,’ January 9, 1978, TNA 
FCO96/822. 
178 Macrae to Wilmshurst, ‘Supply of a Reprocessing Plant by France to Pakistan,’ January 13, 1978, TNA 
FCO96/822, 2; UKE Paris to FCO, ‘MIPT,’ January 10, 1978, TNA FCO96/822. 
! 126!
public action on the deal might, Burdess suggested, stem from wider commercial interests 
such as the Saviem truck plant discussed earlier in the year.179 
Britain sprang to prominence in Pakistan with a raft of press stories that suggested 
the UK supported the wide availability of reprocessing plants. Headlines such as “UK Backs 
N-plant Stand by Pakistan” caused John Bushell to urgently request clarification from 
London. According to Bushell, the Pakistani media was reporting that the United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) had stated that withholding reprocessing facilities could 
not control proliferation and that reprocessing was an essential part of nuclear power 
programmes.180 The FCO suspected that the mistaken headlines came from speeches by 
British officials, submissions to the Windscale enquiry, or from the UKAEA annual 
report.181 Owen told Bushell that if queried by Pakistani officials, the ambassador should 
adopt the line that: 
...the UK has had a large and sophisticated nuclear industry for over 25 years, of 
which reprocessing has formed a major part. As the UK is a nuclear weapon state 
proliferation dangers do not arise. Pakistan, on the other hand, has no such industrial 
or economic requirement for reprocessing, and she is not a nuclear weapon state. 
The circumstances are not, therefore, comparable.182 
 
Owen’s justifications highlight the problematic nature of British domestic nuclear policy 
when it came to dealing with the Pakistani situation and the stark division that arose between 
the nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have nots.’ The arguments made by Pakistan in favour of having a 
domestic reprocessing capability—energy needs and the economic basis—were identical to 
the British justifications for the THORP. Hence, the British reticence to become deeply 
involved in anti-reprocessing plant diplomacy, even though Owen attempted to delineate a 
qualitative difference between British and Pakistani needs and capabilities, predicated on the 
fact that Britain was a nuclear weapon state. This conflicted with Carter’s desire that every 
state should be a ‘have not’ in terms of reprocessing, even though he had grudgingly 
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conceded that states—such as Britain and France—with existing reprocessing facilities 
should be allowed to retain them. 
 Between January 11 and 13, Jim Callaghan visited Pakistan—the first visit by a 
major Western political leader since the military takeover—as part of his tour of the sub-
continent. Just before Callaghan left New Delhi for Islamabad, Owen sent an urgent 
telegram advising that the Prime Minister should not raise the topic of reprocessing and 
instead try to persuade the Pakistanis to accept full fuel cycle safeguards on their nuclear 
facilities.183 In the midst of the pomp, ceremony, and exclamations of mutual affection, 
Callaghan emphasised to his hosts UK concerns about democracy, non-proliferation, and—
contrary to Owen’s advice—the reprocessing plant.184 During their private conversations, Zia 
apparently stated his willingness to sign up to the NPT and to accept full safeguards, 
although Agha Shahi later struck a note of caution regarding this new found enthusiasm for 
the treaty.185 The most significant conversations took place outside of the Callaghan-Zia 
meetings, when officials from both nations discussed the nuclear issue and the potential for 
formal talks in London. Agha Shahi was particularly interested in nuclear guarantees from 
nuclear weapons states to non-nuclear weapon states, and hoped for a sympathetic hearing 
from the British. The prospect of Anglo-Pakistani nuclear talks in London was guardedly 
welcomed and the FCO hurriedly put plans in place for a meeting sometime in February to 
discuss security assurances and transfers of nuclear technology.186 
 The hastily convened Anglo-Pakistani nuclear talks took place in London on 
February 23. The discussions followed a familiar pattern, with the Pakistanis seeking nuclear 
security assurances that would be operative against India, and the British attempting to cajole 
their guests into providing some assurances that they would consider full fuel cycle 
safeguards or even sign up to the NPT. Naiz Naik, Additional Foreign Secretary in the 
Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued that security assurances were vital for the 
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“safety and security of the third world.”187 Neither side in the discussions mentioned the 
reprocessing plant or the clandestine uranium enrichment programme. Despite mutual 
declarations of respect, these talks were fruitless beyond a vague appearance that the 
Pakistanis might be a little more flexible on the subject of security assurances and that 
further talks at a higher level might take place in March.188 
  
Conclusion 
If there was one truism to come out of 1977, it was Robin Fearn’s statement that the “omens 
were scarcely encouraging” when it came to the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. For 
all the effort put in by the Carter administration and the Callaghan government, there was 
little in the way of genuine progress. New faces in Washington, London, and Islamabad had 
not brought new solutions. One dim ray of light emerged on the reprocessing front, with 
expressed French willingness to disengage from the Pakistani deal. However, this was 
tempered by the Giscard government’s lack of enthusiasm for going public on the French 
change of heart. The emergence of the clandestine enrichment programme in late 1976 and 
into 1977 represented a new strand in the tangled web of Pakistani nuclear efforts. Success in 
hindering the Pakistani purchasing programme was notably lacking despite British attempts 
to comprehend and utilise the evidence provided by Pakistani purchasing in the UK. The 
ability to use that evidence to move the non-proliferation agenda forward collided with the 
difficulty of proving the intended end use of inverters, the dubiety of the legal case against 
exports, and the unwillingness of fellow nuclear supplier states to support Britain’s efforts. 
While committed to non-proliferation, Callaghan’s government had to juggle such global 
commitments with the harsh realities of the 1970s British economy. British economic self-
interest in the form of the THORP and the Indian Jaguar negotiations also complicated non-
proliferation activity on the sub-continent and created friction between the US and UK 
governments. In 1978, non-proliferation policy would see some success with the final 
cancellation of the Franco-Pakistani reprocessing plant contract. However, as reprocessing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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188 UKE Islamabad to FCO, ‘Pakistan, India, and Nuclear Proliferation,’ March 13, 1978, TNA FCO37/2112. 
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faded into the background, the clandestine enrichment programme would become a much 
more significant proliferation threat. 
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On November 1, 1978, US Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote to his 
counterparts in London and Paris, expressing unease over Pakistani nuclear ambitions. 
Reflecting on statements by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that—prior to his removal from power—
Pakistan had been on the verge of nuclear capability and would be willing to share that 
capability with the Islamic world, Christopher stated that, “we do find this statement of 
intentions to be disquieting.”1 The Deputy Secretary had good reason for disquiet. Although 
1978 saw a non-proliferation success when the Franco-Pakistani reprocessing plant deal was 
finally abandoned, it also saw the emergence of Islamabad’s clandestine enrichment 
programme as a major international issue.  
 Months of American diplomatic pressure on France and Pakistan were rewarded 
when Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s government finally took the decision to cancel Islamabad’s 
contract for a reprocessing plant. This gave the US government a chance to engage in 
meaningful discussions with Islamabad over issues of aid and arms sales that Pakistani 
determination to acquire the reprocessing plant had hampered. However, it was apparent 
throughout 1978 that moving Zia’s government from the nuclear path would not be so easy. 
Further evidence emerged in 1978 that strengthened the case that Pakistan was 
pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment programme as part of its quest for nuclear 
weapons. Here, the British government took a leading role in non-proliferation diplomacy, 
commencing a campaign conducted in the diplomatic shadows in an effort to marshal a 
consensus amongst nuclear supplier states to prevent Pakistani acquisition of sensitive 
technologies. 
However, the British government also managed to impede sub-continental non-
proliferation policy. The UK remained determined to keep conventional arms sales and non-
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proliferation policy compartmentalised, in the hope of selling the Jaguar strike aircraft to 
India despite American and Pakistani concerns. The Carter administration—continuing to 
link sales of conventional arms to bribing or coercing Zia into giving up his atomic 
aspirations—made unsuccessful efforts to frustrate the Jaguar deal. Furthermore, the UK’s 
own domestic nuclear industry continued to complicate non-proliferation action, with the 
parliamentary decision to allow the building of the controversial THORP weakening British 
non-proliferation credibility in Pakistani eyes. 
 Statements made by Bhutto and Zia during 1978 would lay the foundations for 
public and private discussions about the religious aspects of Pakistani nuclear aspirations 
that took place in 1979 and beyond. Pronouncements such as the “reinforcing the power” 
comments provoked debate about proliferation amongst a transnational faith community. 
Although the image of an ‘Islamic bomb’ did nothing to change actual non-proliferation 
policy in 1978, it provided the basis for a much larger and broader series of public and 
private discussions in the future. 
 
Reprocessing, Arms Sales, and the Foundations of the ‘Islamic Bomb’ 
Despite French indications during 1977 that they were ready to abrogate their reprocessing 
plant contract with Pakistan, the deal continued to vex politicians and diplomats on both 
sides of the Atlantic into 1978. The issue was complicated, not simply by French 
recalcitrance, but by a range of other factors. In terms of the Anglo-American non-
proliferation alliance, the United States also resented Britain’s continued quest for its own 
reprocessing capability, weakening UK non-proliferation standing. Pakistan picked up on the 
essential hypocrisy of the British stance, generating Pakistani antipathy towards the UK. 
Likewise, the on-going British efforts to sell the Jaguar strike aircraft to India created 
another point of contention directly influencing the Pakistan situation. 
 In early April, the Pakistani media highlighted (prompted, Kit Burdess of the British 
Embassy in Islamabad assumed, by their government) one of the inherent contradictions in 
Britain’s position on non-proliferation by running stories focussing on the “discriminatory” 
aspects of the recent parliamentary vote to allow the THORP’s construction. The Pakistani 
press brought this up as a “contradiction in policy” when the UK and the US were trying so 
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hard to prevent Pakistan from acquiring a reprocessing facility.2 During his January 1978 
sub-continental tour, James Callaghan had given critics ammunition by stating that, “I am 
not a fan of reprocessing myself. It won’t help us in our task to rid the world of the threat of 
nuclear weapons.”3 The Pakistani reaction was understandably angry, given that the THORP 
decision reinforced the appearance of discrimination against the developing world. It 
highlighted the inequalities inherent in anti-proliferation strategies: while Pakistan was 
subject to diplomatic initiatives to prevent it gaining reprocessing capability, the UK moved 
on with upgrading and expanding its own capabilities in that area. 
 Regarding Pakistani efforts to acquire reprocessing capability, there was 
considerable anxiety in the US government about how to deal with an aggrieved Pakistan 
following the French deal’s eventual cancellation. The main worry was that Pakistan might 
decide to “go it alone” with the plant and considerable thought was put into averting this 
outcome.4 The US Embassy in Paris proposed a Franco-American solution that would give 
Pakistan increased access to less sensitive nuclear technology, such as reactors, seen as 
economically and developmentally helpful to the Pakistanis. This would also reassure the 
French, who were concerned about how the cancellation would affect France’s credibility as 
a nuclear exporter.5 Arthur Hummel, US ambassador to Pakistan, argued that such a plan 
would help counter accusations of nuclear discrimination against Pakistan and the 
developing world.6 
 At the end of April, Zia demonstrated just how aggrieved he was about the pressure 
being exerted on Pakistan when he connected the THORP, Pakistani nuclear aspirations, and 
discrimination against the Islamic world in an interview with American journalist Bernard 
Nossiter. The Washington Post gave the reprocessing issue the briefest of mentions amongst 
a wider discussion of the General’s Islamic faith.7 However, Kit Burdess, analysing 
Pakistani reporting on the interview, pointed out that there was a “clear plea to the US to 
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stop trying to block the reprocessing plant; and to the French to get on with supplying the 
plant as under the original project.”8 There was the usual (for Zia) oblique reference to 
nuclear weapons, all the while providing assurances that Pakistan did not intend to build any. 
Significantly, for the future of debates about Pakistan’s nuclear intentions, Burdess also 
highlighted Zia’s remarks about discrimination against the Muslim world, observing that, 
“Zia emphasised that Brazil was going to get a reprocessing plant, the Indians would soon 
have a third one, and ‘The Jews have got it [reprocessing technology]. Then why should 
Pakistan, which is considered part of the Muslim world, be deprived of this technology...’” 
Zia also played on American and European concerns regarding the energy crisis: Pakistan 
needed energy security just as badly as the developed world states wracked by the oil shocks 
of the 1970s, so why should Pakistan not have a full nuclear fuel cycle?9 Although not 
explicitly mentioned, Britain—with its recent vote on the THORP—was a component of an 
iniquitous developed world that sought to prevent Pakistan from obtaining facilities that 
European states had or were planning. However, it was the connections Zia made between 
nuclear power and the Islamic world that would come back to haunt the Pakistani leader by 
creating a propaganda problem for Islamabad, London, and Washington when the ‘Islamic 
bomb’ paradigm gained media prominence from 1979 onwards. 
In the face of Zia’s rhetoric, the US and the UK attempted to mitigate an adverse 
Pakistani reaction when it became apparent that the French were finally about to finally 
cancel the reprocessing plant contract. Hummel contended that Pakistan would raise an 
“almighty fuss” and emphasise the perceived injustice of US pressure on France. The 
ambassador argued that the Carter administration must go to considerable lengths in order to 
prove that it was not a “willing accessory or accomplice” to the cancellation.10 Vance (whom 
French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud told that the deal was off) took Hummel’s 
advice on board on May 18 when he outlined the two main US goals as being to guard 
against an “intemperate” reaction and to dissuade Pakistan from continuing its efforts to 
develop a nuclear capability.11 Vance outlined various methods of achieving these goals, 
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including a “tangible package of inducements” (which included restarting financial aid and 
military equipment sales), and a political dialogue to reassure Pakistan over its security 
concerns. Somewhat optimistically, Vance noted that the “reprocessing issue is behind us.”12 
 
Over in London, the THORP was not the only major British commercial interest that 
adversely affected Britain’s credibility on non-proliferation policy. Bilateral Anglo-
American discussions once more highlighted that the US government saw arms sales as a 
non-proliferation tool, in contrast to a British government that compartmentalised arms sales 
and non-proliferation. London saw no problem in continuing to market the Jaguar strike 
aircraft to India, selling a warplane known to have a tactical nuclear role to the nation whose 
conventional and nuclear superiority to Pakistan was the major motivating factor for the 
Pakistani atomic programme. 
In July, Joe Nye called on JNU chief Robert Alston to discuss reprocessing and 
Pakistani security. The Pakistanis had become increasingly nervous about their security 
situation because of the communist coup in neighbouring Afghanistan at the end of April 
that had installed the pro-Soviet government of Nur Muhammad Taraki. Nye and his 
colleagues worried that Pakistan might make concrete moves away from the West, towards 
non-aligned status by leaving the CENTO, and go all out for the nuclear weapons option if 
not suitably reassured by its Western allies. The State Department remained concerned about 
the potential British Jaguar arrangement with India. Nye wondered if, given Pakistan’s 
sensitivity, the UK might not consider delaying or halting the deal?13 FCO officials thought 
this a little hypocritical given that the US was considering the sale of advanced aircraft to 
Pakistan in an attempt to assuage security concerns and ameliorate Pakistani annoyance at 
the various non-proliferation efforts.14 British intransigence regarding the sale of Jaguar—a 
sale that was in competition with French and Swedish aircraft manufacturers—went all the 
way to the top.15 David Owen, despite his warm personal relationship with Cyrus Vance, had 
                                                            
12 Ibid. 
13 Alston to White, ‘Pakistan Reprocessing Plant,’ July 3, 1978, TNA FCO 96/823. 
14 Ibid. 
15 The State Department eventually persuaded the Swedes to drop out of the race by refusing permission for them 




forcefully committed himself to the deal in 1977 and saw no reason to now delay or halt the 
proposed sale.16 Although ambassador Bushell in Islamabad appreciated that the Jaguar 
negotiations were a complicating factor in Anglo-Pakistani relations, he did not expect it to 
cause particular problems.17 Word from New Delhi indicating that British procrastination 
might result in India making this valuable arms purchase from France was a further factor 
accounting for British determination.18 A contract worth £1 billion would be a fillip to the 
ailing British aerospace industry and a feather in the cap of a government under severe 
economic pressure. 
Much to Owen’s annoyance, Carter personally attempted to discourage the Indian 
purchase. The President, in correspondence with Indian Prime Minister Moraji Desai, 
emphasised his policy of restricting the supply of advanced weapons to the sub-continent, 
arguing that such supplies could precipitate an arms race and disrupt the delicate regional 
balance.19 In addition to this presidential intervention, Vance also warned Indian Minister of 
External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee that the acquisition of Jaguar could only have a 
harmful and destabilising effect on the region and potentially cause a rift in US-Indian 
relations.20 The mood in Whitehall was not lightened when word filtered back to the FCO 
that senior State Department official Eric David Newsom had approached the British High 
Commission in New Delhi on a mission to measure Indian tolerance for the sale of American 
combat aircraft to Pakistan.21 British officials recognised that there was genuine alarm in 
Islamabad regarding the Afghan situation, a circumstance not helped by perceptions of a 
relatively relaxed American attitude towards Afghanistan and the ever-present worries about 
India.22 The British Embassy in Islamabad suggested that a way around the problem posed 
by Indian rearmament might be to resurrect the old idea of offering the aircraft for sale to 
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India and Pakistan, thereby putting both sides on an equal footing.23 Owen, angered by 
American interference in what could be a lucrative commercial transaction, argued that the 
Pakistanis had been aware of the potential deal for some time now and he had even recently 
mentioned it to the Pakistani Foreign Minister. “We should look after our relations with the 
Pakistanis,” the Foreign Secretary grumbled, “the Americans can look after theirs.”24 
Owen took the opportunity to plead the British case for Jaguar at the quadripartite 
foreign ministers’ meeting involving Owen, Vance, de Guiringaud, and Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher of West Germany that took place during the 1978 G7 summit in Bonn. The 
Foreign Secretary admitted that, yes, the situation had contributed to regional concerns, but 
that Britain had offered to sell the aircraft to India and Pakistan. The British government 
could not help it, Owen contended, if Pakistan was not interested in, or lacked the money for, 
Jaguar. According to the Foreign Secretary, the UK had taken a measured attitude, kept the 
Pakistanis informed, and believed that in the end, the sale would not be taken as a “tilt” 
against Pakistan.25 
 In the end, American protestations that Jaguar would alter the situation on the sub-
continent came to naught. In October 1978, Moraji Desai’s government made the decision to 
buy the warplane to fulfil the deep penetration strike role for the Indian Air Force and by 
July 1979, the first aircraft had landed at Jamnagar airbase.26 The tension surrounding the 
sale of these aircraft illustrates the way in which domestic economic needs could transcend 
the global requirements of non-proliferation policy. The mid-year diplomatic arguments over 
the reprocessing plant also highlighted key differences between Britain and America. 
Britain—in approving the THORP and in its intransigent insistence on the sale of Jaguar to 
India—looked inward towards its own domestic economic difficulties, which were 
intertwined with issues exacerbated by the energy crises. Thus, Callaghan’s government 
consistently and clearly compartmentalised the issues of the Jaguar deal and non-
proliferation, despite the fact that Jaguar was always an impediment to a successful sub-
continental non-proliferation policy. American officials—from the President down—had 
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argued for four years that the Jaguar deal was having an adverse effect on anti-proliferation 
action on the sub-continent. For the United States, conventional arms sales were a tool of 
non-proliferation policy, as either a bribe or means of coercion. Weapons were a means of 
reassuring Pakistan in the face of a worryingly unstable situation and a nuclear neighbour, 
with this reassurance a key theme in attempts to discourage Pakistan from pursuing its 
nuclear ambitions. If the US government could bolster Pakistan’s conventional military 
forces and persuade the Indians not to re-arm, logic dictated that there was less incentive for 
Pakistan to pursue nuclear weapons. In contrast, Britain took a compartmentalised approach. 
Despite the arms control commitment of major British political figures such as David 
Owen—angered at perceived American interference in the UK’s economic affairs—the 
magnitude of the Jaguar deal (and the THORP project) was such that non-proliferation had 
to subordinate itself to economic necessity. The need to support an ailing British industry in 
a time of economic woe trumped concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons. 
 
At the same time as American interference in Britain’s economic affairs was angering David 
Owen, Zia made comments that would—at least in part—form the foundations of a decades-
long media fascination. On July 17, the Pakistani leader stated in a Saudi Arabian newspaper 
interview that, “no Muslim country has any (atomic arms). If Pakistan possesses such a 
weapon it would reinforce the power of the Muslim world.”27 The English-speaking media 
did not cover the interview, even though Arthur Hummel assumed that the information had 
been passed to major news outlets. Hummel advocated a restrained US stance on Zia’s 
remarks, seeing them as a “gaffe” that could—if the US or French governments publicised 
the comments—create domestic problems for Zia at an already difficult time.28 Nevertheless, 
in conjunction with Zia’s blustering rhetoric about the Muslim world in his April interview 
with Bernard Nossiter, the Pakistani leader’s remarks formed the basis for the media 
imbroglio surrounding the so-called ‘Islamic bomb’ that surfaced in 1979. Until 1979, such 
remarks would—in the West at least—remain solely the subject of limited governmental 
speculation. Zia’s aim with his pronouncements was clear. Under pressure from Western 
                                                            




states, the Pakistani leader, his subordinates, and religious allies sought to dissipate the 
American and British pressure on Pakistan’s nuclear programme by changing matters from 
an anti-Pakistani issue to an anti-Muslim issue. By positioning Pakistan as a victim, Zia 
hoped to leverage support from his co-religionists in the Middle East and South Asia. This 
quest for support from a faith community would give rise to a media outcry that the 
American, British, and Pakistani governments would have to deal with in 1979 and beyond. 
Zia’s statements were discussed at the G7 summit in Bonn, where Owen was 
pressing the case for selling Jaguar to India. De Guiringaud contended that such 
“disquieting” statements “exposed the Pakistani position to the public,” and made it easier 
for France to justify delaying or cancelling the reprocessing plant. Regarding the Islamic 
aspect, Vance saw Zia’s pronouncements as a bluff and was quick to point out that the quite 
different Islamic states of Saudi Arabia and Iran had urged Pakistan not to build a nuclear 
weapon.29 Pleading for confidentiality, Owen lauded de Guiringaud for a “courageous” 
French stand when the Frenchman told his counterparts that the Quai d’Orsay had dispatched 
a representative to Islamabad seeking a delay to the sale.30 Reflecting on non-proliferation in 
general, the American Secretary of State was sceptical about the chances for truly controlling 
the spread of nuclear technology but—reflecting the Carter administration’s continued focus 
on reprocessing—contended that plutonium was still the prime concern.31 
 After the summit, Owen cabled the British Embassy in Islamabad to see if his 
subordinates could expand upon Zia’s disturbing statements.32 Kit Burdess responded on 
July 23, observing that the reprocessing plant had become a matter of national pride in 
Pakistan. The plant—and by extension the implicit nuclear weapons programme—had 
become solidly identified with Pakistani national identity and self-image.33 In a widely 
publicised speech that Burdess was sure had government endorsement, prominent religious 
and political leader Maulana Mufti Mahmood spoke in “terms which left no doubt that he 
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was referring [positively] to nuclear weapons (for Pakistan and the Muslim world).”34 British 
ambassador John Bushell backed up Burdess’s views, highlighting Pakistani government-
approved media comment that the reprocessing plant was “a matter of life and death for 
Pakistan.” Furthermore, Zia had stated, “Not only the government but the people of Pakistan 
were committed to the procurement of [a] nuclear reprocessing plant.”35 French and 
American pressure on Pakistan was ill received. André Jacomet, de Guiringaud’s 
representative, met with Zia’s representatives on July 17 and 19, attempting to persuade the 
Pakistanis to agree to the plant’s delay or cancellation. Jacomet later related that his 
Pakistani hosts reacted very badly to this request and refused to agree. The Frenchman then 
made a tense situation even worse when he attempted to use Zia’s “power of the Muslim 
world” interview as evidence that Pakistan was planning to build a bomb and to proliferate.36  
 However, the roots of the ‘Islamic bomb’ were not just based on Bhutto and Zia’s 
blustery rhetoric. Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi’s lieutenant Abdessalam Jalloud visited 
Islamabad in mid-August, prompting worries about a Pakistani-Libyan nuclear alliance and 
cooperation in building a reprocessing plant, should the French deal be cancelled.37 
Moreover, at the end of September, the JNU received a press agency release noting 
Pakistani-Libyan connections that it regarded as “well informed”. The release drew on 
rumours of a triangular Chinese-Libyan-Pakistani relationship that Whitehall viewed as “a 
nasty idea.”38 As will be demonstrated, the idea of Pakistani-Libyan nuclear cooperation was 
one of the main platforms on which public narratives surrounding the ‘Islamic bomb’ were 
built, despite the fact that the issue did nothing to affect actual non-proliferation policy.  
 
As well as questions of pan-Islamic proliferation, policymakers in London and Washington 
also had to consider matters of Pakistani nationalism and national pride. Senior US 
diplomats wanted to influence any post-cancellation Pakistani nuclear plans and gain 
assurances that there would be no efforts to continue with building a reprocessing plant. In 
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order to restart the flow of aid, Pakistan would very publicly have to relinquish sovereign 
rights and subjugate itself to American dictates. The State Department strongly implied that 
if Pakistan abandoned pursuit of the French reprocessing plant and assured the 
administration of its good intentions, then there could be the chance of restoring the 
economic aid cut off in September 1977.39 The Pakistanis were opposed to giving any 
assurances, stating that if Pakistan did wish to press ahead with a reprocessing plant, “it 
would not matter how many assurances [it] provided.”40 Hummel saw the request for 
assurances as unacceptably impinging on Pakistani sovereignty and claimed that no 
government of Pakistan could survive the public outcry over such an assurance.41 
 Given the level of anti-American feeling welling up in the Pakistani media over the 
reprocessing plant, anxiety on both sides was unavoidable. According to the British embassy 
in Islamabad, the Pakistani press and public believed that the US government was engaged 
in a conspiracy against Pakistan. British observers viewed the situation as irrational: the 
Pakistani press stressed the reprocessing plant’s importance and denigrated the value of US 
aid, “which most serious officials must consider to be indispensible.” 42 Here was a situation 
where outside observers contended that Pakistan should suppress national pride and self-
image in order to gain Western aid. Becoming involved in the fracas might be 
counterproductive to British interests and the Islamabad embassy strongly recommended that 
Britain keep a low profile at this point.43 Ambassador Hummel—in a frank discussion with 
his British opposite number John Bushell (a discussion that Bushell advised should not reach 
wider American or French ears)—was pessimistic about the situation. Hummel was certain 
that a final negative reply from Paris would lead to a Pakistani withdrawal from CENTO, 
something that Bushell had mooted at the end of July.44 One way the UK could help 
ameliorate the effects of the anti-US line emanating from Zia’s administration was through 
the BBC World Service’s influence in Pakistan. The BBC could be used as a medium to 
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clarify the French position regarding the plant, which emphasised that the cancellation was 
entirely the decision of Giscard’s government and not made under US pressure.45 Finally, 
Bushell commented on the potential for a Pakistani move to non-aligned status. The 
Pakistanis were, he commented, receptive to Soviet “blandishments.”46 
By the beginning of September, American and French officials believed they had 
resolved the reprocessing issue, despite the fact that Zia and other senior Pakistanis were 
doing all they could to reinvigorate the ill-fated project by linking it to the Saviem truck 
plant deal.47 After André Jacomet’s hapless mission in July, Giscard had written to Zia 
indicating, in convoluted and obscure language, that once the INFCE studies had been 
completed, France was willing to renegotiate the deal. Arthur Hummel believed Giscard’s 
message was tantamount to total cancellation of the contract.48 On August 23, Zia announced 
that the deal was off.49 Pakistani comments were initially mild, but became more heated 
when Agha Shahi remarked on the perfidy of “some of the nuclear supplier states and their 
allies [who] prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to Third World 
nations.”50 In early September, Zia repeated his earlier assertion that it was Washington’s 
pressure on Paris that led to the plant’s cancellation and that he would continue to press the 
French to meet their contractual obligations.51 Kit Burdess noted that Zia’s statement that 
Pakistan was “determined to acquire nuclear technology and hoped that with the help of 
Allah its efforts in this regard would be successful,” had apparently convinced the French of 
Pakistan’s desire to develop nuclear weapons.52 British analyses suggested that the 
Pakistanis were unable or unwilling to recognise that remarks made by Zia—and not 
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“rumours”—were the root cause of anxiety about a Pakistani bomb being developed for use 
by the wider Arab or Muslim world. Furthermore, Burdess suggested that it was the implicit 
connection between the reprocessing plant and nuclear weapons—and the position of nuclear 
weapons as a ‘prestige’ technological development—that made non-proliferation efforts 
seem like such an attack on Pakistani national image and identity.53 
Now that there had been public acknowledgement that the reprocessing plant deal 
was dead, the issue entered a new phase when the US government sought assurances from 
Giscard’s representatives that there was no chance that the deal could come back to life. 
With Washington seriously considering the resumption of aid to Pakistan, and with key anti-
proliferation figures in Congress to be persuaded that Pakistan was worthy of such aid, the 
State Department thought an explicit commitment from Paris would be helpful.54 André 
Jacomet rebuffed the US request when he met with Gerard Smith, Carter’s roving 
ambassador for non-proliferation affairs. Jacomet felt that, because of domestic political 
difficulties, a public statement from Giscard would simply give Jacques Chirac—the former 
prime minister and de facto leader of the French right—and the Gaullists ammunition to 
attack Giscard’s beleaguered government.55 Despite considerable pressure from Smith, 
Jacomet refused to offer any assurances that the Carter administration could present to 
Congress as part of their negotiations over aid to Pakistan.56 
 The State Department pressed ahead with consultations on Capitol Hill despite 
French recalcitrance. These discussions took place between Newsom, Nye, John Glenn (one 
of the NNPA’s main congressional authors), and Clement Zablocki (Chairman of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee). The talking points covered a number of issues, including the 
threat to US regional interests by a “disintegrating or radicalized Pakistan.”57 The State 
Department portrayed Pakistan as fearful of the unfriendly (India) or unstable (Afghanistan 
and Iran) states that surrounded it and losing confidence in the West’s ability to provide for 
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Pakistani security.58 Newsom and Nye argued that the Pakistanis could be reassured 
regarding their security situation, and encouraged to move away from a bomb programme, 
by the resumption of economic aid and military equipment sales.59 In any regard, US 
officials saw Pakistan as having neither the technical prowess nor the industrial ability to 
complete the reprocessing plant without external aid. The inverter problem was alluded to, 
but given scant attention, as Carter administration officials believed that the technical 
challenges of a centrifuge based enrichment programme were insurmountable for Pakistan, 
and that such ambitions could be defeated by strict supplier controls.60 According to the two 
State Department officials, restoring good relations with Pakistan would give the 
administration a better chance of dealing effectively with the nuclear problem. 
 France was once more in the spotlight when stories appeared in the French press that 
the firm Robatel had received a license from the government to export centrifuges for a 
reprocessing plant.61 Jacomet, who perceived a Gaullist hand in the affair, strenuously denied 
this.62 Intelligence from a highly placed anonymous source in the Élysée Palace did, 
however, indicate that the Pakistanis were searching for suppliers who would allow them to 
complete the reprocessing plant on their own or with the help of another supplier nation.63 
Indeed, the Pakistanis broadly hinted that they might turn to their ally China for aid.64 The 
State Department had already sought and received “credible” assurances from Beijing that 
the Chinese did not intend to offer Pakistan assistance to complete the reprocessing plant.65 
Likewise, Chinese diplomats “emphatically denied” nuclear co-operation with any other 
state to their British counterparts.66 
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 In early October, the United States once more attempted to use arms sales and aid as 
a means of luring Islamabad away from the nuclear path. Cyrus Vance indicated to Agha 
Shahi that the United States was ready to resume financial aid programmes and consider 
military sales to Pakistan. Vance wanted Shahi to understand that this potential resumption 
of aid was on the basis that Pakistan did not intend to develop nuclear weapons capability. 
The Secretary of State observed that recent reports had suggested that Pakistan was 
exploring “other means” of “completing the reprocessing plant or otherwise acquiring a 
nuclear option through indigenous efforts.”67 Shahi had asked about the possible sale of A-7 
attack aircraft in light of the Indian intention to buy Jaguar, and Vance made it clear that he 
saw no reason for the Indian purchase.68 The Jaguar sale might, Vance suggested, create a 
new spiral of arms acquisitions in the region. Subject to Congressional approval, Carter had 
decided in July that he was still willing to sell Pakistan forty to fifty of the less capable F-5E 
warplanes that had previously been considered in 1977 to replace the Pakistan Air Force’s 
Korean War vintage F-86 fighters.69 The Pakistanis again brought up Jaguar during 
November meetings with a US delegation to Islamabad. Lucy Benson (Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs) made it clear to the Pakistanis that 
they would have to come up with a list of arms requirements that both met their needs and 
did not contravene Carter’s stated policies on conventional arms restraint.70 
By this point US intelligence had caught up with what the British had been telling 
them for several months, passing their conclusions to Congress in highly diluted form. 
Senators and Representatives were informed that, although the non-proliferation problem 
with Pakistan had not been completely resolved, the restoration of normal relations would 
“best serve both our non-proliferation objectives and our interest in regional stability.”71 
Newsom, Hummel, and Nye briefed Glenn two days later, discussing the possibility of an 
indigenous Pakistani programme. The team concluded that, although Pakistan was clearly 
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exploring multiple means of gaining access to weapons-grade nuclear material, these 
methods would take time and could be closely monitored.72 The US government shortly 
acquired further intelligence on Islamabad’s intentions. Pakistani ambassador Iqbal Ahmed 
Akhund had informed Arthur Hartman that Pakistan “had every intention of finishing the 
reprocessing plant on its own.”73 Hartman concluded that Akhund had all but admitted the 
nuclear programme’s military nature, its function being to give “the Pakistani people, 
Indians, and others a perception of a Pakistani military capability.”74 
 
By November, the Americans were engaged in the final preparations for a diplomatic 
offensive that the Carter administration hoped would finally kill any chance of the 
reprocessing plant ever being completed. Influenced by the reports that Pakistan may have 
been seeking to complete the facility with foreign aid, the Carter administration determined 
to ensure that such completion would be impossible. The UK and France were the first 
foreign eyes to see the US démarche, provided with the communication before general 
circulation. Although heavily redacted, this document—with its much lengthier talking 
points than the version eventually dispatched to embassies around the world—gives a sense 
of Carter administration feelings. Warren Christopher articulated serious concerns about the 
Pakistani reprocessing and enrichment programmes, and was particularly desirous of a 
continued dialogue with France over reprocessing.75 The main American worry was the 
impact of Pakistani nuclear ambitions on the South Asian geopolitical situation. In the 
aftermath of the Afghan Revolution and with growing instability in Iran, Christopher 
deemed it “critical to stability in the region and to our non-proliferation objectives to inhibit 
Pakistan from moving closer to the threshold of nuclear explosive capability.”76 
                                                            
72 ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Consultations on Pakistan: details on Indigenous Nuclear Capabilities 
(Supplement to Oct. 6, 1978 memcon prepared by Ambassador Hummel),’ October 6, 1978, USPQB, Doc.19. 
73 USE Paris to State, ‘Pakistan Ambassador to France Hard-Lines on Reprocessing Plant’, October 21, 1978, 
DNSA, NP01612, 1. 
74 Ibid. 
75 State to USE London et al, November 1, 1. 
76 Ibid, 3. 
 
 146 
Christopher’s cable also alluded to inflammatory statements made by Bhutto in the 
text of his political testament written in jail.77 While imprisoned, Bhutto had stated that—
before his removal from power—Pakistan was on the verge of “full nuclear capability” and 
was willing to share this capability with the “Muslim world.”78 “We do not necessarily 
accept Mr. Bhutto’s claims of imminent success in this field,” stated Christopher at this 
juncture, “but we do find this statement of intentions to be disquieting.”79 Even though 
Christopher found Bhutto’s remarks “disquieting” and potentially having “profound 
implications,” the implied Islamic dimension did not change basic American assumptions 
about the reasoning behind the Pakistani programme. Christopher and his colleagues “were 
under no illusion that Pakistan’s motivations or intentions have changed,” with Islamabad’s 
nuclear ambitions still perceived as a “national project.”80 Thus, Bhutto and Zia’s rhetoric 
about the ‘Islamic bomb’ failed to alter American perceptions and policy regarding Pakistani 
intentions. For the Carter administration, while the idea of the ‘Islamic bomb’ might have 
proved “disquieting,” it did not change the fundamental assumptions about the national 
quality of Pakistan’s bomb project and the dual issues of regional stability and global non-
proliferation policy. 
The responses from London and Paris to Christopher’s telegram provide a working 
demonstration of a lack of European unanimity over non-proliferation. The JNU’s Robert 
Alston responded on the British government’s behalf and indicated there was a slight case of 
confusion over which nations might be able to supply nuclear components to Pakistan. 
Alston observed that the recipients of the proposed American cable and Britain’s parallel 
démarche on the clandestine enrichment programme (discussed later in this chapter) were 
different. Britain should thus be given time to send further cables in order that both 
campaigns were fully coordinated.81 Alston also commented that US allies such as Taiwan 
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and South Korea—both countries that had pursued nuclear weapons programmes—might 
prove problematic in their reactions to a campaign of Pakistani nuclear containment.82 In 
contrast, André Jacomet was more anxious about the situation’s European dimension, 
particularly concerning West Germany. Now assured that France’s own domestic 
reprocessing plants were untouchable, Jacomet told the US consular staff that furnishing 
sensitive nuclear equipment to Pakistan would conflict with the French position on nuclear 
proliferation. According to Jacomet, France’s most serious concerns were with Italy and the 
FRG, which did not care about French non-proliferation policy.83 Jacomet was relieved that 
the US démarche made no mention of the reprocessing plant deal’s cancellation, as there was 
still a “great sensitivity [in the French government] to any direct linking on our part of US 
policies with the French decision to cancel the deal.”84 
 When the finalised American démarche—influenced by the French reporting on 
Pakistani efforts to complete the reprocessing plant and Anglo-American intelligence on the 
clandestine uranium enrichment programme—was finally sent out, it left its recipients in no 
doubt that Washington was very serious about ensuring that Pakistan would not complete the 
reprocessing plant. Sent in Cyrus Vance’s name, the request was made due to “deep concern 
at the highest levels” of the Carter administration.85 The communication sketched American 
concerns in light of intelligence flowing into Washington. In view of the increasing 
instability in the region—continued Pakistani-Indian tensions, the Afghan revolution, and the 
stirrings in Iran—it was vital for continued stability that Pakistan be prevented from gaining 
nuclear capability.86 In a move that caused some degree of peevishness in London, the cable 
cited the UK as the source of “firm information” that Pakistan was also constructing a 
centrifuge-based uranium enrichment facility. Vance encouraged supplier governments to be 
watchful when it came to Pakistani overt and covert attempts to acquire the means to 
complete their reprocessing facility.87 
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 Responses to this major diplomatic initiative were mixed, once more illustrating that 
American and British concern about proliferation was not universally shared. Many were 
routine expressions of acknowledgement or willingness to cooperate. Some governments, 
such as the Canadians, Italians, and Japanese, expressed surprise that Pakistan was 
considering the reprocessing plant’s completion.88 Despite niggling doubts, the Netherlands 
government regarded Bhutto’s death cell testimony as simple boasting regarding the 
Pakistani programme’s status. Furthermore, the Dutch were concerned about the developing 
world’s reaction should word of a Western offensive against Pakistan leak out. Nuclear 
power, officials in The Hague suggested, was a great status symbol for developing nations, 
as it represented the acme of industrial and technological achievement. Actions that created 
even the perception that Western nations were trying to prevent developing states from 
gaining access to nuclear technology presented a “psychological question” that the West 
would have to consider very carefully.89 Some of the US conclusions about Pakistani 
intentions and progress surprised the West German government and, like the Dutch, Bonn 
was concerned about the on-going campaign’s potential public relations implications. The 
last thing the Auswärtiges Amt wanted to see was a headline stating “US and FRG in 
Nuclear Boycott of Pakistan.”90  
 The concern expressed by the FRG and the Netherlands over adverse reactions to a 
“boycott” of Pakistan was echoed by American diplomats. Hummel was nervous about a 
plan to inform the Indians about the diplomatic campaign. The ambassador argued that, if the 
press found out that the US government had been talking to India behind Pakistan’s back, 
there could be a hostile reaction from Islamabad. Colluding with Western nations to prevent 
Pakistan from continuing with its bomb programme was one thing, colluding with the 
Indians would be quite another.91 Vance contended that India already seemed aware of 
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Bhutto’s claims of nuclear capability and the UK inverter story, but that US representatives 
in India had been instructed not to mention Pakistan in talks.92 Robert Goheen, US 
ambassador to India, reinforced Vance’s statement. Goheen was sure that the Indians had 
known for some time about American suspicions, and the Indians themselves believed that 
Pakistan was only two or three years from producing a bomb.93 
 At the end of November, the French further reassured US representatives of their 
firmness regarding the reprocessing plant. Jacomet emphasised that, despite a continuing 
dialogue with the Pakistani government, there was no possibility of France ever helping to 
complete it.94 He did mention that Pakistan had requested bilateral discussions regarding a 
“plutonium storage scheme”, something that Gerard Smith found highly unusual if there was 
to be no plutonium produced in Pakistan.95 
 For the Carter administration, the manoeuvring against the Franco-Pakistani 
reprocessing plant deal represented a qualified non-proliferation success. The French had 
finally cancelled the contract and there was a generally positive response from nuclear 
supplier nations regarding US moves to prevent the Pakistanis completing the plant with the 
aid of third parties. Regardless of the success of the anti-reprocessing offensive, it was quite 
clear that Pakistani nuclear ambitions remained undiminished. A major factor in this 
realisation was the mounting evidence of another strand to the nuclear programme. It was 
this much more covert aspect that would be the focus of anti-proliferation action on the sub-
continent from late 1978 onwards, action that would be led not by America, but by Britain. 
 
The Clandestine Uranium Enrichment Project 
Parallel with American led anti-reprocessing efforts, action directed against Pakistan’s 
clandestine uranium enrichment programme gathered pace. From 1978 onwards, it became 
apparent to first the UK and then the US that the inverters ordered from EEIC by agents 
working on behalf of Pakistan during the previous eighteen months represented only a small 
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part of a huge, international project aimed at gaining the capability to produce weapons-
grade enriched uranium. It was in this strand of non-proliferation diplomacy that Britain 
would take the lead. 
In March of 1978 Mr E. S. Harris, EEIC’s managing director, yet again contacted 
the DoE, passing on his suspicions about another request to tender that his company had 
received from Weargate Ltd, supply agents acting on the Pakistani government’s behalf. The 
enquiry was for inverters worth £2 million, a much larger order than the small shipments 
dispatched to Rawalpindi in 1977. Again, Harris claimed that the inverters were of a similar 
specification to those used in BNFL’s centrifuges at Capenhurst in Cheshire despite 
Pakistani claims that the devices were for use in a textile mill.96 
Once Harris informed the DoE about the inverter order, British non-proliferation and 
economic interests began to collide again. After Harris communicated his suspicions to the 
government, considerable evidence and expert opinion was amassed from a diverse range of 
sources—including BNFL, the MoD, and the DoE—that the likely end-use for the inverters 
was as components of a uranium enrichment plant.97 Given the British economy’s precarious 
state in 1978, the DoE’s Barbara Parkin observed that this was a substantial order that would 
be of great benefit to a British manufacturer.98 EEIC had made representations to the 
government that, in the event of not being permitted to fulfil the order, the prospects for their 
workforce were bleak.99 In the end, the government decided that the FCO—in consultation 
with the United States and other NSG member states—should take the lead, with FCO 
enquiries informing a final decision on whether or not to allow the export.100 When Agha 
Shahi visited London just after the March 18 announcement that a Lahore court had passed a 
death sentence on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, British suspicions about the clandestine programme 
were kept under wraps despite discussions of nuclear security assurances, and attempts by 
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David Owen to persuade Shahi to at least agree to delaying acquisition of the reprocessing 
plant.101 
 At the end of March, the FCO officially brought inverters to the attention of the US 
government. The FCO Joint Nuclear Unit’s (JNU) Martin Bourke wrote to the Washington 
embassy’s First Secretary, the experienced diplomat Michael Pakenham, asking for US 
input.102 Bourke’s main point was whether the Americans felt that their export restrictions 
covered inverters and how these controls related to their ‘machinery’ for combating the 
proliferation problem. There was less incentive for Britain to halt the sale if the Americans 
felt that their export restrictions did not cover inverters. Furthermore, the FCO tasked Kit 
Burdess in Islamabad with finding out (in the subtlest way possible) whether or not the 
Pakistanis did have plans to build an enrichment plant.103 
 Other than a brief message from Pakenham on March 28 to the effect that inverters 
probably fell within the spirit, if not the letter, of US non-proliferation legislation, it was 
several weeks before the State Department offered a substantive response.104 In the FCO’s 
eyes, that response was less than satisfactory. Pakenham related the opinion of Joe Nye, who 
questioned the “quality and dependability” of the intelligence indicating that the inverters 
were for a nuclear enrichment facility.105 US intelligence agencies had “not come up with 
any evidence that the Pakistanis were organising themselves for the development of an 
enrichment capability.”106 Despite the British government’s conviction—based on all the 
evidence that had been amassed since late 1976—that the inverters were for a clandestine 
uranium enrichment project, the State Department wanted to wait until there was 
incontrovertible evidence of wrongdoing before they would step into the murkiness of this 
“grey area.”107 
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Between the request for American input and the unsatisfactory mid-April response, 
intelligence continued to flow into Whitehall from the British Embassy in Islamabad. 
Burdess submitted detailed appraisals of Pakistani intentions, noting that he had heard 
nothing concrete, but was unsurprised that Pakistan may have embarked on an enrichment 
programme, as this would probably be the only way PAEC could get access to enriched 
material without acceding to full-scope safeguards or the NPT.108 Furthermore, Burdess 
doubted the claim that the inverters were for a textile mill. Burdess was familiar with the 
plant for which the inverters were allegedly intended, observing that the factory had no 
means of spinning cloth and produced items from materials manufactured elsewhere in 
Pakistan. Nonetheless, Burdess concluded that stopping the inverter export at this point 
might do more harm than good by arousing Pakistani suspicions and leading Islamabad to 
adopt even more secretive methods in future. Burdess felt that confronting the Pakistanis 
over these discrepancies could only stop a covert enrichment programme if incontrovertible 
proof could be found that the inverters were indeed intended for an enrichment facility.109 
 In Washington, the CIA presented the limited fruits of its intelligence efforts on the 
Pakistani bomb programme on April 26. Parts of this detailed report remain classified, but 
from the unredacted sections—and despite London alerting the US authorities to Pakistan’s 
covert centrifuge project—it appears that the analysis did not consider a centrifuge-based 
enrichment programme.110 The report focused on reprocessing as the route to a bomb and 
assumed—incorrectly—that unlike Bhutto, Zia attached a relatively low priority to the 
nuclear programme.111 Following on from this apparent oversight, the CIA would continue 
to award little significance to the possibility of an enrichment programme for some months 
to come, as it focused on the reprocessing issue. 
 This opening period of Anglo-American communication on Pakistan’s enrichment 
project saw a marked difference between the British and American views of the situation. 
British officials recognised that the EEIC inverter order was potentially a very serious non-
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proliferation regime breach and attempted to formulate ways to handle the situation. When 
the FCO informed its American counterpart, the State Department offered little more than 
bland platitudes. From Carter downwards, the US focus at this stage concentrated on 
reprocessing as the main proliferation danger. With American intelligence agencies offering 
little or no information on enrichment and unwilling to rely on evidence from the UK, 
Carter’s team gave enrichment a low priority. Because American policy—typified by the 
NNPA—was directed so much towards the ‘big ticket’ elements of proliferation such as 
reprocessing plants, the Carter administration apparently failed—despite warnings—to see 
the dangers inherent in a smaller-scale, clandestine uranium enrichment programme. This 
highlighted a contradiction in the Carter administration’s non-proliferation policy. Despite 
their enthusiasm for non-proliferation efforts directed at reprocessing capabilities, the US 
government—not wishing, as Nye had intimated, to fight a ‘war on two fronts’ until there 
was definite proof of Pakistan duplicity—deprioritised the possibility of a secret Pakistani 
enrichment scheme.112 
 
From late summer onwards the inverter problem came to the fore. By this stage EEIC had 
had its tender accepted and was in the process of manufacturing the components, the UK 
export control list not yet including inverters. Transatlantic discussions saw the UK taking 
the diplomatic lead in an effort to gain unanimity amongst potential suppliers as intelligence 
pointing towards a covert Pakistani bomb programme accumulated. By late October, the 
campaign against the Pakistani bomb effort was in full swing. The United States continued 
to make efforts to ensure the end of the reprocessing plant deal, while Britain carried out an 
interlocking campaign against the clandestine enrichment project. 
 Up to this point, discussion of inverters had taken place behind closed doors, but in 
late July, the issue became semi-public when Labour MP Frank Allaun asked in parliament 
“[I]f consideration has been given to the purchase of variable frequency inverters, which are 
used in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, by TEAM, a German company, for supply to 
Pakistan, in the light of the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty or other measures to 
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prevent the spread of nuclear weapons?”113 Allaun was one of the parliamentary Labour 
Party’s staunchest anti-nuclear campaigners, a passionate CND supporter, and an organiser 
of the Aldermaston Marches against nuclear weapons.114 Tony Benn, the Secretary of State 
for Energy and one of Owen’s fellow non-proliferation enthusiasts, had to provide a written 
reply. “Yes,” he responded, 
However equipment specially designed for use in a gas centrifuge installation was 
not at that time subject to the Export of Goods Control Order; such equipment is 
now subject to control. Any application to export equipment which is specially 
designed for uranium enrichment plants would be treated with full regard to our 
Non-Proliferation Treaty—NPT—and other international obligations, in accordance 
with the statement of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 31st March 
1976.115 
 
On July 26, Allaun again probed the issue, this time asking the Secretary of State for Trade, 
Edmund Dell, if “the supply to Pakistan by Emerson Industrial Controls of Swindon of 
equipment which will form part of that Government's technological capability to 
manufacture their own nuclear weapons was made with his approval.” Dell responded 
bluntly “No. A licence to export such equipment would have been needed only if the goods 
involved had been subject to the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1970.”116Although buried 
within the parliamentary record, the questions asked by Allaun would shortly bring the 
clandestine Pakistani programme into the public gaze.117 Allaun continued to plague the 
government with questions on the Pakistani nuclear programme throughout 1978 and 
beyond. Existing histories of the Pakistani nuclear programme posit Allaun’s questioning as 
the moment at which the British government began to take the issue seriously. As the 
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archival record demonstrates, however, serious concerns had in fact been raised long before 
the MP asked his questions.118 
 Before Britain’s diplomatic campaign against the covert Pakistani purchasing 
programme got under way, there were discussions within the government over whether or 
not to actually control the export of inverters, and, if control was required, what form this 
should take. The DoT was understandably keen not to place additional burdens on hard-
pressed British exporters, but overall the feeling was that export restrictions must be 
toughened up in the face of a major non-proliferation test.119 Additionally, the FCO decided 
not to seek “end use assurances” from Pakistan. David Hannay, head of the FCO’s Energy 
Department, believed that the Pakistanis would simply say the inverters were not for use in a 
bomb programme, requiring the British government to either allow the export or openly 
accuse the Pakistanis of lying. 120  
 Tony Benn wrote to Owen on August 30 expressing his deep concern about the 
problem. “I believe,” he stated in an echo of the US NNPA, “that we should do everything 
possible to prevent the spread of sensitive technology.”121 The problem was that the inverters 
themselves could be used for a range of industrial purposes, not just for uranium enrichment 
centrifuges. In a summary that broadly reflected inter-departmental and ministerial thinking, 
Benn’s subordinates asserted that the non-proliferation value of controlling the exports—
even though such controls were of little value should other supplier nations not be persuaded 
to do the same—outweighed the problems additional export controls would cause for British 
manufacturers.122 Despite the tension that existed between the two men, Owen agreed with 
Benn’s assessment and restated his conviction that Pakistan was pursuing a nuclear weapons 
programme based on enriching uranium.123 The Foreign Secretary asserted that the burden 
on British exporters—in terms of delays and possible lost contracts—would just have to be 
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borne in order to see that Britain was able to fulfil this “major priority of our non-
proliferation policy.”124 In this case, Britain could subordinate economic concerns to non-
proliferation. Enhanced export controls might cause inconvenience to manufacturers, but if 
the EEIC case was typical, the losses would only amount to a few million pounds. This 
contrasted significantly with the Jaguar and THORP cases, when the sums of money 
involved were several orders of magnitude greater. In those cases, prioritising non-
proliferation over billions of pounds of orders and investment was simply too great a burden 
for Callaghan’s government to bear. 
 By early October, Allaun’s questions in the Commons brought the entire affair out 
into the public domain. Newspapers local to the EEIC factory in Swindon started asking the 
government questions, receiving bland replies from the DoT that consideration was being 
given to controlling exports of “certain electrical equipment.”125 Weightier media voices 
were raised when the Guardian and the Financial Times ran stories on October 6 about the 
exports. The Guardian revealed that the government had been pressuring EEIC to drop the 
Pakistani deal and included disgruntled comments from senior management at the company. 
EEIC had already protested to the DoE in private, but now expressed their anger in public.126 
Alasdair Malpas, EEIC’s personnel manager, stated that, “The Government has asked us not 
to make it. But we pointed out that we have no contract with Pakistan. Our contract is with 
an agent, and we might be sued for damages. In any case there would be no difficulty in 
getting the equipment elsewhere. There is nothing magic about it. Swindon should have the 
business rather than anyone else.”127  
 With the issue now becoming embarrassingly public, diplomatic and inter-alliance 
communications intensified in the run-up to Britain’s campaign to alert nuclear supplier 
states to the danger posed by the clandestine Pakistani programme. John Bushell in 
Islamabad astutely commented that the Pakistanis were intent on pursuing a nuclear 
programme regardless of the barriers put in their way. Furthermore, Bushell argued that 
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because of the evolving situation in Afghanistan, Britain should offer Pakistan any support it 
could.128 In a meeting between American and British officials in London, Joe Nye circulated 
drawings showing exactly how inverters could fit into a centrifuge array. Tom Pickering 
noted that Bhutto’s prison cell statements about imminent nuclear capability made it 
somewhat easier to publicly take action against Pakistan. The tenor of the meeting was that 
any efforts to retard the clandestine programme must be made secretly in order to avoid the 
perception of discrimination or a “US crusade” against Pakistan.129 It had also become 
apparent to the FCO that the Pakistanis were attempting to purchase not just inverters, but a 
wide range of equipment from Britain that could be used as part of the enrichment project.130  
 
On October 26, the British government began its diplomatic campaign to halt, or at least 
retard, the clandestine Pakistani enrichment project. Before the campaign’s initiation, FCO 
officials had bilateral meetings with the West Germans, who had been so obstructive in 1976 
and 1977. Again, there were vague promises to investigate the situation and get back to the 
British government.131 When the full campaign started, Owen dispatched three related 
telegrams laying out overall British aims, assessing Pakistani intentions, and providing 
speaking notes for consular representatives. These cables shared the case’s basic facts: that 
an order had been placed with EEIC; that there were suspicions of a covert weapons 
programme; and that the immediate aim was to prevent Pakistan from acquiring inverters 
from other suppliers.132 Not wanting to create the impression of an international crusade, 
Owen was keen to place these efforts within a wider non-proliferation context, as opposed to 
a campaign that singled out Pakistan. The Pakistanis were described as being “in a nervous 
state about their security situation” and it was necessary to avoid any “overreaction which 
could itself have long-term destabilising consequences in the region.” 133 There was no 
mention of the fact that Britain was contributing to these security fears by pressing ahead 
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with the Jaguar sale. Suspicions about a covert enrichment programme were broadly 
outlined, highlighting the various purchases that front organisations had been making and the 
unsafeguarded nature of domestic Pakistani uranium supplies.134 Owen’s speaking note for 
diplomatic representatives covered the key UK concerns and emphasised British status as a 
depository party to the NPT and core NSG member. Recipient governments were to be made 
aware that revised British export controls on inverters would come into force on November 
9, and other nations were urged to take similar steps themselves.135 Finally, Owen contacted 
his ambassadors in nuclear supplier countries instructing them that, if the American 
démarche on reprocessing were mentioned in their discussions on inverters, UK officials 
should confirm that the American approach had full British support.136 
 There were mixed reactions to the démarche. The Dutch government was concerned 
that it might have difficulty in obtaining information about inverter orders while the 
governments of Australia, Canada, Italy, Spain, and Sweden broadly agreed with the British 
approach and assessment.137 The West Germans assured the British that inverters were 
already covered by their export controls, that they agreed with the démarche’s aims, and that 
a more considered reply was imminent.138 
 While the British démarche was making its way around the capitals of Europe, North 
America, and Australasia, Anglo-American cooperation continued apace. Returning from a 
tour of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, State Department official Jack Mikloss confided to 
Deputy Under Secretary of State Hugh Cortazzi (who informed Owen) that the Pakistanis 
were thoroughly lacking in self-confidence and that this lack of confidence might influence a 
move towards non-aligned status.139 At the same time, US embassies were instructed to 
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emphasise that the Carter administration shared British concerns and to be aware that the US 
would shortly be sending out its own démarche on reprocessing.140 Furthermore, the 
Americans passed previously classified intelligence to the UK that indicated Pakistan was 
apparently working on various technologies necessary for a nuclear bomb programme, such 
as high explosives, triggering systems, and laboratory-scale reprocessing operations.141  
 Differences between the British and American positions came to light over the 
inverter issue and its place in wider superpower relations. Back in early October, Alston had 
submitted a list of countries that Pakistan might turn to if the EEIC order was turned down. 
Those countries fell into three categories: those that were definitely known to have the 
capacity to manufacture inverters (including France, the FRG, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland); those that possessed adequate technology to manufacture them, but whose 
capability to actually do so was unknown (Austria, Australia, Canada, Japan, and Sweden); 
and those countries that were assumed to have the capacity to manufacture comparable items 
if they wished (such as Brazil, India, Iran, Israel, South Africa, and the USSR.)142 These lists 
formed the basis of the countries approached in both the UK démarche on inverters and its 
US counterpart on reprocessing. After both of these diplomatic efforts had begun, the matter 
of approaching the USSR remained unsolved. The US government planned to have an 
informal discussion with the Soviets on the margins of a late November INFCE meeting.143 
Robert Alston was concerned about this and made his feelings known via the US embassy in 
London. British officials had considered approaching the Soviets at the point of sending out 
their démarche, but had ruled out such action because they were “not certain [of the] Soviet’s 
[sic] commitment to non-proliferation” and whether or not it would outweigh their “special 
political interests vis a vis Pakistan.”144 Alston suggested meeting with Nye in Vienna to 
discuss the matter more fully. In this meeting Nye noted that the Americans were “well 
satisfied” with the reactions to their own démarche and Alston went over the British doubts 
about an approach to the Soviets. The meeting’s conclusion was that when Gerard Smith met 
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with Soviet representatives, he would speak from the notes prepared in Washington (thereby 
excluding the British notes on their démarche) and offer no further elaboration on them.145
   
The Fallout 
The two-pronged diplomatic attack on the Pakistani nuclear programme did not end the 
issue. Despite this, the view from London was that the campaign had been a qualified 
success. The major nuclear-exporting nations had been alerted to the situation and reached 
broad agreement on exports. At the same time, the Pakistani government had not publicly 
attacked the UK in the way it had done with America over the reprocessing plant.146 
Washington was slightly more sanguine about the evolving situation. US intelligence was 
now feeding back information that despite the “best efforts” of nuclear supplier states, 
Pakistan had made great progress in pulling together the major components for a uranium 
enrichment programme.147 Thinking in London paralleled these assessments, the FCO 
suggesting that Pakistan was “pressing ahead as rapidly as possible with the development of 
a fissile material production capability” and “continuing its attempts to acquire a nuclear fuel 
reprocessing facility that would produce plutonium.”148 
 As December progressed, a variety of international diplomatic sources backed up the 
US intelligence appraisal of the Pakistani situation. On December 18, Burdess reported to 
the FCO that he had met with an Australian diplomat whose name was only recorded as 
‘Baker.’ Baker had approached Burdess because of the US démarche on reprocessing, which 
mentioned that the UK had “hard evidence” of Pakistani nuclear intentions. When Burdess 
outlined the information that the UK had gathered, Baker commented that he had recently 
been to Kahuta, east of Rawalpindi, where there was a “frenzy” of construction. The 
Australian seemed to think (and Burdess was quick to disabuse him of the notion) that 
machinery was being installed at Kahuta with the compliance of BNFL. Having seen other 
nuclear facilities, Baker was convinced that the facilities being constructed at Kahuta formed 
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part of a nuclear weapons programme.149 Baker’s companion on his visit to Kahuta was 
French diplomat Jean Forlot, who fed information back to the US embassy in Islamabad. 
Forlot came to the same conclusions as Baker—that work was proceeding swiftly on 
constructing some form of nuclear facility—and Arthur Hummel quickly passed these 
suspicions back to his superiors in the State Department.150 
This diplomatic intelligence arrived on the back of statements by Zia a few days 
earlier that re-emphasised the possibly pan-Islamic dimensions of Pakistani nuclear 
ambitions. In a speech inaugurating a conference on commercial and industrial matters, he 
called for technical and economic cooperation between Islamic countries that should not 
remain dependent on the West.151 Burdess suggested that the pan-Islamic comments on the 
value of nuclear energy and the pursuit of that technology would be taken by Pakistanis as a 
re-affirmation of Pakistan’s intention to develop a nuclear weapons capability.152 
 The increased volume of evidence signalling Islamabad’s determination to build an 
enrichment plant persuaded the United States and United Kingdom to plan another series of 
démarches aimed at shutting down Pakistani access to further supplies of components for 
centrifuges. In a meeting with US officials, British diplomats fretted about the political 
consequences and tried to reassure themselves that the US and UK were thinking in the same 
direction. The main danger, from the British point of view, was that if Pakistan perceived 
itself as the victim of further Western diplomatic pressure on an issue so identified with the 
nation, then a departure from CENTO and a move towards non-alignment became all the 
more likely.153 The Americans thought the Pakistani attitude towards CENTO was more 
likely influenced by other external matters, such as the developing situation in Iran. The US 
government drew on its experiences in dissuading South Korea and Taiwan from pursuing 
indigenous nuclear weapons programmes, and thought that the tactics used there would have 
a similar effect in the case of Pakistan.154 British scepticism was well founded. South Korea 
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and Taiwan were two nations tied to America on a much more deep-seated and fundamental 
level than Pakistan ever was. Therefore, the US had much greater diplomatic weight and 
could assert considerably more pressure than it could on Pakistan. Furthermore, the South 
Korean desire to develop nuclear weapons was in direct reaction to the Carter 
administration’s desire to reduce US troop numbers in the country, leaving them fearful in 
the face of the huge North Korean army.155 Whitehall analysts suggested that politically it 
might be easier for Zia to quit the enrichment programme, as it had not been publicly 
announced, and therefore cancellation would not result in a loss of face.156 By this juncture, 
the United States had been firmly persuaded by its British ally and its own belated 
intelligence gathering that Pakistan was engaged in a covert attempt to enrich uranium. As 
the reprocessing plant problem faded away, it was the enrichment project—much harder to 




In 1978, two strands of non-proliferation activity became intertwined. The Carter 
administration achieved a measure of non-proliferation success by realising its aim of 
preventing Pakistani acquisition of a nuclear reprocessing plant. However, just as the threat 
of a Pakistani bomb based on recovered plutonium was receding, the covert enrichment 
project became the focus of non-proliferation policy and action. This was a field in which 
Britain took the lead, attempting to marshal international opinion against Pakistan. 
Callaghan’s government also impeded non-proliferation by pressing ahead with the 
commercially lucrative deal to sell Jaguar aircraft to India and through the success of the 
parliamentary vote to approve construction of the revenue-generating THORP. Because of 
this, the Carter administration was frustrated by British insistence on prioritising commercial 
interests over non-proliferation. However, these cases illustrate the level at which the British 
government was willing to subordinate non-proliferation to economic self-interest. The 
emergence of the clandestine enrichment programme as an international issue saw 
Callaghan’s government quite willing to accept relatively small economic burdens in order 
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to enforce anti-proliferation policy. When it came to multi-billion pound enterprises such as 
Jaguar and the THORP, the economic turmoil of the 1970s forced Callaghan, Owen, Benn, 
and their colleagues de-prioritise non-proliferation. Regardless, the passing of these two 
commercial milestones would allow Britain to take a more active role in non-proliferation 
into 1979, the government freed from two major economic constraints. The year 1978 had 
also seen the foundations being laid for a major cultural component of debates on Pakistan’s 
nuclear aspirations. Bhutto and Zia’s remarks about the pan-Islamic nature of their atomic 
ambitions would become a huge part of the public discussion of Pakistan, the Middle East, 
and nuclear weapons. Although the responses of the media and governments to the ‘Islamic 
bomb’ would be quite different, they would nonetheless help to shape the outcry over 
‘Islamic’ nuclear proliferation that emerged over the next twelve months and into the 
decades beyond. 
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Chapter 5: “A dream of nightmare proportions” 
January 1979–December 1979 
 
At 5.12am on December 18, 1979, Labour MP Tam Dalyell stood in the House of Commons 
and delivered a philippic against the Pakistani nuclear programme and the prospect of atomic 
proliferation in the Islamic world. “This is a spine-chilling prospect–a dream of nightmare 
proportions,” he intoned, “Great Governments, such as those of the Soviet Union or the 
United States, can be counted upon to act with deliberation…but the bad dream come true of 
a Gadaffi [sic] bomb or an ayatollah bomb is altogether different.”1 Dalyell’s apocalyptic, 
classically orientalist speech that starkly differentiated between ‘responsible’ states and the 
‘irresponsible’ Islamic world brought to a close a year where Pakistani nuclear aspirations 
had gone from a modest media story to front-page news. Revelations about the ‘Islamic 
bomb’ and Pakistani metallurgist A.Q. Khan’s role in appropriating gas centrifuge designs 
from Europe ensured that the religious and clandestine elements of Pakistani nuclear 
ambitions became the dominant public narratives. Within these narratives, there was a strand 
of alarmism around the ‘Islamic bomb’s’ impact on global proliferation. ‘Proliferation 
cascade’ alarmism was nothing new, normally voiced in terms of security concerns and 
national prestige. This was proliferation of a different kind, founded in the cultural 
connections between disparate states. 
 Historians have recently identified the influence of cultural factors in nuclear 
policymaking. Matthew Jones has analysed the importance of the cultural construct of race 
as an influence on American nuclear policy in Asia.2 Unlike Jones’ findings—where race is a 
significant factor—an analysis of non-proliferation policymaking by the US and UK during 
the late 1970s indicates that the cultural factor of religion had no meaningful influence on 
policy. In order to demonstrate this, this chapter will cover the media ‘scare’ surrounding the 
‘Islamic bomb’ paradigm and then go on to analyse how the paradigm was received by 
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policymakers in Washington and London. By doing so, it will show that the ‘Islamic bomb’ 
failed to influence non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan. While some individuals in 
government placed credence in the idea of trans-Islamic proliferation, nobody could offer 
evidence that it was either taking, or going to, take place. What the ‘Islamic bomb’ concept did 
do was create a propaganda problem that the White House and Whitehall needed to address. 
The third section of this chapter—examining the genuine changes that took place in 
policy and strategy towards Pakistan—demonstrate that it was not the ‘Islamic bomb’ but the 
problems created by a Pakistani state determined to acquire nuclear capability that forced 
change upon the American and British foreign policy establishments. By the middle of 1979, 
it was Zia’s unwillingness to abandon the nuclear programme that prompted a significant but 
little remarked upon policy change on both sides of the Atlantic. The Carter administration 
and Thatcher government shifted from a commitment to preventing proliferation in South 
Asia to a policy of mitigating eventual Pakistani nuclear acquisition. This centred on a quest 
for assurances from both Pakistan and India not to test nuclear weapons. No longer did 
America and Britain seek to stop Pakistan from acquiring nuclear capability, they decided 
that ameliorating the effects of that acquisition was the only real option open. Overall, this 
period clearly demonstrates that what was taking place was not a ‘clash of civilisations,’ but 
a clash between Western states determined to enforce some form of non-proliferation policy 
and a developing world state led by men even more determined to gain nuclear capability. 
 
The ‘Islamic bomb’ in Public 
Although the concept of the ‘Islamic bomb’—a nuclear weapon transcending state 
boundaries and spanning a transnational religious community—had appeared in Pakistani 
and in Western governmental comment before 1979, it was only in that year that the issue 
burst into the media, increasing public pressure on policymakers in Washington and London 
but failing to influence policy in any significant way. Following the Indian nuclear test of 
May 1974, connections between nuclear weapons and Pakistan’s Islamic faith were not as 
clear to the media and peripheral politicians—such as British Members of Parliament—as 
they later became. However, the 1974-78 period laid the groundwork for an emotive issue in 
the trilateral American-British-Pakistani relationship.  
! 166!
Media commentary on the ‘Islamic bomb’ mostly ignored the disparities between 
Muslim states, taking Pakistani rhetoric at face value and expressing a belief that because 
Pakistan was an Islamic state, it would share its nuclear achievements with co-religionists.3 
During the Cold War there were pro-American and pro-Soviet states, states representing 
various Islamic sects, and states—such as Libya and Pakistan—vying for leadership 
positions within the Muslim world. Pakistan used its nuclear programme to make itself 
unique, nuclear weapons forming part of a quest for regional leadership based on religious 
community.4 Positioning the nationalist Pakistani pursuit of nuclear weapons as an Islamic 
issue allowed two quite different Pakistani leaders to legitimise that pursuit. For Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto and Mohammad Zia ul-Haq the ‘Islamic bomb’ was a means of legitimising the 
nationalist reasoning behind the nuclear programme.5 National security and a political desire 
for nuclear power were the main driving forces. The ‘Islamic bomb’ allowed both leaders to 
cloak their quest in transnational religious garb, presenting Western non-proliferation efforts 
as anti-Muslim and not just anti-Pakistani. Pakistan also asserted its Islamic identity as a 
means of differentiating itself from India and the common civilisational heritage that both 
countries shared.6 Bhutto, in particular, set out to remodel the image of Pakistan in foreign 
eyes, emphasising his socialist ideals and Pakistani ties with the wider Muslim world.7 Zia 
emphasised Islam’s role in political and civil society, striving to mould Pakistan to his vision 
of an Islamic state and appealing to domestic constituencies: the military, harder-line Islamic 
radicals, and widespread anti-Indian sentiment.8 However, as Pervez Hoodbhoy argues, 
individual Muslim countries may cloak their desire for nuclear weapons in Islamic garb, but 
the motivations are secular and nationalistic. Just as Israel’s nuclear weapons serve the 
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Israeli state and not Judaism, Pakistan intended its quest for the atom bomb to serve the 
purposes of the Pakistani state. 9 
 
The Indian nuclear test coincided with changes in Pakistan catalysed by Bhutto’s ‘tilt’ 
towards religious conservatism, a shift connected to his economic and security agendas. The 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) had acclaimed Pakistan as a leading Muslim 
state, and after the Indian explosion, Bhutto naturally turned for financial aid to the countries 
that had so recently elevated his country to a position of such esteem.10 The move towards 
the increased significance of Islam in Pakistani political life re-invigorated domestic debate 
about Pakistani national identity, tying that identity to Islamic traditions rather than 
geography or ethnicity. 
 At this early stage, the Pakistani government exploited the bonds of faith in verbal 
attacks on India. In an announcement timed to coincide with Pakistani Independence Day on 
August 14, 1974, PAEC chief Munir Ahmad Khan outlined the test’s religious dimensions: 
The history of Muslims is full of instances which show that any threats to 
their existence brings out their inner strength of faith which unifies them and 
helps them surmount great difficulties. India’s explosion was aimed at 
demoralizing us but it may serve as a jolt to awaken us from a long slumber 
so that we quickly summon and deploy all our moral, human, and material 
resources in defence of our country…It may also bring realization in other 
Muslim countries that India’s ambitions extend far beyond the sub-continent 
and this threat to Pakistan is also a threat to them.11 
 
Here Pakistan’s senior atomic scientist—a man cognisant of the drive for the bomb—
explicitly Islamised the nuclear issue to elicit Muslim support. Although Washington and 
London made little of this rhetoric at the time, Bhutto and Zia echoed such statements through 
the years. From prison, Bhutto had claimed that Pakistan was near to a nuclear breakthrough, 
stating, “We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, 
Jewish, and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The communist powers also possess it. 
Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.”12 
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As discussed in Chapter Four, during 1978, Zia had publicly linked nuclear 
technology and Islamic faith, stating, “[T]he Jews have got it. Then why should Pakistan, 
which is considered part of the Muslim world, be deprived of this technology,” and, “No 
Muslim country has any [nuclear weapons]. If Pakistan possesses such a weapon it would 
reinforce the power of the Muslim world,” a comment that featured in the late-1978 
American and British diplomatic offensives.13 Religious leaders, emboldened by Zia’s 
policies, also entered the fray. Conservative cleric Maulana Mufti Mahmood spoke in “terms 
which left no doubt that he was referring [positively] to nuclear weapons (for Pakistan and 
the Muslim world.)”14 The visit of Gaddafi’s right hand man Abdessalam Jalloud to 
Islamabad in mid-August prompted diplomatic comment on the potential for a Pakistani-
Libyan nuclear alliance and, should the French deal be cancelled, cooperation in building a 
reprocessing plant.15 Dread of Libyan-Pakistani nuclear cooperation was the foundation of 
much of the media furore surrounding the ‘Islamic bomb.’ 
 
Before 1979, the ‘Islamic bomb’ was absent from the Western media. The Iranian revolution 
of February 1979—a popular uprising that caught the Carter administration completely off-
guard and drove the Shah, America’s staunchest ally in the Islamic Middle East, from 
power—dramatically brought to Western public attention a new form of political, puritanical 
Islamic radicalism. While sometimes characterised as anti-modern, Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
new republic was by no means anti-technology. Khomeini repeatedly emphasised that 
Muslims had to improve their access to technology and harness science in the service of 
Islam.16 The later hostage crisis also negatively influenced the American public’s 
perceptions of Islam.17 It was in this atmosphere—where Islam appeared to be growing in 
power—that the ‘Islamic bomb’ surfaced. Driven by Pakistani rhetoric and media revelations 
about the nuclear programme, Israeli and Indian pressure, and increased militancy in the 
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Islamic world, 1979 saw the fear of Islamic nuclear weapons become a key component of 
public debate on Pakistani atomic aspirations. 
 The exposure of the ‘Khan Affair’ thrust the ‘Islamic bomb’ into the Western 
consciousness. In late March, the West German Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) 
television channel highlighted security failings going back to 1975 at the British-Dutch-
German Urenco uranium enrichment facility in the Netherlands and speculated on the 
situation’s Muslim aspects. The documentary highlighted A.Q. Khan’s theft of centrifuge 
secrets from Urenco, weaving together the Islamic issue and Western efforts to disrupt the 
Pakistani nuclear programme into a web of speculation and recrimination.18 The ZDF 
broadcast subscribed to the notion that “radical Arab countries,” like Libya “whose hatred of 
Israel and all those who desire peace in the Middle East is well known” financed Pakistan.19 
From the ZDF programme onwards, the ‘Islamic bomb’ became a significant trope 
in the media and the commentary of non-governmental, peripheral political figures such as 
British MPs. The New York Times and Washington Post repeatedly placed the Pakistani 
programme within a pan-Islamic context.20 By June, broadcaster Walter Cronkite introduced 
a CBS report on ‘The Pakistani-Islamic Bomb’ that painted an apocalyptic picture of Middle 
Eastern nuclear warfare. From the outset, reporter Bill McLaughlin assumed that bonds of 
faith would cause Pakistan to share its nuclear technology, claiming that Libya financed the 
Pakistani bomb programme.21 “Reliable” informants proffered information that led 
McLaughlin to contend that the Islamic world sought nuclear weapons for violent ends: 
“Libya wants it [a Pakistani nuclear weapon] to be the nuclear sword of the Moslem world. 
And Pakistan not only has close relations with Libya, it is also deeply committed to the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation.”22 The Pakistani Embassy in Washington responded 
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furiously to CBS’s narrative, disavowing the Libyan connection.23 Nuclear experts on both 
sides of the Atlantic concluded that McLaughlin’s “intelligence sources” were quite likely 
Israeli.24 
 June was a fruitful month for speculation. In Britain, the Guardian ran multiple 
stories on the Pakistan programme and the Khan imbroglio, unquestioningly referencing an 
‘Islamic bomb’ and claiming that Pakistan was not just developing an atomic bomb, but was 
working on thermonuclear weapons.25 The publicity surrounding the Khan Affair prompted 
MPs to ask awkward questions in parliament. Leo Abse, Frank Allaun, Bob Cryer, Jim 
Marshall, David Stoddart, and Dalyell—all from the Labour Party—queried British 
involvement in the scandal and British approaches to the Pakistani problem.26 Most vocal 
initially was Abse, who quizzed Margaret Thatcher, asking the new Prime Minister if she 
was aware that the Khan Affair had brought the possibility of an “Islamic bomb”—a bomb 
that would subvert the Western position with Middle Eastern oil producers—that much 
closer?27 Thatcher was silent regarding Islamic nuclear weapons posing a threat to the power 
of the Western world. More publicity then came from an unexpected source. The magazine 8 
Days, published in London, funded by the Emirati ambassador, and distributed around the 
Middle East and South Asia, published a lengthy article on Khan. Correct in some respects, 
inaccurate in others, it concluded with more unquestioning comment on the Pakistani 
bomb’s pan-Islamic nature.28 
 Pakistani protestations about their intentions did little to curtail speculation. Having 
utilised ‘Islamic bomb’ language throughout 1978, senior figures in Islamabad recognised 
their rhetoric’s danger in the febrile, post-Iranian revolution environment where Western 
nations feared the Muslim world. Officials denied that the now implicitly admitted nuclear 
programme was anything other than an enterprise created by and for the Pakistani state. 
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Interviewed by the BBC, Zia cryptically commented, “It does not mean that Pakistan one 
day will make a bomb and it will fly it off [sic] in an umbrella to its Arab friends and say 
here is the bomb, now throw it down the drain. How can that be done?”29 The CBS report 
and the 8 Days article infuriated Agha Shahi, who contended that the media commentary 
was part of a campaign against Pakistan, repudiating connections between the Islamic world 
and the nuclear programme.30 This was followed by an editorial in the semi-official Pakistan 
Times railing against the ‘Islamic bomb’ as a “Western created myth” that was “part of the 
process of rallying the non-Islamic world against the Islamic people.”31 Zia, Shahi, and the 
Pakistani media were unwilling to recognise that it was their rhetoric—and that of Bhutto—
that gave birth to the ‘Islamic bomb’ and initiated the media frenzy. 
 
As summer turned to autumn, the press continued to posit a trans-Islamic nuclear project 
centred on Pakistan. American journalist Don Oberdorfer buried Carter administration 
statements on the lack of evidence for an ‘Islamic bomb’ at the tail end of an article on 
Congressional disquiet about the Pakistan situation.32 Sunanda Datta-Ray, reporting from 
Calcutta for the Guardian, referenced the “intense speculation about the imminence of the 
Libyan financed ‘Islamic bomb’.”33 A subsequent article on British links to the clandestine 
Pakistani purchasing programme ignored official comment about the ‘Islamic bomb’s’ 
speculative nature and once more suggested Libyan financing for the project.34 In India, D.K. 
Palit and P.K.S. Namboodiri published Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb, arguing Pakistan was 
indeed engaged in a nuclear project with a pan-Islamic dimension.35 FCO analysts regarded 
the book—which received considerable attention in India—as hawkish and intended as a 
“wake-up call” for the Indian government.36 In reality, the book contributed nothing new to 
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the debate, offering no proof of Arab funding for the Pakistani programme and leaving the 
project’s Islamic nature implicit.37 
On 9 December, the Observer published an article on A.Q. Khan that firmly tied 
together Pakistani nuclear ambitions, Islam, and the clandestine programme. ‘How Dr Khan 
Stole the Bomb For Islam,’ written by Colin Smith and his Indian colleague Shyam Bhatia, 
followed up on mid-year stories alleging British links to the Pakistani nuclear programme.38 
Smith and Bhatia amplified this a week later with an article—‘Atoms for War’—considering 
the wider implications of nuclear proliferation, again reflecting on the Islamic dimension.39 
The ‘Dr Khan’ and ‘Atoms for War’ articles inspired Dalyell to raise the matter in 
parliament.40 After pointing towards a “potential world holocaust” originating in the Arab 
world or Asia, he outlined his “dream of nightmare proportions,” in which Islamic solidarity 
was the root of nuclear proliferation in an unreliable, irrational Muslim world.41 Dalyell’s 
speech symbolised how embedded the notion of the ‘Islamic bomb’ had become when the 
media and peripheral political figures discussed the interactions between nuclear technology 
and the Islamic world. 
 
Public comment on the ‘Islamic bomb’—from Oberdorfer’s reports, to Smith and Bhatia’s 
exposés, to Dalyell’s histrionics—tended towards the orientalist and alarmist. As the Islamic 
nuclear issue was developing, Edward Said published the landmark Orientalism. Although 
scholars have debated Said’s at-times ahistorical observations and conclusions ever since, his 
thoughts on media images of Islam are apposite when considering the ‘Islamic bomb.’42 
“Lurking behind all these images,” he argues, “is the menace of jihad. Consequence: a fear 
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that Muslims (or Arabs) will take over the world.”43 Fear did lie behind public discussion of 
the Islamic bomb: fear of Middle Eastern nuclear war and more modest—but still 
significant—fears of changes in the balance of power between the Muslim world and the 
West.  As sociologist Jonathan Lyons notes, there is a “single, persistent Western discursive 
formation of violence in Islam that remains largely immune to serious challenge on historical, 
linguistic, and theological bases.”44 Moreover, non-proliferation and the ‘Islamic bomb’ feed  
into the belief that developed nations have a monopoly over the legitimate use and 
technologies of violence.45 Cultural anthropologist Hugh Gusterson comments that for 
decades, creators of foreign policy and public opinion saw the spread of nuclear weapons to 
the Islamic world as particularly dangerous.46 In the case of Pakistan in the 1970s, both 
Gusterson and Lyons are correct in their assessment of public discourses, but as the 
documentary evidence demonstrates, the policymakers of the 1970s were far less influenced 
by fear of pan-Islamic proliferation. As this study shows, the ‘Islamic bomb’ was—for 
policymakers—a problem of propaganda rather than an imminent reality. 
Reporting on the ‘Islamic bomb’ also formed part of a continuum of proliferation 
alarmism extending back to 1945. For decades, governmental, scientific, military, and media 
figures had made dire predictions about the spread of nuclear weapons. At the core of this 
was the notion a ‘proliferation cascade,’ an unstoppable chain reaction of new nuclear states 
emerging after an ‘Nth country’ had achieved nuclear capability.47 The ‘cascadologists’ 
feared that an ‘Nth country’ acquiring nuclear weapons would threaten the national security 
of other nations, thereby leading to a domino effect. Fears surrounding the ‘Islamic bomb’ 
were of a different stripe. This was not a potential cascade based on national security or even 
the ‘prestige’ of being a nuclear state. It was a cascade based solely on the perception that 
sharing a common (and poorly understood) religion meant that one country achieving 
nuclear status would lead to an automatic, and willing, spread of that status. 
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The ‘Islamic bomb’ Behind Closed Doors 
Many works on America, Britain, and the ‘Islamic bomb’ misunderstand how policymakers 
comprehended and interpreted Pakistani rhetoric. The ‘Islamic bomb’ was present in 
discussions of the Pakistani nuclear programme, but understandings were frequently more 
nuanced than in public discourses. There may indeed have been anti-Muslim, even racist, 
sentiments present in policymakers’ minds, but the available evidence does not show that 
this influenced policy to any significant degree. There was never any concrete evidence of an 
‘Islamic bomb,’ but the idea provoked deliberation and discussion about how to deal with 
the publicity it created. There were policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic who at times 
placed greater emphasis on the possibility of an ‘Islamic bomb.’ However, both the 
American and British governments recognised that there was little—if any—hard 
intelligence or evidence to back-up assertions of a Pakistani desire to equip its co-religionists 
with nuclear weapons. 
While the ‘Islamic bomb’ became embedded in the media coverage of Pakistan, 
nuclear weapons, and the Middle East, policymakers in Washington and London sought to 
cut through the speculation, despite the increased pressure that the Islamic issue and the 
Pakistani purchasing programme put on non-proliferation policy. Islam had been a thread 
running through British and American assessments of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions since 
1974. FCO analysts suggested eleven days after the Indian detonation that Pakistan may seek 
firmer links with “Iran and the Arab states,” a natural move for Islamabad given Pakistan’s 
troubled history with India and known links with friendly Islamic states.48 The British 
Embassy in Islamabad opined that there was mounting domestic pressure from harder-line 
religious elements—such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)—to pursue a nuclear option.49 
Furthermore, senior diplomatic officers thought that Pakistan might well seek to put pressure 
on India through its OIC ties.50 The most direct connection between a Pakistani nuclear 
programme and the Muslim world came from an FCO SAD assessment produced two weeks 
after the Indian explosion. In the midst of an analysis of the test’s impact, SAD commented: 
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In order to minimise the real cost for Pakistan and also to increase the Arab 
commitment to him [Bhutto] he would almost certainly seek substantial 
financial assistance from the Middle East oil producers. Indeed he might 
even endeavour to involve them in some kind of nuclear partnership. A 
development of this kind in the already potentially explosive situation in the 
Middle East, particularly with its anti-Soviet undertones, would produce its 
own dangers.51 
 
In the years after the Indian test, Islam popped up in various contexts. In a meeting with 
Henry Kissinger in late 1975, the Indian ambassador to the United States Triloki Nath Kaul 
pointed out the rising danger of pan-Islamism. Kissinger’s response was illuminating: “We 
may become allies yet.”52 In 1977, British officials had noted discussion of the reprocessing 
plant as a potentially pan-Islamic facility. The Pakistan Times had asserted Pakistan’s 
willingness to assist Muslim countries in acquiring nuclear technology, but Robin Fearn at 
the British Embassy in Islamabad noted, “it is a theme which may be developed as a factor in 
US hostility to Pakistan’s acquisition of the plant.” However, reflecting on the significance 
of potential pan-Islamic proliferation, he suggested, “Perhaps it need not be taken too 
seriously.”53 French consular staff in Islamabad thought the same, indicating to their British 
counterparts that there was no evidence that the Muslim world attached any significance to 
the reprocessing plant as an “Islamic facility” and the entire raison d’être of the plant was to 
retain the nuclear weapons option for Pakistan in the hope of gaining parity with India.54 
American intelligence suggested Muslim nations had promised aid for the nuclear 
programme, Pakistan having apparently convinced the quite disparate Islamic states of Saudi 
Arabia and Libya that “the Muslim world must no longer suffer the humiliation of being 
second class citizens in a nuclear age.”55 At a joint meeting in Washington at the end of 1977, 
American and British delegates agreed that under Zia, Pakistan was looking increasingly 
towards the Islamic world for support.56 
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During 1978, Zia’s rhetoric about “reinforcing the power of the Muslim world” and 
Bhutto’s death-cell testimony about the imminence of Pakistani nuclear capability were 
debated in multilateral gatherings (for example, at the G7 summit in Bonn). However, as 
Warren Christopher’s diplomatic cables in late 1978 demonstrate, those making non-
proliferation policy placed no credence in the blustery rhetoric emanating from Islamabad. 
Despite senior figures such as Arthur Hummel arguing that Zia’s comments were nothing 
more than a “gaffe,” the Pakistani leader’s remarks truly laid the groundwork for the much 
more wide-ranging public and private debates about the spread of nuclear weapons in the 
Islamic world that emerged in 1979. 
 
For American and British officials in 1979, the ‘Islamic bomb’ featured prominently in the 
months before it became a major public issue. Visiting London, Jack Mikloss (Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East & South Asia) and Paul Kreisberg (of the 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs) suggested that Pakistan had “offered to be the supplier 
of nuclear weapons to the Arab world.” They saw this as explaining perceived Pakistani 
casualness about the risks of American pressure.57 Arthur Hummel echoed these beliefs, 
suggesting that Pakistan might use future nuclear capability to win financial support from 
“Arab oil producers.”58 Missives from the British Embassy in Islamabad mirrored this worry, 
arguing an American embargo’s impact on the Pakistani economy might be minimal “if 
accounts of Arab backing for Pakistan’s nuclear programme are correct.” In such a case, the 
Symington Amendment’s invocation and an embargo on aid would only move Pakistan 
closer towards the Islamic world, rather than reducing nuclear ambitions.59 Although a 
Pakistani move towards closer alliance with the Islamic world was not a signifier of a desire 
to spread the ‘Islamic bomb,’ this created a paradoxical point in policymakers’ minds: by 
taking action to head off the ‘Islamic bomb,’ the US might increase the chances of Pakistan 
moving further away from the West. 
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 For some American and British policymakers, public speculation about an ‘Islamic 
bomb’ provoked anxiety about Israeli, Islamic, and Indian opinion. Not only would a break 
in relations with Pakistan—viewed as a moderate Muslim state—adversely affect the 
similarly restrained Gulf states’ sentiments, there was apprehension about the ‘Islamic 
bomb’s’ impact on Israeli and Indian attitudes towards Pakistan.60 Vance noted Anglo-
American unanimity, stating, “We both share the same deep concern about the regional and 
international consequences of Pakistan developing a nuclear weapon, particularly in view of 
the ‘Islamic bomb’ aspect to the situation with regard to both Israel and India.”61 
The ‘Islamic bomb’ idea had gained traction in India, where government officials 
vacillated over whether or not they believed that Pakistan was pursuing an Arab-financed 
‘Islamic bomb.’62 Unsurprisingly, given the long history of Indo-Pakistani tension and 
conflict, New Delhi frequently made much of the issue, arguing for the Islamic dimension’s 
centrality. However, Sir John Thomson (British High Commissioner to India) offered a more 
nuanced response suggesting that there might only be general, ephemeral support for the 
Pakistani nuclear programme amongst Muslim nations.63 At the highest level, Jim Callaghan 
agreed with Prime Minister Moraji Desai that if there were evidence of Arab involvement in 
the Pakistani programme, this would make the situation much more serious, but Callaghan 
offered no evidence for the Muslim funding theory.64 At this stage, American and British 
policymakers and diplomats recognised that the ‘Islamic bomb’ idea was a provocation, not 
a reality, prompting Israeli fears of a nuclear threat from the Islamic world and increasing 
long-standing Indo-Pakistani tension. 
In bilateral Anglo-American discussions, shared concerns became apparent. John 
Bushell quizzed Hummel, who contended that sharing nuclear technology was the quid pro 
quo for Islamic support of the Pakistani programme. Hummel suspected that supporters 
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included Libya, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps others.65 Meeting with senior State Department 
officials in Washington, Anthony Parsons (Deputy Under-secretary at the FCO) observed 
that “events in Pakistan were one of the most horrifying developments since 1945,” and the 
possibility that Arab money might be available to Pakistan only added to the danger for the 
Middle East.66 Parsons had never been one to shy away from fearful pronouncements about 
Islamic nuclear capability. “Pakistan is paranoid in its attitude towards India,” he wrote, “and 
I do not at all like the association between the Pakistani nuclear programme and Arab money 
(not proven but likely) in the present atmosphere prevailing in the Moslem world. It would 
not be difficult to construct a Nevil Shute type scenario out of all of this.”67 However, the 
FCO thought it unlikely that Arab countries would knowingly fund the Pakistani nuclear 
programme, even though many Muslim states might be glad that a co-religionist had 
achieved nuclear capability.68 
Although the FCO largely dismissed Parsons’ comments, his view—couched in 
terms of the Iranian Revolution and Middle East unrest—exposed an underlying fear of a 
violent, irrational Muslim world dragging the planet to a nuclear fate of the kind so vividly 
depicted in Shute’s bestselling 1957 novel On The Beach (and its 1959 film adaptation).69 
Shute’s representation of an atomic apocalypse had galvanized readers and reviewers alike 
and it had—in the intervening years—become the iconic image illustrating a nuclear end of 
the world.70 Parsons’ comments—that made the spread of nuclear weapons to the Islamic 
world the most shattering, apocalyptic change since the creation of the atomic bomb—could 
be taken as illustrative of ‘Islamic bomb’ fears in government. However, his argument’s 
main thrust was that Pakistan was an unstable, paranoid state with a deeply unsatisfactory 
government.71 Parsons’ statements, whilst expressing fear of Muslim nuclear weapons, were 
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more deeply founded in classically Western concerns about ‘irrational’ and ‘unstable’ 
oriental peoples and rulers. The concerns expressed by Parsons did, however, have a genuine 
basis in fact. Pakistan did have an extremely troubled and volatile political history, with 
extended periods of military rule and martial law. 
Carter’s roving non-proliferation ambassador Gerard Smith also thought that 
Pakistan was “secretly transgressing norms” of nuclear behaviour adhered to by most states. 
Smith was also fearful about the prospects for the Middle East, noting that if a “Moslem 
bomb” was a genuine threat, the Israeli reaction must be considered. Nuclear weapons in the 
Middle East and South Asia required much wider deliberation if the ‘Islamic bomb’ were 
“on the cards.”72 State Department officials though that this aspect posed a serious threat to 
US national interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, with Pakistan moving “more 
towards the militant Islamic camp.”73  
 Despite the apocalyptic visions of some individuals, at this stage policymakers on 
both sides of the Atlantic saw the ‘Islamic bomb’ paradigm as provocative, rather than a 
genuine threat. The most worrying aspects were the potential reactions of Israel and India, 
the two states who felt most threatened by, respectively, the Islamic world and Pakistan 
specifically. The consensus was that although it was a worrying idea, no one could offer any 
hard evidence that the ‘Islamic bomb’ was about to become a reality. 
 
While the ‘Islamic bomb’ remained pure speculation, harder evidence of clandestine 
Pakistani efforts to acquire the necessary components for uranium enrichment facilities 
continued to emerge. From the British perspective, this purchasing pattern required urgent 
and determined action.74 The US government had similar fears, acknowledging that 
enrichment was now the core of the Pakistani bomb effort and could lead to a potential 
derailment of US-Pakistani relations by triggering the Symington Amendment.75 However, 
non-proliferation policy came into conflict with human rights and regional security policies. 
Furthermore, a non-proliferationist Congress created problems for the administration and 
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Zia’s stonewalling turned promising avenues into blind alleys. Finally, within the Carter 
administration, there was confusion over the formulation and implementation of policy. 
 In Whitehall, GEN 74 pondered the timescale for Pakistan achieving nuclear 
capability. According to experts, Pakistan could produce weapons-grade uranium using the 
stolen centrifuge designs by 1982 at the earliest, although 1984-85 was more likely. The 
main constraint on Pakistani efforts was the requirement for precision-made ‘bellows’ for the 
enrichment cascades.76 British customs officials had stopped a shipment of bellows from 
Ireland and were pushing the Irish government to prevent further exports.77 French 
investigations discovered that the Pakistanis had contracted the engineering firm Calorstat to 
provide the same equipment. London and Washington shared anxieties about the purchasing 
effort and submitted diplomatic representations to the French government. 78 This new 
evidence resulted in British ministers once again tightening export controls and seeking 
“pressures and inducements” to dissuade Pakistan.79 
 By March, intelligence on Pakistani purchasing was flooding in to Washington and 
London. The State Department attempted to influence the Swiss government when it became 
apparent that multiple Swiss firms were supplying components to Pakistan.80 Bern was 
reluctant to act, offering only vague assurances to talk with the companies concerned.81 
America also pressured the FRG when reports suggested that multiple West German 
companies were involved in supplying components.82 In light of this, the US and UK 
continued their close cooperation in attempting to shut down the purchasing networks. For 
the Carter administration, the situation was becoming increasingly difficult as mounting 
evidence of Pakistani intentions made it impossible to prevent the Symington Amendment’s 
invocation. 
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The US government faced contradictory needs: to force the Pakistanis to abandon 
their nuclear aspirations, while preserving relations in a strategically significant region.83 
Here, non-proliferation policy and Cold War imperatives collided as détente crumbled. The 
Iranian Revolution had destroyed the US alliance with Tehran just as it appeared that the 
Soviets were involving themselves more deeply in neighbouring Afghanistan. However, 
Pakistan was not simply seen as a bastion of US regional influence, but it was also a 
potentially significant part of wider Cold War arms control. The ‘Tackman’ radar stations in 
Iran that had monitored the Soviet missile test range at Tyuratam had been lost because of 
the revolution, and required replacing with new sites. The most obvious location for these 
was in Pakistan.84 A harsh non-proliferation policy risked driving Pakistan away from the 
US, striking a further blow to US regional influence and superpower arms control. 
The Carter administration faced a wave of intelligence and publicity that made the 
Symington Amendment’s imposition a certainty. January to March saw numerous efforts 
aimed at retarding the imposition by engaging with Zia’s government. The State Department 
viewed the problem as one of regional security and stability: with the situation in Iran, a 
rupture with Pakistan could pose serious regional problems for the US.85 The elite, multi-
agency Policy Review Committee (PRC) agreed to delay the Symington Amendment’s 
imposition on the grounds of the on-going diplomatic efforts and Pakistan’s critical regional 
importance.86 Hummel had confronted Zia with intelligence about the nuclear programme 
and the Pakistani president responded angrily, offering inspection rights to any nuclear 
facility in Pakistan as proof of his peaceful intentions.87 The administration seized upon this 
opportunity, as it usefully demonstrated to Congress the correctness of resisting the 
Symington Amendment’s application.88 In the end, Zia dashed hopes for inspections when—
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unmoved by warnings about US legislation—the Pakistani leader informed Warren 
Christopher that he would not permit scrutiny of nuclear facilities and refused to rule out a 
“peaceful” nuclear test.89 
The growing publicity attendant upon Pakistani ambitions highlighted the 
problematic nature of open US challenges to Zia’s government. In contrast to the ‘softly 
softly’ approach favoured by some State Department officials, Gerard Smith favoured a high 
profile, international campaign against the Pakistani bomb, echoing Anthony Parsons’ view 
that the situation posed the “sharpest challenge to the international structure since 1945.” 
Smith argued that when faced with an eroding global consensus against nuclear weapons, 
“[T]he prospect of ‘Moslem’ bombs is as likely as a German and Japanese bomb (consider 
what their jingos would make of these countries remaining 3d class powers.)” 90 The threat in 
Smith’s eyes was not the ‘Islamic bomb’, but the impact of Pakistani nuclear attainment on 
the international scene, leading to a cascade of key non-nuclears deciding to pursue the 
nuclear option. Smith argued that the current non-proliferation policy towards the 
subcontinent was too parochial and demanded that the situation be placed in a global 
context.91 Realising that massive publicity about the Pakistani programme was inevitable, 
State Department non-proliferationists such as Pickering favoured the high-profile “sunshine 
approach,” placing the full glare of publicity on Pakistan, potentially turning international 
opinion against Islamabad.92  
 Zia’s intransigence, the Symington Amendment’s looming implementation, and the 
flow of information on the purchasing project led the State Department to scramble for a 
new policy. Hummel argued only a “bold initiative” would meet Pakistani security 
requirements and constrain nuclear ambitions.93 Tom Pickering (Assistant Secretary of State 
for Oceans & International Environmental & Scientific Affairs) and Harold Saunders (Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near East Affairs) suggested such a "bold initiative," an "audacious 
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buy-off” comprised of extensive security assistance—consisting of arms sales and economic 
aid—aimed at assuaging Pakistani fears.94 Additionally, they suggested, there could be 
exploration of an Indo-Pakistani agreement to neither build nor test nuclear weapons if 
assistance did not result in movement on the nuclear front. Pickering and Saunders also 
noted that, “The likelihood of an ‘Islamic bomb’ with its consequences in the Arab-Israeli 
dispute will increase Congressional concerns over anything we might propose doing for 
Pakistan.”95 Here, Pickering and Saunders worried that the ‘Islamic bomb’ idea would cause 
increased consternation in an actively non-proliferationist Congress. However, the proposal 
never gained traction. Warren Christopher’s assistant Steve Oxman thought Pickering and 
Saunders were “dreaming” if they imagined the package would look like anything other than 
a bribe for Pakistan and if they believed Congress would permit such a package in the face 
of persuasive evidence of Pakistani nuclear ambitions.96 The DoD and ACDA also opposed 
security assistance for Pakistan, lest it be mistaken for tacit approval of the nuclear 
programme.97 Human-rights proponents in the State Department also rejected increased 
security assistance, protesting Zia’s imposition of Islamic punishments in Pakistan.98 
The reaction to the Pickering-Saunders proposal highlighted the issues the Carter 
administration faced in dealing with Pakistan. The challenges of balancing non-proliferation, 
conventional arms control, and security assistance were becoming all too apparent. The 
Pickering-Saunders proposal did, in one sense, presage a sea change in administration policy 
towards Pakistan. Pickering and Saunders’ suggestion of exploring a non-test/non-
production agreement between Pakistan and India would in time become a core element of 
administration strategy. This strategy eventually focused on the non-testing portion and—
when Vance eventually articulated it in early June—moved policy from prevention to 
mitigation of Pakistani nuclear capability.  
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By early April, events were taking place that typified the tension between the various strands 
of Carter’s overall foreign policy plaguing his time in office. There was strain between 
regional and global proliferation concerns. As Smith had noted at the end of March, the 
administration needed to think more widely about how Pakistan was affecting the global 
environment. Pakistani security was certainly a regional issue and non-proliferation was a 
global issue. Addressing one meant addressing the other, and vice versa. On April 6, 1979—
two days after Bhutto’s execution—Carter invoked the Symington Amendment, embargoing 
arms sales and aid to Pakistan because of mounting evidence of a uranium enrichment 
programme. The aid cut-off, coupled with the Khan Affair, created more headlines and 
antagonised a Pakistani political establishment already dealing with the violent domestic 
convulsions provoked by Bhutto’s execution.99 The Symington Amendment’s 
implementation angered the Pakistanis. Islamabad was particularly aggrieved that the US 
had continued to supply nuclear fuel to the Indian reactor at Tarapur, an issue that was 
causing difficulties for the Indo-American relationship.100 There was little enthusiasm in the 
Carter administration for the imposition of sanctions, as Pakistan would suffer little real 
harm from the withdrawal of bilateral economic aid. However, failure to publicly react to the 
blatant Pakistani activities would signal open acquiescence to Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions 
and diminish US credibility on non-proliferation issues.101 
 At the same time as the Carter administration was grappling with the issue of non-
proliferation credibility, the US print media, radio, and television extensively publicised the 
Khan Affair.102 From the publicity, the FCO in London expected an onslaught against Britain, 
and readied briefings that defended British actions and said the absolute minimum about the 
Pakistani programme.103 The story eventually broke wide open, publicised by the BBC, 
Swiss television, the New York Times, the Daily Telegraph, and many other news outlets 
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which all followed the lead given by ZDF.104 During the hard-fought British general election 
campaign of May 1979, the FCO attempted to deflect questions onto the Dutch and aligned 
Britain with American concerns about the enrichment programme.105 On May 4, as it became 
clear Callaghan had lost the election, his government—pushed by Carter—made a final 
representation to the Pakistanis regarding British anxieties about the enrichment 
programme.106 The changes taking place in British politics militated against a serious 
reception for the démarche. It later became evident that the Pakistanis had discounted the 
representation as the “dying whim of the outgoing government.”107 
In the wake of April 6 and the Islamic element’s ever widening media prominence, 
the FCO placed little credence in the idea of a pan-Islamic nuclear capability originating in 
Pakistan. Egyptian diplomats expressed to their British counterparts anxiety about the 
swirling rumours regarding Libya, suspicious of Pakistani attempts to position themselves as 
suffering anti-Islamic discrimination.108 Despite provocative Indian speculation that 
Pakistan’s sole nuclear desire was to produce an ‘Islamic bomb’ funded by Arab money, key 
FCO officials were unanimous in doubting the real or potential existence of an “Arab 
bomb.”109 The JNU’s David Carter described evidence for this as “woefully thin.”110  
Meanwhile, Islamabad responded to the Symington Amendment’s imposition by 
making the embargo a pan-Islamic issue. Agha Shahi argued that it was “discriminatory, 
based on false charges, and designed to keep nuclear power out of the hands of Muslim 
countries.”111 Shahi contended that the restriction was the fault of a “Zionist lobby” and 
denied that Libya or any Islamic nation was funding the nuclear programme.112 During this 
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tense period, State Department guidance for US consular officials emphasised the problem 
of regional and global proliferation and not religious affiliation: 
Q: What would be the implications for the Middle East of what has been 
described as a “Muslim bomb” to balance the Israeli bomb? 
 
A: As you know the Israelis have repeatedly stated in the past that they 
would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the region. In our 
view, any proliferation of nuclear weapons anywhere can only have the most 
serious consequences for world security.113 
 
US discussion guidelines for consular officials illustrated that policymakers—despite what 
individuals might think in private—realised the ‘Islamic bomb’ was a propaganda problem 
by stressing that the issue was not one of discrimination, emphasising extensive US nuclear 
cooperation with Islamic nations like Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey.114 
Over time, it became apparent that the evidence for an ‘Islamic bomb’ was limited at 
best, non-existent at worst. In bilateral US-UK discussions, Pickering highlighted 
fragmentary Australian indications about Libya and Iraq.115 He observed that while Saudi 
Arabia had been a substantial aid donor to Pakistan, it was doubtful the Saudis explicitly 
intended to finance the nuclear programme, especially as Riyadh had been making 
disapproving noises about Pakistani atomic intentions.116 John Bushell, in his valedictory 
dispatch from Islamabad, echoed doubts about the willingness of Muslim states to align 
themselves with the Pakistani nuclear project and a concurrent unwillingness in Pakistan to 
ally with more extreme, Iranian-style political Islam. Bushell argued that “cooperation with 
Muslim brothers, yes, alliance on the basis of fundamentalist Islam, no thank you.”117 The 
ambassador contended that Pakistan was indeed a significant Muslim nation in terms of its 
population, but other Islamic states might treat the thought of Pakistan as an “arsenal of 
Islam” with caution.118 Furthermore, Bushell asked, “In Islamic terms an ‘arsenal’ Pakistan 
may be: but now an arsenal in nuclear terms also? With the problems of its politics and 
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policies post-Bhutto, which Arabs can seriously want to become engaged with Pakistan?”119 
Following up, the outgoing ambassador argued that the further Pakistan went with a nuclear 
programme, the harder it would be for Zia to give it up, particularly if nuclear technology 
became a asset in Pakistani relations with the wider Muslim world.120 
 
By late spring, the US government was making efforts to persuade interested parties that the 
‘Islamic bomb’ was little more than propaganda. The Americans voiced fears of a nuclear 
arms race on the sub-continent and tried to demolish the Indian belief that the real danger 
posed by Pakistan lay in an Israeli/Islamic nuclear confrontation.121 In Washington, 
Pickering faced questioning in Congress. He noted that the administration believed Pakistan 
was aiming for a nuclear weapons capability but refused to discuss alleged Libyan financing 
in open session, leading to further media comment about the Gaddafi connection.122 
In meetings between Vance, Smith, and Agha Shahi, Shahi stressed that the ‘Islamic 
bomb’ was pure speculation, highlighting that Pakistan had turned down Saudi offers of 
finance for the reprocessing plant. Castigating the ‘Islamic bomb’ as nonsensical was a 
theme in Shahi’s representations throughout 1979.123 US officials felt that Pakistan was 
working hard to get the right reaction from the Muslim and developing worlds, in case they 
had to publicly justify the nuclear programme’s military nature.124  From using the ‘Islamic 
bomb’ as a threat, the Pakistanis had moved to belittling the very idea they had helped create. 
For Vance, writing on June 6, Pakistani nuclear sharing was a serious prospect, which could 
be addressed by distributing nuclear technology amongst Pakistan’s “Islamic friends,” giving 
the US “a much better chance of exerting influence against any GOP [Government of 
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Pakistan] move to contribute to a so-called Islamic bomb.”125 Thus, Vance advocated 
undercutting the Pakistani position by offering Muslim states the fruits of nuclear technology 
without the threat of nuclear weapons. 
Meanwhile, the State Department and CIA vacillated on the Islamic proliferation 
issue. The State Department acknowledged that the ‘Islamic bomb’ was the subject of 
feverish speculation and believed that Pakistan might have a material interest in spreading 
nuclear technology, but analysts had no substantive evidence for pan-Islamic nuclear 
cooperation.126 However, the CIA suggested that offers of political and financial support 
from oil-rich sympathisers in the Islamic world could tempt Pakistan. Indeed, Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, or Iraq might have induced Pakistan to share sensitive nuclear equipment and to 
propose terms for future nuclear cooperation.127 The CIA later reversed its position on the 
Iraqi example, casting doubt on Pakistani willingness to provide nuclear technology or 
materials to Baghdad because of Islamic solidarity.128 
As media speculation mounted, Western European leaders came under pressure from 
the nation most fearful of Islamic nuclear capability. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin contacted British, French, and West German leaders warning of the danger posed by 
the ‘Islamic bomb’ and demanding action. Writing to Thatcher, Begin described in dire 
terms the consequences of a Pakistani nuclear weapon in the hands of Gaddafi.129 The 
attached Israeli briefing drew links between Pakistan and the Arab world, but none of the 
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The FCO’s Paul Lever did not subscribe to Begin’s assertions, stating: 
While we share their concern, we believe that they may be making over 
much of Pakistani-Arab links. Although the Pakistanis are getting financial 
aid from Arab states the limited evidence available to us (and the 
Americans) does not support the suggestion that there is any plan to produce 
an “Islamic Bomb” or to produce weapons-usable material in Pakistan for 
other Islamic countries.131  
 
The speaking note prepared for Thatcher’s May 23 meeting with Begin reflected this 
viewpoint, shared throughout the FCO and other departments.132 Despite the media exposure, 
JNU chief Robert Alston emphasised that the conclusion of earlier British intelligence 
reporting that there was little evidence of Arab assistance for the Pakistani nuclear 
programme still held true.133 In the face of widening media coverage, the FCO advised 
British consular officials worldwide that there was “virtually no evidence” for “Arab 
financing” of the Pakistani nuclear programme.134 
Thatcher did not raise the matter with Begin face-to-face and responded via a letter 
to the Israeli leader that she took a personal hand in drafting.135 Thatcher sympathised with 
Israel’s position, but repeated the FCO’s analysis, pointing out that, “None of the evidence 
currently available to us suggests there is any arrangement to transfer weapons-useable 
material from Pakistan to other Islamic states or organisations.”136 She went on to outline the 
many steps Britain had taken to thwart the clandestine Pakistani purchasing programme and 
urged Begin to consider his own country’s role in preventing Middle Eastern nuclear 
proliferation.137 A month later, Peter Carrington probed Indian Foreign Minister Shyam 
Nandan Mishra at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka, Zambia. 
Carrington asked if the Pakistanis were developing an Islamic bomb or a Pakistani bomb. 
Mishra’s aide, Jagat Mehta, could not discern an “integrated Islamic political strategy” 
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behind the bomb programme. Carrington replied that if it did prove to be an Islamic bomb, 
“it would make the Middle East even more unstable.”138 The Thatcher-Begin letters and the 
related FCO discussions illustrate the way in which fears created by the  ‘Islamic bomb’ 
paradigm needed to be addressed. Despite the media coverage—and as the FCO pointed 
out—there was little evidence pointing to a pan-Islamic nuclear project. 
 
As the British government transitioned from Labour to Conservative, there was no reduction 
in the pace of British and American efforts to shut down Pakistani access to sensitive 
materials. There was a requirement to persuade key suppliers such as France, Switzerland, 
and West Germany of the need to take more—and stronger—action on export controls 
despite considerable resistance, particularly from the Germans and Swiss, neither of whom 
were convinced that the danger was as pressing as the UK and US insisted.139 France agreed 
to watch Calorstat carefully and Helmut Schmidt eventually assured Carter that his 
government would investigate the improvement of statutory export controls.140 The Swiss—
whose companies were major suppliers to the Pakistanis—were unresponsive, arguing that 
the NSG guidelines and the NPT stipulations meant there was little they could do at 
present.141 The Swiss government—like its West German neighbour—closely adhered to the 
existing regulations, even when it became apparent that those regulations were wholly 
inadequate in the face of new approaches to the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technologies. 
 British officials were aghast that the Dutch had neither informed the UK of their 
misgivings about Khan nor terminated his employment when he came under suspicion in 
1975.142 The FCO opined that initial Dutch explanations were inadequate and demanded a 
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clearer account.143 There was dissatisfaction about Dutch handling of the matter, their initial 
report characterised as “unconvincing and difficult to understand.”144  
 Members of Thatcher’s government stressed to the Pakistanis they were just as 
concerned about the nuclear issue as Callaghan and Owen had been. Douglas Hurd, Minister 
of State in the FCO, pressed the matter home, urging the Pakistani ambassador to understand 
that although Britain did not want to single out its friends in South Asia, the UK was 
extremely anxious about the nuclear programme.145 The new British ambassador in 
Islamabad, Oliver Forster, noted that in his first meeting with Agha Shahi, the foreign 
minister had launched into a “bitter tirade” about the Americans and “Jewish lobbies” in the 
US that were behind the campaign against Pakistan, contrasting this with what he saw as a 
more proportional British response. Forster disliked this attempt to drive a wedge between 
the US and UK, but declined to respond to Shahi’s provocations. Forster suggested, in a 
point that Thomson in New Delhi agreed with, that an aggressive “big stick” policy by the 
UK would provoke the same violent and emotional reaction. Quietly persuasive diplomacy 
was the way forward.146 
Quiet diplomacy was a theme that also surfaced in multilateral discussions. Gerard 
Smith proposed an informal summit to impress upon Western European nuclear supplier 
nations the situation’s urgency. The UK would attend but the government expressed 
reservations about any appearance of developed world countries ‘ganging up’ on Pakistan, 
the new British Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington noting that he had serious misgivings 
about the meeting becoming public knowledge.147 While the French refused to attend, 
Carrington instructed his representatives to support the US, underline the seriousness of 
Pakistan’s ambitions, and emphasise the need for international controls and 
communication.148 Robert Gallucci opened the meeting by stressing the US intelligence 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 FCO to UKE The Hague, ‘Theft of Secrets from Almelo: “The Khan Affair”,’ July 23, 1979, TNA 
FCO37/2206; UKE The Hague to FCO, ‘Theft of Secrets from Almelo: “The Khan Affair”,’ July 31, 1979, TNA 
FCO96/957. 
144 Carter to Thorp, Untitled, August 20, 1979, TNA FCO96/959. 
145 FCO to UKE Islamabad, ‘Pakistan Nuclear,’ June 7, 1979, TNA FCO96/955. 
146 UKE Islamabad to FCO, ‘Pakistan Nuclear,’ July 23, 1979, TNA FCO96/957; New Delhi to FCO, ‘Pakistan 
Nuclear,’ July 26, 1979, TNA FCO96/957. 
147 FCO to UKE Vienna, ‘Pakistan Nuclear,’ June 19, 1979, TNA FCO96/955. 
148 UKE Washington to FCO, ‘Vienna Discussions on Pakistan,’ June 25, 1979, TNA FCO96/956; FCO to UKE 
Vienna, ‘Pakistan Nuclear,’ June 26, 1979, TNA FCO96/955. 
! 192!
assessment that the Pakistani centrifuge programme strongly suggested a nuclear weapons 
project. The attendees reached the consensus that subtle diplomacy and the more effective 
application of export controls were the best way forward.149 
 
As media attention to Pakistan’s so-called ‘Islamic bomb’ increased with the CBS report, the 
8 Days article, and the publicising of the Khan Affair, public speculation began to affect 
bilateral relations between both the US and Pakistan and the UK and Pakistan. Robin Fearn 
in Islamabad described the Pakistanis as being in a state of “mounting exasperation” over the 
never-ending revelations about their clandestine nuclear programme.150 The most damaging 
story was American journalist Richard Burt’s feature on Pakistan in the New York Times.151 
As one of three potential solutions to the Pakistani problem, Burt suggested that the US was 
planning military strikes against nuclear installations.152 Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sardar 
Shah Nawaz protested vigorously to Hummel, claiming that the article had been “inspired” 
by the US government.153 In the midst of this, Shah Nawaz submitted a letter Zia had 
composed before the Burt article. According to Zia, the US Congress had misunderstood the 
Pakistani nuclear programme which, making matters worse, was described as a “Muslim 
atom bomb.” Zia offered Carter a “firm assurance that Pakistan’s nuclear programme is 
entirely peaceful in nature and that Pakistan has no intention of acquiring or manufacturing 
nuclear weapons.”154 This assurance—something that US officials had sought for months—
was not as unequivocal as the administration desired and fell short of explicitly ruling out 
nuclear testing or the transfer of materials to other states, but that did not stop Zia repeating 
similar formulations for the rest of the year.155 
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The Burt article elicited hasty US government repudiations in public and private, 
and concurrent Pakistani moves to increase defences around the ‘peaceful’ enrichment 
facilities at Kahuta.156 Here was a key instance of the media coverage surrounding Pakistan’s 
nuclear aspirations and the notion of an ‘Islamic bomb’ having a demonstrable and 
damaging effect on the chances for a diplomatic solution by further alienating Pakistan. State 
Department spokespeople hurried to deny that the US was planning to strike at its South 
Asian ally while the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Hummel for a 
dressing-down.157 In conversation with British consular officials, Mike Hornblow of the 
State Department’s Pakistan desk denied strike plans were in place but conjectured that Burt 
might have misunderstood “unknown individuals” who were speculating about Indian or 
Israeli military action.158  American rebuttals failed to prevent a stern rebuke from the 
Pakistani government, which castigated the Burt article and the CBS report as part of a 
campaign to incite “Israel, India, and even the Soviet Union to destroy Pakistan’s budding 
nuclear facilities.”159 Such was the Pakistani response, the US Embassy in Islamabad opined 
that there was likely to be lasting damage to bilateral relations and a reduction in the scope 
for “rational dialogue” on the nuclear issue.160 The Pakistani ambassador to Britain attacked 
the media speculation as inspired by the US government. The suggestion of an ‘Islamic 
bomb’ prompted him to ask: “why should Pakistan, which depended a great deal on 
economic support from its Islamic friends, so exacerbate the Arab/Israel situation as to 
threaten the continuation of this help[?]”161 Zia expanded upon this theme when British 
parliamentarians visited Pakistan, treating them to a tirade on the “American conspiracy” 
and the “myth of an Islamic bomb.”162 
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Within the US General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament 
(GAC), there was speculation that it was the Israelis—supposedly working on a plan named 
‘Entebbe 2’—who were most motivated to strike at Pakistani nuclear facilities out of fear of 
Middle Eastern proliferation.163 ACDA’s Charles van Doren noted that Burt had made things 
a lot harder for the US. While military options had not been under consideration, the 
categorical denials about the fracas issued by the State Department made it all the more 
difficult to ever consider such an option.164 
 
Violent misunderstandings rooted in misconceptions about US attitudes towards Islam 
provoked another damaging episode in US-Pakistani relations. Armed radicals stormed the 
Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, igniting protests around the globe when rumours circulated 
that the United States and Israel were behind the defilement of Islam’s holiest site, rumours 
that Carter believed were started by the Ayatollah Khomeini.165 The most serious protest was 
the burning of the US Embassy in Islamabad. Occurring in the month American hostages 
were taken in Tehran, Brzezinski was fearful that the situation was becoming one of 
America versus Islam.166 Dreading more, and increasingly deadly, attacks on US facilities, 
Vance ordered the evacuation of non-essential personnel from sensitive posts throughout the 
Middle East and South Asia.167 Zia later privately commented—espousing a view of his 
people more often associated with Western observers—that the attack was evidence the US 
needed a strong leader in Pakistan to control the emotional and volatile Pakistani nation.168 
Thomas Thornton—interviewed in 1995—argued that after the embassy incident, US 
relations with Pakistan were “about as bad as with any country in the world, except perhaps 
Albania or North Korea.”169 Back in 1979, Thornton commented to Brzezinski that there was 
little way he could see to engage in sensible policy-making about Pakistan. A worry—shared 
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by the National Security Adviser—was that any punitive action on nuclear matters could 
finally destroy what remained of the relationship with a strategically important ally.170  
Faced with Islamic opposition to the United States and a deteriorating situation in 
South Asia, in London the Cabinet saw the attacks as evidence that “the influence of Islamic 
extremism” was spreading from Iran to Pakistan.171 Despite this, FCO observers opined that 
non-proliferation diplomacy relying upon generalisations about an ‘Islamic bomb’ could 
prove damaging rather than useful: “It seems dangerous, for instance, to put about 
suggestions of an ‘Islamic bomb’. In general, we think it would be a mistake to make quite 
sweeping generalisations without backing them up with proposals for action which might be 
taken to remedy the situation.”172 Here, the FCO displayed a nuanced view of the situation, 
recognising that lumping the entire Muslim world into a single monolithic group was 
counter-productive. Likewise, the British analysts argued that panicked fear-mongering of 
the kind seen in the media served no purpose without solutions to address the root causes of 
the problem. Finally, like many of their American counterparts, British policymakers saw 
financial incentives as a greater motivator for Pakistan to proliferate to nations such as Libya 
or Saudi Arabia than any sense of Islamic solidarity.173 The Islamic links posited in the 
Observer ‘Dr Khan’ article were, in the FCO’s view, so speculative as to be unworthy of 
comment.174  
Just as the ‘Islamic bomb’ became embedded in public discourses, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 forced rapid bridge-building between the West 
and the Islamic world. While covert governmental and overt Congressional pressure 
continued on Pakistan during the 1980s, the dominant American foreign policy apparatus—
and its British partner—recognised that action against Pakistan must be subservient to anti-
Soviet action in Afghanistan. It became the case that it was not enough to simply repair 
relations with Pakistan, but better relations between the West and the wider Muslim sphere 
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were needed to foster a coalition against the USSR. Mention of the ‘Islamic bomb’ required 
curtailing lest it create rifts in the emerging alliance between the ‘free world’ and the 
‘Muslim world.’  
 
For British and American policymakers, understandings of the ‘Islamic bomb’ were subtler 
than those of the media and peripheral political figures. Senior politicians, government 
officials, and diplomats recognised that faith was a cloak concealing a nationalistic desire for 
nuclear capability. They correctly assessed that Pakistan had an economic and political stake 
in portraying itself as the custodian of Muslim nuclear power but found no evidence to 
suggest plans for wider, pan-Islamic proliferation. 
For policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic, media coverage of the ‘Islamic 
bomb’ transformed public perceptions of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions spatially from a 
regional, South Asian matter to a multi-regional problem affecting the Middle East and 
beyond. Although policymakers assessed that proliferation because of faith was not 
especially likely, the public perception of a potential Islamic nuclear capability that this 
created needed to be combated. The US press guidance in April, Thatcher’s June response to 
Begin, and the diplomatic fallout from the Burt article demonstrate that this media-generated 
perception forced reactions from the foreign policy establishments in Washington and 
London. Mention of an the ‘Islamic bomb’—regardless of its flimsy reality—required a 
response in the febrile, fragile atmosphere of the post-Camp David Accords era. There were 
scintillae of doubt about trans-Islamic proliferation. The “what ifs?” surrounding the ‘Islamic 
bomb’ exposed niggling fears—founded in long-standing tropes about the Islamic world’s 
violence and irrationality—that if Muslim states did acquire nuclear weapons, the threat was 
much more serious than other forms of proliferation. The ‘Islamic bomb’—the merest 
mention of which could provoke anxiety and outrage—represented a collision of culture, 
geopolitics, and international security. 
 
From Prevention to Mitigation 
As the ‘Islamic bomb’ was becoming a significant public issue, the US and UK governments 
continued to seek political solutions to the problem of Pakistani nuclear ambitions. Indeed, 
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despite the responses that the ‘Islamic bomb’ required, the idea prompted little—if any—
change in policy towards Pakistan. What did change policy was the recalcitrance and 
stubbornness of Zia and his government. While continuing to make efforts to inhibit 
Pakistani access to the materials required for its enrichment programme and thus increase the 
time it would take for Islamabad to attain nuclear capability, American and British non-
proliferation policy towards Zia’s government underwent a significant change during 1979. 
By mid-year, the Carter administration and the new Thatcher government had realised that 
the Pakistanis were not going to abandon their atomic aspirations. Policy therefore changed 
from attempting to prevent Pakistani acquisition of nuclear capability to mitigating the worst 
effects of acquisition. Core to this mitigation strategy was seeking Pakistani assurances not 
to test a nuclear ‘device.’ Carter and his advisers still attempted to maintain pressure on Zia 
by resisting Pakistani demands for arms shipments and aid but by mid-1979 had effectively 
resigned themselves to an eventual Pakistani nuclear capability. Peter Constable–Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs–typified this attitude when—in 
early June—he argued that the US government had reached a “dead end” and recommended 
a strategy based on asking Zia not to test.175 The cut-off of aid under the terms of the 
Symington Amendment in April of 1979 was a significant marker of the maintenance of 
pressure, but beneath the sanctions, there was little hope that Islamabad would ever abandon 
the bomb. Although British policymakers spent time considering possible pressures and 
inducements for Pakistan, they were far less wedded to directly pressuring Zia than their 
American counterparts. This created occasional friction between the allies, as American 
policymakers believed that the British government lacked serious commitment to non-
proliferation goals. Initial British solutions revolved around a regional security treaty 
involving India, Pakistan, and China. When this proved unworkable, the UK suggested a 
global solution in the form of a “universal declaration” on nuclear trade and non-
proliferation. Despite British zeal for a political endeavour seen as complementing and 
enhancing the NPT, there was little enthusiasm in the United States and Europe. Regardless 
of the different approaches taken, by the end of 1979 American and British solutions to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 State to USE New Delhi, June 6, 1979, 1-2. 
! 198!
Pakistani nuclear problem had both coalesced around policies of mitigation, rather than 
prevention. 
 
Bilateral traffic between the US and the UK on Pakistan during early 1979 highlighted the 
confusion within American foreign policy circles about the right way to approach the 
Pakistani nuclear problem. In mid-January, Thomas Pickering consulted with British 
representatives in London and Washington. He made it clear that although the State 
Department wanted pressure put on the Pakistanis, excessive publicity would make the 
situation with Congress even more difficult.176 The FCO was most alarmed at the lack of 
concrete ideas on how to deal with the problem. Just after Pickering left London, the NSC’s 
Tom Thornton arrived without tangible plans for Pakistan. Thornton did not favour military 
support for Zia, preferring dialogue between Pakistan, India, and China to promote a stable 
South Asia. FCO SAD’s Kelvin White advocated trying to ease Pakistani fears about India 
by getting the Indians to agree to safeguards and inspections. Thornton agreed, but had no 
idea how to achieve this.177 A week later, Jack Mikloss arrived with more opinions, 
advocating enhanced US financial support for Pakistan.178 The FCO found itself having to 
divine American intentions from these visitations. British officials concluded that Pickering 
wanted to hit the Pakistanis hard, Thornton wanted to leave them alone for a while, and 
Mikloss wanted to cosset them.179 In the face of this confusing disparity of opinion, the 
British drove forward with plans for regional, then universal, political solutions.  
Bilateral, multilateral, and regional nuclear treaties had been a part of discussions on 
the South Asian nuclear situation ever since 1974. The Pakistanis had proposed a South 
Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SANWFZ) in the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) every year since the Indian test. This proposal—based on the expectation it would 
put greater international pressure on India—had never gained traction and, more importantly, 
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India consistently rejected such notions. Pakistan had also frequently expressed a willingness 
to sign the NPT as soon as India did. As Naeem Salik argues, this “provided a convenient 
shelter for Pakistan to hide behind when subjected to international pressure.”180 The failing 
of this, as Salik notes, was that Pakistani policy was hostage to Indian policy decisions and 
actions.181 It was within the context of American indecision, sub-continental recalcitrance, 
and the realisation that ‘sticks and carrots’ were not enough that the UK attempted to forge 
an agreement to arrest the Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race.182 
Because of these factors, British thinking on halting that arms race underwent a 
speedy evolution during the spring and early summer of 1979. From proposals for a 
modified SANWFZ, there was a rapid transformation when ACDD chief Christopher 
Mallaby proposed an Indo-Pakistani regional security treaty (RST).183 Mallaby wanted to re-
shape the old SANWFZ idea, changing the name, geographical scope, and political 
concessions that both sides would have to make.184 Senior officials thought the proposal 
worth considering, if China could be included to assuage Indian fears. Moberly and Cortazzi 
immediately informed the US embassy about British plans for the RST proposal. US 
consular staff responded favourably and agreed that UK leadership in the matter might elicit 
better results from South Asia and China.185 French officials indicated that the RST—should 
Britain get it moving—was something they would be happy to support.186 It was at this point 
that Thomson outlined what he saw as the political complexities militating against a regional 
solution and sketched the plan that he devoted considerable energy to advocating: a global, 
‘universal declaration’ on nuclear trade and non-proliferation.187 FCO arms control experts 
were extremely sceptical about Thomson’s proposal while accepting the difficulties of 
implementing the RST. ACDD suggested various alternatives, from building on the on-going 
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(and ultimately fruitless) Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) negotiations to a massive “son of 
NPT.”188 A wrinkle appeared in these discussions when David Owen sternly rebuked his 
staff for discussing matters with the US without first appraising ministers of the proposals 
and for effectively ignoring Thomson’s proposals.189 
By mid-June, Margaret Thatcher had ushered the Callaghan government from office. 
This change coincided with—but did not create—a shift in policy towards Pakistan’s nuclear 
aspirations. The Symington Amendment’s imposition and the accumulating publicity about 
the Khan Affair and the ‘Islamic bomb’ demanded new and wide-ranging thinking on 
policy.190 Thomson, who by this time had ensured his universal declaration became the 
dominant political means of dealing with the sub-continental nuclear question, effected the 
strategy change.191 This change had not been smooth. The JNU and ACDD continued to 
advocate the RST, despite Indian hostility to such a proposal and Owen’s scepticism in the 
weeks before he left office.192 The delay in formulating a new policy stemmed from the 
American desire to try out approaches to Pakistani and regional security concerns before 
employing ‘new thinking.’193  
 
The American approach was subtly different from that of the British government and 
illustrates the Carter administration’s gradual turn from prevention to eventual mitigation. 
While the British strategy prior to the adoption of Thomson’s plan focussed on an Indo-
Pakistani security treaty, the US tended towards a treaty specifically linked to both states 
neither producing nor using nuclear weapons. There was agreement between Pickering and 
State Department human rights advocates that it might be worthwhile pursuing a solution to 
the Indo-Pakistani problem through a bilateral nuclear accord.194 The NSC thought such an 
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accord, focusing on a joint non-production/non-use agreement between India and Pakistan, 
worthy of implementation.195 This proposal—although still advocating an active non-
proliferation stance through the quest for promises not to produce nuclear weapons—was a 
small step on the road to mitigation. Although requests not to produce weapons were 
mitigation of a sort, such a suggestion implicitly accepted eventual Pakistani ability to 
produce nuclear weapons alongside the pre-existing Indian capability. Vance argued that the 
US-Pakistan security relationship and the Carter administration’s non-proliferation policy 
were often in conflict. According to Vance, the most notable facet of this conflict was the 
situation in Afghanistan and the threat it posed to Pakistani and US interests in South 
Asia.196 Zia was relieved that US ties with Pakistan were not entirely focussed on the nuclear 
issue and from this came Hummel’s observation that Zia might be persuaded to agree a 
‘freeze’ on the enrichment programme, allowing the resumption of aid and giving time for 
broader, more lasting non-proliferation agreements to be constructed.197 Although it was 
another ‘long shot’, the State Department alerted the FCO to this new initiative—carried out 
under Hummel and Pickering’s auspices—in order to use classified British intelligence on 
the clandestine enrichment programme in discussion with the Pakistanis.198 For Pickering, it 
was vital to pin Islamabad down to a deal before bringing New Delhi into any bilateral 
accord.199 Like the failed inspection team visit, the freeze proposal died in the face of Zia’s 
obduracy.200 
 After the freeze proposal’s failure, it became apparent that—once again—nothing 
short of massive US support to alleviate Pakistan’s security fears regarding India and 
Afghanistan would have any influence on nuclear ambitions. Shah Nawaz and Munir Ahmad 
Khan admitted as much to Hummel and Robert Gallucci in Islamabad on April 25, while 
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maintaining the perennial claim of a peaceful nuclear programme.201 Agha Shahi and Zia 
were of a similar mind when they met with Vance and Hummel respectively in early May, 
both Pakistani statesmen reiterating the long-standing offer to sign a bilateral or regional 
Indo-Pakistani non-proliferation agreement.202 As usual, Indian reluctance to sign a regional 
agreement that did not include China undermined this offer.203 Gerard Smith was 
exasperated by Vance’s agreement with Shahi to explore Congressional attitudes towards 
arms sales, believing that this would confuse key allies over the American stance on the 
Pakistani problem.204 Furthermore, the US Embassy in Islamabad believed that opportunities 
for further bilateral US-Pakistan progress were severely limited.205 Because of these 
colliding factors, the NSC suggested a complex approach that combined a range of actions 
and strategies. The approach brought together Pickering and Saunders’ Indo-Pakistani ‘non-
use/non-production’ idea, a potential resumption of aid, a coordinated diplomatic campaign 
aimed at key Pakistani allies, continued efforts to frustrate the clandestine programme, and 
enhanced talks with India.206 Vance, in conversation with Carrington, clung to the hope that 
he could persuade India and Pakistan to agree to a regional pact.207 
 Within the elite PRC, the conflict between ardent non-proliferationists such as Smith 
and the regionally focused State Department bureaux was clear. Smith wanted to set up an 
international group to assess the Pakistani problem, something that Christopher felt should 
be on an informal basis lest it appear that the developed world was ganging up on 
Pakistan.208 Smith argued that it was not simply a matter of dealing with Pakistani 
perceptions, but global perceptions about America’s commitment to non-proliferation.209 A 
suggestion previously put forward by Paul Kreisberg of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) was 
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for an independent, well-respected figure to act as a mediator in South Asia.210 The 
suggestion received tacit approval, but only if there were reasonable prospects for an Indo-
Pakistani non-development/non-use agreement. Preparatory to this, Ambassador Robert 
Goheen in New Delhi should have exploratory discussions with the Indians. CIA chief 
Admiral Stansfield Turner injected a note of alarm into proceedings when he drew attention 
to intelligence reporting suggesting that Pakistan might carry out a nuclear test before 
November, well in advance of US and UK estimates of when it might have nuclear explosive 
capability.211 Rumours of an imminent Pakistani test in part drove US diplomacy in the 
coming months. Avoiding a Pakistani nuclear test would form a cornerstone of the 
mitigation strategy. Were Pakistan to test a nuclear device it would damage American 
credibility by showing the world that US non-proliferation policy had failed. Persuading 
Pakistan to remain in a state of “nuclear ambiguity” would give the appearance of non-
proliferation success whilst allowing regional security concerns—such as the evolving 
situation in Afghanistan and the tensions between India and Pakistan—to be addressed. 
These rumours about a test—there was precious-little hard intelligence to support 
them—and their appearance in the media threaded their way through discussions throughout 
late May and beyond. The rumours connected to debates within the Carter administration, 
debates that led Peter Constable to clearly elucidate the change in policy from prevention to 
mitigation. Robert Goheen received instructions to approach Desai with the bilateral plan 
and potential third party mediation.212 The politically embattled Indian prime minister would 
not countenance a non-development/non-use agreement. Desai reminded Goheen that India 
had already made a non-development pledge and, if Zia did the same, that would be as good 
as any formal arrangement. More dramatically, Desai stated that if Pakistan did test a 
bomb—or indicated it was about to test one—India would act at once “to smash it.”213 In 
light of this confrontational response, Goheen eschewed mentioning third-party mediation 
plans. Rumours of an impending Pakistani test reached the media because of comments by 
none other than Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee during his visit to the USA in late 
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April.214 The American attempts to gain an Indo-Pakistani agreement bore little fruit because 
of intransigence on both sides, media speculation about the Pakistan bomb project, and a 
lack of focus on the administration’s part. 
The telegrams to and from Goheen bracketed Constable’s gloomy June 6 telegram 
where he fretted about the ‘Islamic bomb.’ Constable–backed by Cyrus Vance–argued that 
the US had “come to a dead end in our bilateral and multilateral efforts to prevent the spread 
of nuclear weapons technology to the nations of South Asia.”215 The only solution was a new 
strategy that—rather than seeking to prevent the spread of nuclear technology to South 
Asia—sought Pakistani assurances they would not detonate a PNE, formal assurance of 
India’s commitment not to further develop nuclear weapons, and Chinese assurances against 
deploying nuclear force in a hypothetical Sino-Indian conflict.216 While the Carter 
administration had resigned himself to the fact that Pakistan would develop some form of 
nuclear capability, the State Department sought to prevent that new-found capability from 
being tested. At the heart of this desire to avoid public displays of atomic attainment was a 
fear that the weight of India and Pakistan’s ascent to nuclear capability would be too much 
for the global non-proliferation regime to bear. Constable therefore argued that: 
If we fail to act decisively, we will also jeopardise our global non-proliferation 
strategy, which could collapse under the weight of two additional nuclear weapons 
states. By treating South Asia as a ‘special case’, we may have a better chance to 
head off nuclear weapons development here, and also to preserve in the rest of the 
world those elements of our non-proliferation strategy which are working[.]217 
 
Here was the clearest expression yet from a senior foreign policy figure in the Carter 
administration that the US government had resigned itself to the fact that Pakistan could not 
be prevented from gaining nuclear capability, even if that capability was couched in the 
disingenuous terms of a ‘PNE.’ 
Although policy had subtly moved rom prevention to mitigation, Carter himself was 
unwilling to make an explicit exception to policy in the case of Pakistan. In response to 
Constable’s memo, Gerard Smith contended that acquiescing to Pakistan acquiring 
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities would be a mistake that would “drain most of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
214 Perkovich, 218. 
215 State to USE New Delhi, June 6, 1979, 1 
216 Ibid, 2. 
217 Ibid, 3. 
! 205!
consistency out of your [Carter’s] nuclear policy.” Annotating the memo, Carter noted that 
he agreed with Smith.218 Because of the impasse and the threat posed to global non-
proliferation and political relationships in the sub-continent, Vance tasked Gerard Smith 
with creating a committee to find a solution.219 
The June debates over strategy towards Pakistan represented a hugely significant 
change in policy little remarked upon in the existing literature. No longer was the Carter 
administration attempting to halt proliferation in South Asia. Faced by Zia’s stonewalling of 
every attempt to resolve the Pakistani situation in favour of the non-proliferation regime, 
Carter’s flagship policy had hit a dead end. Despite Carter’s agreement with Smith that an 
exception to policy would be untenable, the decision to seek assurances over testing 
demonstrated that prevention had failed and mitigation was the goal. Persuading the 
Pakistanis not to test a device—PNE or otherwise—would preserve the public appearance of 
working towards non-proliferation and head off a further deterioration in Indo-Pakistani 
relations. This would save American ‘face’ and hopefully maintain credibility on non-
proliferation. While this change was taking place in Washington, a similar change was 
taking place in Britain as the Thatcher government made efforts to gain international backing 
for its universal declaration. 
 
By early July—and despite internal debates over wording—the British universal proposal 
was ready for submission to key foreign capitals. The ‘Draft Declaration on Nuclear Trade 
and Non-proliferation’ was just three double-spaced pages long, and laid out nuclear 
energy’s importance, the need to avoid proliferation, the necessity for international 
consensus and co-operation, for technical assistance to developing countries, and for 
arrangements to be made regarding nuclear technology transfers.220 The declaration’s 
stipulations were, in essence, an international suppliers and purchasers agreement coupled 
with a restatement of the NPT’s Article IV.221 The British government, in adopting the 
declaration as the main plank of their non-proliferation policy, tacitly accepted that Pakistan 
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was going to gain nuclear capability but still wanted to delay the advent of a Pakistani bomb 
as much as possible. The declaration did not make any effort to undermine the Pakistani 
programme, but offered another layer of proliferation controls in order to try to delay 
eventual acquisition and to mitigate the effects of further proliferation from Pakistan. 
Before the declaration was made ready for submission, there were the first high-
level non-proliferation meetings between the US and UK since Britain’s change of 
government. During these meetings, it became clear that avoiding a Pakistani nuclear test 
was core to future strategies. Douglas Hurd met with Smith and pointed out that while the 
pressure being exerted by Western governments on Pakistan was feeble, the US and UK 
should be working with the non-aligned nations on the grounds that a Pakistani nuclear test 
would have damaging implications for international atomic trade and thus harm developing-
world nuclear prospects.222 While Smith stated without much optimism that Vance had 
tasked him with producing an inter-agency study aimed at solving the sub-continental 
nuclear problems, Thomson extolled his declaration’s virtues, pointing out that a global 
solution avoided the appearance of bullying any one nation.223 Smith left London with a 
copy of the draft and the promise of American feedback.224 
 It became apparent that the much more global British policy conflicted with the 
American regional focus when it came to South Asia. The FCO opinion was that the 
declaration was a “positive way forward, rather than a negative pressurising policy.”225 
While the Smith study was still on-going, Michael Pakenham characterised American 
strategy as returning to twin bilateral strands. The US would search for ways to solve the 
Tarapur problem with India, while dealing with Pakistan by reversion to ‘sticks and 
carrots.’226 Much of this revolved around either withholding or offering the supply of 
advanced military equipment and potentially giving more publicity to the clandestine 
Pakistani programme—the “sunshine approach.” Regarding the universal declaration, there 
was little sympathy in Washington for the proposal, where officials preferred postponing 
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further institutional relationships between nuclear purchasers and suppliers until the 
1980s.227 The Americans harboured reservations about the declaration, although Pickering 
had admitted that they had no coherent alternatives.228 Patrick Moberly observed that the 
State Department felt that the declaration would end up as a “lowest common denominator 
approach,” becoming so diluted as to have no meaningful power. Likewise, Moberly 
suggested that the British approach sat awkwardly with American emphasis on supplier 
controls and Congressional legislation such as the Symington and Glenn Amendments and 
the NNPA (although these were not directly cited). The French had also raised objections 
relating to the on-going INFCE process. Senior negotiators in the French government 
observed that any universal declaration on nuclear trade could be seen by the developing 
world as unwisely pre-empting the results of INFCE. 229 
During August, Hugh Cortazzi visited Washington to drum up American support for 
the declaration, briefed to make it clear that the Thatcher government did not favour 
“bullying” Pakistan and preferred a political solution that did not target individual 
countries.230 In discussions with Jane Coon, the newly appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for the Sub-continent who had considerable experience of Pakistan and non-proliferation, 
Cortazzi emphasised the limited scope for the development of relations with Pakistan when 
that country was entering an economic and political crisis. Coon was sympathetic, and noted 
that she shared Britain’s more restrained assessment of when Pakistan might be able to test a 
nuclear weapon, agreeing that sober, quiet diplomacy was a better alternative to the 
“sunshine approach.” Still, Coon reiterated American objections to the declaration. From her 
perspective, it would mean acquiescing to sensitive nuclear facilities in Pakistan when there 
was no guarantee that safeguards were adequate.231 Coon’s remarks on acquiescing to 
nuclear facilities did not reflect the fundamental change at the higher levels of American 
non-proliferation policymaking. Cortazzi departed, having failed to change minds. As for 
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other states, the Canadians and French were sitting on the fence while the Australians and 
Germans were unenthusiastic about the concept, notwithstanding brief initial interest.232 
Despite vigorously promoting the universal declaration, the British government 
eventually conceded it was never going to gain traction. However, with the Smith Study 
stalled, the US still did not have an alternative. Vance was trying to paper over the widening 
cracks in his department, the main fault line being between the ardent non-proliferationists 
such as Smith and Pickering who at minimum wanted safeguards applied to Pakistani 
facilities and the ‘regionalists’ from the various geographical bureaux who would be content 
with assurances of good behaviour.233 Zia had made vague noises about assurances in his 
letters to Carter over the preceding months and during his September visit to New York, but 
these were far short of the more formal guarantees that even the regionalists desired.234 PPS 
chief Anthony Lake outlined the available options to deter proliferation while maintaining 
good relations with Pakistan. In most cases, these options—such as the provision of 
advanced F-16 fighters—conflicted with other administration policies on conventional arms 
restraint and there had been little—if any—consideration of what to do if all approaches 
failed. Furthermore, he noted deep divisions on all the potential avenues for progress.235 
There was hope for progress when Agha Shahi visited Washington in October. The 
nuclear issue dominated the meeting, even though Zia had again cancelled elections and was 
proceeding with the Islamisation process, something the Carter administration was wary of 
because of the conflict this created with the human rights agenda.236 Intelligence and media 
rumours of an imminent Pakistani nuclear test added urgency to the meeting.237 From the 
fractious discussions came assurances that Pakistan would not develop nuclear weapons or 
transfer sensitive nuclear technology, promises that aligned with what Britain was attempting 
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to achieve with its universal declaration. Assurances not to develop nuclear weapons did not, 
however, preclude the development of a PNE along the lines of the 1974 Indian explosion. 
Shahi was far less forthcoming on the most public statement of nuclear attainment: testing, 
although he assured Vance that Pakistan would not have the capability to test for at least six 
months.238 Reports from the State Department and the NSC to the FCO highlighted the fault 
lines in the administration. Tom Pickering observed that Shahi discussed the nuclear project 
in terms of national pride and prestige, but the US side in the talks continually emphasised 
the impediment to good relations that the “pointless” bomb programme created. Furthermore, 
deterioration in the regional situation would not automatically cause a change in US attitudes 
while a nuclear test would prompt a “fundamental reconsideration” of the entire 
relationship.239 Thus, Pickering had tacitly conceded that it was admission of nuclear 
capability (PNE or otherwise) through testing—and not the capability itself—that was now 
the administration’s prime concern. From the NSC side, Thomas Thornton was furious with 
the State Department’s line in the discussions. According to Thornton, there was agreement 
between Carter, Brzezinski, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that if the Afghan 
situation deteriorated, the US should offer aid to Pakistan. Thornton concurred with British 
assessments of a Pakistani test’s imminence (which firmly stated that the earliest Pakistan 
could test was in two to three years’ time) and argued that “unduly alarmist” appraisals of 
when Pakistan might explode a device were being used by Vance’s clique to pursue a 
strategy of pressuring Pakistan regardless of the impact on other policies.240 
 While the US informed the UK of the Shahi meeting, parallel discussions were 
taking place aimed at healing a rift in the trans-Atlantic non-proliferation alliance. In London 
on October 12, a quadripartite meeting had taken place between American, British, French, 
and West German representatives. In the run-up to the conference, British analysts saw the 
Pakistani problem as particularly acute: international non-proliferation efforts would be 
damaged, there was the chance of war with India, and a Pakistani test would bring the 
prospect of a “Muslim bomb” that much closer. Here again, ‘cascadology’ reared its head in 
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conjunction with the old trope that a lack of action in one instance of potential proliferation 
would irreparably damage the entire edifice. For the British, the only answer was through 
positive diplomatic solutions.241 There was a consensus on all these points at the meeting and 
a shared willingness to seek new and imaginative diplomatic solutions.242 After the fact, the 
Americans were depressed by what they perceived as British unwillingness to do anything 
about Pakistan. Thornton placed Britain just ahead of the FRG in terms of a desire to address 
the problem.243 The FCO was anxious to avoid this grim view of Britain’s attitude becoming 
common currency in Washington, even though British officials saw the US as having few, if 
any, constructive plans. Carrington eventually sent a stern telegram outlining the many 
British efforts to frustrate Pakistani nuclear ambitions and the considerable efforts they had 
undertaken to achieve a political solution.244  
 When Gerard Smith toured European capitals in early November, the FCO was at 
pains to point out how seriously Britain took the situation. The prospect of a Pakistani test 
loomed over everything, especially as Zia had refused to rule one out.245 The Islamabad 
embassy argued there was little that could be done if the Pakistanis were determined to test, 
but after they had “proved their virility” with a test there could be opportunities for 
progress.246 From New Delhi, Thomson averred that testing was likely to provoke a military 
response from India and again advocated the lapsed universal declaration idea.247 The FCO 
concluded that British objectives must be to discourage testing, maintain tight controls on 
sensitive supplies, and continue diplomatic contacts with Pakistan.248 This was, in the baldest 
terms, acceptance from the British foreign policy community that prevention had indeed 
failed and that mitigation was now the only option. Patrick Moberly located Pakistan at the 
centre of a nexus of proliferation anxieties: a Pakistani test could open the door to a 
proliferation cascade, perhaps even re-invigorating the old question of West German nuclear 
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weapons. American and British non-proliferation policy—typified by the NPT—was 
frequently predicated on keeping nuclear weapons out of West Germany’s hands.249 The 
British reaction to a test would affect credibility and the ability to exert influence in all future 
cases. Moberly was disappointed that a tougher, more combative line against Pakistan was 
not recommended.250 Cortazzi agreed that a strong line was needed, but felt that Britain 
carried little weight in Pakistani eyes and was therefore limited in influence.251 When Smith, 
Pickering, and van Doren arrived in London, Cortazzi was at pains to point out that the UK 
was not complacent, despite what the US delegation might think. He suggested that the 
universal declaration was a still a viable idea, as it addressed the problems presented by 
Pakistan and India.252 Smith responded by highlighting how important the CTB negotiations 
were in showing the developing world that the nuclear weapon states were taking vertical 
proliferation seriously but he also espoused scepticism about the universal solution’s 
viability because of its linkages to the international nuclear trade.253 
 Smith offered a gloomy assessment of his sojourn in Europe when he returned to 
Washington. West Germany lacked commitment to non-proliferation, the Netherlands was 
supportive, France stressed it was the only nation other than the US to take concrete action 
against Pakistan, and Britain doubted that ‘sticks and carrots’ would have any effect. The 
UK and FRG had also cited the Chinese point of view on the entire issue.254 Chinese officials 
had defended the right of states to acquire nuclear weapons and advised against a tough line 
on Pakistan due to its importance in the South Asian anti-Soviet structure.255 Despite this, 
Chinese diplomats had frequently advised American counterparts that they disapproved of 
the “unwise” Pakistani weapons programme. A later CIA estimate challenged this position, 
suggesting China was actually aiding the Pakistani programme as part of its anti-Soviet 
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posture.256 Smith saw the PRC as “preaching the need to bolster Pakistan as a barrier to 
Soviet adventurism in the region” and argued there was “little enthusiasm in Europe to 
emulate our position with Pakistan.”257 
 The British still attempted diplomacy to encourage change in Pakistan, despite 
American doubts. There were fraught meetings in London between Shah Nawaz, Minister 
for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs Peter Blaker, and Hugh Cortazzi. Shah Nawaz found 
suggestions of Libyan funding for the nuclear programme “utter nonsense” and harangued 
his hosts about all the efforts—SANWFZ, offers for joint inspections with India—that 
Pakistan had made to defuse the situation.258 Cortazzi pointed out that the cancellation of 
elections and the imposition of Islamic punishments were seriously affecting Pakistan’s 
image in British eyes, an image that could be further damaged should Pakistan carry out a 
nuclear test.259 Kelvin White of SAD thought Shah Nawaz’s comments were “flannel” but 
noted that, over lunch, Shah Nawaz had stated that Pakistan should enter a state of nuclear 
ambiguity, just like Israel.260 This was exactly what both Britain and America, in their own 
ways, sought from the Pakistani leadership. Cortazzi then visited Pakistan, meeting with Zia 
and Shahi. Despite once more outlining British concerns and clarifying that Britain had no 
desire to deprive the developing world of access to nuclear power, beyond expressions of 
goodwill and mutual respect, little was gained by Cortazzi’s sojourn.261 
 By this time, the State Department was searching for any solutions to the Pakistan 
problem. Aside from continuing with diplomatic efforts and attempts at reassuring Pakistan 
about its security, a proposal was made to offer Zia funding for a civilian nuclear energy 
programme, the reason he and Bhutto had claimed for the reprocessing and enrichment 
projects in the first place.262 This was a last throw of the dice for the Americans. The 
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Islamabad embassy sacking did yet more damage to the US-Pakistan relationship and the 
hostage crisis in Tehran occupied the administration’s attention.263 In the end, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan would force the Carter administration to make concessions on the 
supply of arms to Pakistan, the ‘sticks and carrots’ that so much faith had been placed in. 
 The political efforts to combat Pakistani nuclear aspirations underwent dramatic, but 
little commented upon, change during 1979. The gradual switch from prevention to 
mitigation was a significant alteration in policy, especially for the ardently anti-
proliferationist Carter administration. This switch in focus came about because of Pakistani 
intransigence and an unwillingness of Zia and his subordinates to make any concessions on 
the nuclear front. Factional disagreements within the US foreign policy establishment and an 
almost overwhelming faith in the ability of bribery or coercion to solve proliferation 
problems also hampered the search for solutions. The move to mitigation did not, however, 
go unchallenged. Ardent non-proliferationists on both sides of the Atlantic sought to 
maintain a more stringent non-proliferation policy. British efforts to provide a global 
political answer foundered because of reticence amongst the nuclear weapon states and 
nuclear supplier states—particularly America—to consider yet another nuclear agreement at 
a time when SALT II, the CTB, and in particular INFCE were all being discussed.  
 
Conclusion 
For American and British policymakers, 1979 was a year of confusion and tension. Publicity 
surrounding the Pakistani programme contributed to a more heated environment, less 
conducive to rational diplomacy. The ‘Islamic bomb’ stories in the media presumed a change 
in the geopolitical scope of the Pakistani nuclear problem. In public, Pakistani atomic 
aspirations were no longer a regional, South Asian issue, but an issue with far-reaching 
consequences extending to the Middle East. While the ‘Islamic bomb’ paradigm prompted 
the American and British governments to react to the propaganda problem it created, the 
intense public discussion about the supposed pan-Islamic nuclear ambitions did little to alter 
the actual policies or strategies used against Pakistan. What did dramatically alter policy was 
the intransigence of Zia and his government. The key policy change was the move from 
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preventing Pakistan acquisition of nuclear capability to mitigating such an acquisition. This 
was a crucial and little commented upon alteration. The Carter and Thatcher administrations 
essentially acquiesced to the inevitability of Pakistani nuclear weapons provided the US and 
UK could maintain the appearance of standing against proliferation. The request for Pakistan 
not to test a nuclear device was at the crux of this. Such a demand would maintain non-
proliferation credibility by removing the potential for a very public embarrassment. In the 
final analysis, it was not the cultural factor of religion that exerted the greatest influence, but 
ideas of credibility and face-saving. As 1979 ended, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
changed the terrain even more. In addition to the tacit acceptance of Pakistani nuclear 
ambitions contained within the attempts to gain ‘no testing’ assurances, the invasion meant 




Chapter 6: “Peanuts” 
December 1980 to January 1981 
 
On January 18, 1980, Muhammad Zia ul-Haq stood before American journalists and 
disparaged Jimmy Carter’s offer of military and economic assistance for Pakistan, describing 
as “peanuts” the US government’s proposed $400 million aid package.1 Carter’s 
abandonment of the embargo put in place by the April 1979 implementation of the 
Symington Amendment stemmed from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. US policy 
towards Pakistan had undergone profound change during 1979, from aiming to prevent 
Pakistan gaining nuclear capability to endeavouring simply to mitigate the effects of 
inevitable attainment. Now, Carter’s policies underwent yet another alteration, casting 
conventional arms restraint aside in an attempt to maintain the appearance of an active non-
proliferation stance in South Asia and bolster Pakistan in the face of Soviet adventurism. 
American and British policy transitioned during 1980 from one of mitigation coupled with 
an embargo on arms sales and aid to one of mitigation, with arms sales and aid becoming de-
linked from nuclear policy. As Scott Kaufman persuasively argues, after the invasion of 
Afghanistan, Carter’s policies on human rights, conventional arms restraint, and non-
proliferation vanished.2 
 Vital to this story were American, British, and Pakistani attempts to maintain 
appearances and credibility. For the Western states, this appearance was one of active non-
proliferation activity. The core means for realising this aim were requests to Pakistan not to 
undertake nuclear testing. Testing would be the most public demonstration that Islamabad 
had attained nuclear capability and if Pakistan were to test, the impact would throw the entire 
trilateral relationship into doubt. In the face of Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan, none of 
the three nations could afford for this to occur. Pakistan’s sometimes contrary desire was to 
avoid being seen as acquiescing to American demands in order to retain standing and 
influence in the Muslim and non-aligned worlds. 
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 Media attention focusing on the nuclear programme also caused frustration, 
particularly within the British government. Stories about the Khan Affair, the ‘Islamic bomb’, 
and the clandestine purchasing project threaded through media coverage. This coverage—
particularly that related to the Khan Affair—shone a light on efforts to impose global 
controls on sensitive exports. The reluctance and recalcitrance of key developed world 
nuclear technology supplier states were also parts of a complex and often frustrating 
situation for the American and British governments. However, the clandestine purchasing 
programme was one area where the UK and US governments did continue to make genuine 
efforts to retard the Pakistani nuclear programme through export controls and international 
diplomacy. 
 This chapter will not cover general responses to the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan. Many fine scholarly works offer in-depth analyses of policy and motivation, 
especially as it relates to the Carter administration.3 Rather, this chapter examines the 
invasion’s impact on responses to the Pakistani nuclear programme. America and Britain 
were determined to confront what they saw as renewed Soviet aggression in the developing 
world, but both faced the dilemma of balancing non-proliferation with the wider needs of a 
reinvigorated Cold War.  
  
The Khan Affair and the ‘Islamic Bomb’ Redux 
Clandestine procurement, the Khan Affair, the ‘Islamic bomb,’ and the media attention paid 
to these connected issues created serious problems for the US and UK governments during 
1980. Margaret Thatcher’s government in particular came under pressure from 
parliamentarians and journalists, both of whom kept the Pakistani nuclear programme in the 
public eye. The propaganda predicament this created, while the Anglo-American alliance 
attempted to fashion a Muslim bulwark against Soviet expansionism, was a thorn in the side 
of administrations juggling the challenges of non-proliferation and the Soviet threat. 
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 By January 1980, the British government was expressing frustration at Dutch delays 
in publishing their report on the Khan Affair. Thatcher, Peter Carrington, Douglas Hurd, and 
other ministers were being bombarded daily with parliamentary questions on the affair, 
exports, and the Islamic connection. Consequently, the FCO pressed their Dutch counterparts 
to release the report in the hope of gaining a respite from the ceaseless parliamentary 
attentions.4 The British Embassy in The Hague reported that Dutch contacts regarded their 
own government as being evasive, a consequence of the potential for international 
embarrassment upon publication of the report and infighting between the Foreign Ministry 
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.5 British diplomats in the Netherlands portrayed Gijs 
van Aardenne, Minister of Economic Affairs, as deliberately delaying release.6 Such were 
the delays that Secretary of State for Energy David Howell wrote to van Aardenne, pointedly 
asking for a publication date.7 British irritation with the Dutch continued up to the report’s 
release on February 29. In preparation, the FCO briefed embassies to prepare for extensive 
media coverage, stressing British innocence in the affair, concern about the laxity of Dutch 
security, emphasis on export controls, and the extent of diplomatic representations to the 
Pakistanis.8  
In parliament, Thatcher’s government remained under pressure from opposition 
parties in the Commons and Lords. The Liberal Lord Avebury, the Labour Lord Wynne-
Jones, and the usual ‘awkward squad’ of anti-nuclear MPs such as Frank Allaun and Tam 
Dalyell all asked questions about the Pakistani programme. Dalyell personified the 
parliamentary pressure on the Thatcher government. His barrage of questions covered the 
Khan Affair, covert purchasing, and the ‘Islamic bomb.’ On January 17, the Prime Minister 
responded to Dalyell’s probing on the Khan report, assuring the MP that the government was 
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taking steps to prevent a repetition of the affair.9 Shortly thereafter, Dalyell reiterated his 
“nightmare” of an ‘Islamic bomb’: 
 
If I have nightmares, they are about a Pakistani bomb or a Libyan bomb. We are 
now told that the Iraqis are doing nuclear weapons for some years, should also be 
about an Iraqi bomb. Those nations might use a nuclear bomb. It is for that reason 
that I go on and on, at Prime Minister's Question Time, about the Khan incident, the 
Urenco incident at Almelo.10 
 
The bombardment continued, with Dalyell putting over forty questions to the government 
during January and February, continually alluding to the “development of a Pakistani or 
Islamic nuclear weapon.”11 His supplementary question on “Arab links with Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons programme” received a non-committal answer from the FCO that such 
associations were speculative, rendering official comment impossible. In the background, the 
FCO underscored the persistence—especially in connection with Libya—of such rumours, 
but also emphasised a lack of conclusive evidence for such links.12 Fellow Labour MP Frank 
Allaun supported Dalyell. Allaun had, in 1978, publicised the inverter issue, and used that 
instance of Pakistani “deceit” to interrogate Thatcher on the wisdom of arming Pakistan to 
resist Soviet incursions. As had been the case from 1974 onwards, the larger question was of 
whether or not the proliferation question could exist in compartmentalised form, hived off 
from other matters such as conventional arms supply. Thatcher explicitly compartmentalised 
the issues, contending that the government had sought Pakistani assurances on nuclear 
technology transfers. Thatcher argued that Pakistan was now in the “front line” of a revived 
Cold War, making the issue of arms sales a separate matter.13  
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 Dalyell’s ceaseless prying provoked frustration and anger within a government 
attempting to balance support for Pakistan with attempts to delay Islamabad’s eventual 
Pakistani nuclear capability. Senior ministers tasked Norman Lamont, DoE Parliamentary 
Under-secretary, with briefing Dalyell in the hope of persuading the MP to moderate his 
inquisition. Reflecting on the meeting, Lamont informed Carrington that he had explained to 
Dalyell how troubled the government was about the Khan Affair, making repeated 
representations to the Dutch, but were constrained by the situation’s delicacy and wider 
implications. Lamont concluded that his tête-à-tête with Dalyell might have moderated the 
MP’s campaign.14 This was a forlorn hope. FCO arms control experts concluded that the 
state of affairs had become absurd, each answer giving Dalyell ammunition for his next 
salvo.15 The MP persisted, following up speculation about Libyan-Pakistani nuclear 
connections. The government maintained that such matters were speculative or confidential 
and Prime Ministerial briefings still argued that there was no “corroborative evidence” for 
such allegations.16 Furthermore, the FCO reasoned that to develop nuclear weapons, Libya 
must abrogate its NPT commitments and a recently concluded IAEA safeguards 
agreement.17 Dalyell's relentless interrogation led to the suggestion of another confidential 
briefing, this time with the FCO’s Douglas Hurd.18 For the rest of the year and far into the 
decade, Dalyell kept the pressure on Thatcher’s government regarding Pakistan and wider 
nuclear issues. 
 By the time the FCO commented on the “absurdity” of Dalyell’s relentless pursuit of 
answers there had been extensive discussions within the government, and between Britain 
and America, that emphasised that attempts to hobble the Pakistani purchasing programme 
could not cease. Michael Pakenham at the British Embassy in Washington observed that 
further revision to export controls in the US and UK might be required, now that the 
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Pakistanis were aware of the efforts being made to impede their access to critical materials.19 
The FCO was also concerned that because America and Britain were making public moves 
to bolster Pakistan, some key nuclear technology suppliers “may relax on the Pakistan 
nuclear issue, not only in their diplomatic contacts with the Pakistanis but also in the field of 
export controls.” The FCO regarded the American position as critical, arguing that many 
other states took their cue from the US.20 The State Department’s Thomas Pickering—
visiting London on January 18—observed to the JNU’s Robert Alston that while no further 
pressure would be put on Pakistan regarding the nuclear issue and aid offers were not 
contingent upon a change in Pakistani nuclear policy, the Carter administration had made it 
abundantly clear that non-proliferation credibility remained relevant. Furthermore, the US 
government would continue pursuit of tough export controls and remained committed to 
encouraging compliance by other states.21 Communications to US embassies at the end of 
the month clarified this stance, underscoring the continuing need for Anglo-American 
diplomatic cooperation to frustrate the enrichment programme.22 
 
Mounting evidence not only of Pakistani purchasing efforts, but also of the lack of controls 
in key supplier states, confirmed the need for sustained attention to export restrictions. The 
FRG, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and even Britain itself, were all highlighted as 
somehow problematic. The geographical diversity of Pakistani purchasing compounded the 
difficulty and complexity of managing export controls. As more information appeared, it 
became clearer that the Pakistani network was well organised and global in reach. The West 
German attitude remained awkward, the FRG’s government unwilling to take the action on 
export controls that the UK and US desired.23 British diplomats kept their German contacts 
under pressure, but the outlook was gloomy. By October, Britain’s Bonn embassy contended 
that the Germans had “given up” on the question of exports, and were obstructive and 
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disinclined to put proper regulations in place.24 The US and UK saw Turkey as a potentially 
worrying case because of Islamic ties, Turkish disillusionment with the West, Turko-
Pakistani military relations, and potential Turkish interest in acquiring nuclear technology 
for its own use. Like Britain, Turkey was in dire economic straits and, in the florid language 
of one British official, would “sell her soul to the devil” for foreign trade.25 However, the 
final analysis was that the Turks probably saw Pakistani nuclear aspirations as destabilising 
and—although the Turkish government relied on Islamic fundamentalist support in 
parliament—it was doubtful if that influenced Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel’s 
administration in this case. 26 The US made a series of representations to the Turks, who 
were sympathetic to the problem but as with many other nations, including the FRG, felt 
they could do little because of inadequate export controls and a lack of justification for the 
action.27 In northern Europe, the Norwegians were more amenable to British and American 
approaches. Newspaper stories about firms supplying materials to Pakistan had recently 
embarrassed the Norwegian parliament.28 The US and UK expressed concern and in return 
gained guarantees from Oslo to tighten controls and curtail the export of sensitive items to 
South Asia.29 
 Thatcher’s government remained anxious about the role of British companies in 
supplying Pakistan with materials for the clandestine programme. The inter-departmental 
Official Group on the Control of the Export of Special Materials and Equipment 
(OGCESME) identified several shipments to Pakistan and argued that the implications of a 
nuclear arms race on the sub-continent had become even more serious. Export controls had a 
key role to play in winning time for a political solution.30 Parliamentary and public interest 
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in the issue made it even more important that orders—such as one placed with (and declined 
by) EEIC—be prevented from leaving the country or stopped at source.31 
 Switzerland was one of the most intractable supplier states and the Swiss case 
typified the challenge of controlling sensitive exports. The American and British diplomatic 
efforts of 1979 had borne little fruit, and Swiss firms such as CORA and VAT remained—
according to American and British intelligence—principal suppliers to the Pakistani 
programme. In US-UK meetings, Robert Gallucci noted the difficulties posed by 
Switzerland and Robert Alston clarified the need for close cooperation to combat the 
activities of Swiss firms.32 Preparing for a meeting between Carrington and his Swiss 
opposite number, Pierre Aubert, Alston opined, “The Swiss are the least cooperative of all 
suppliers of nuclear equipment in exercising restraint in the interests of non-proliferation. 
They try to hide behind the letter of the minimum conditions agreed by the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group.”33 In Washington, the NSC staff commented that the Swiss record on 
Pakistan was “just appalling” and that all American protestations had gone unheeded.34 The 
Swiss government, despite démarches from Washington and London, remained reluctant to 
directly intervene, characterised by NSC Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff as ignoring 
exports not explicitly identifiable as nuclear. Even high-level representations—such as 
Warren Christopher’s approach to Swiss ambassador Raymond Probst on the latter’s 
departure from the position—failed to achieve results.35 
Swiss reluctance to target its ‘leaky’ firms fed the media furore surrounding the 
Pakistani programme. The Washington Post reported extensively on the matter—frequently 
using the ‘Islamic bomb’ as a framing device—alleging that the Carter administration had 
threatened to curb nuclear cooperation with Switzerland unless the Swiss government 
improved export controls.36 Christopher made it clear that this was not strictly the case, but 
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that the State Department had delayed Swiss requests for the transfer of US-origin fuel to the 
UK and Italy for reprocessing until Bern took action on exports to Pakistan.37 Despite media 
coverage and diplomatic pressure, the Swiss continually frustrated efforts to bring them into 
the export control fold.38 By the last few weeks of the Carter administration, the situation 
remained unresolved, despite a more constructive tone from Bern and a turnabout in US 
attitudes that—concurrent with the waning of enthusiasm for non-proliferation—saw 
denying approval for the transfer of Swiss fuel as less of a pressure point and more of an 
impediment to gaining Swiss cooperation.39 
In Britain, the question of British firms being disadvantaged by a commitment to 
strict controls had been debated ever since the inverter issue became known. In late 1979, the 
outcry over the Khan Affair had rekindled these debates. Hurd argued for tighter controls in 
light of the Khan revelations. Although Britain could not do this alone, Hurd pointed out that 
strong action would send a clear signal to other supplier nations.40 The DoT’s Cecil 
Parkinson accepted the situation’s seriousness, but stressed the importance of foreign trade 
to Britain and argued that if other countries (such as Switzerland) were not enforcing 
controls, why should the UK damage its economy by rigorously screening exports?41 From 
this brief debate, export controls were tightened to place further restrictions on items that 
could potentially be used in a nuclear weapons programme.42 The same debate took place in 
mid-1980, prompted by Swiss dissembling about their nuclear exports. Parkinson harked 
back to his 1979 comments and although he disagreed with a strong British stance on exports 
whilst competitors were profiting from the Pakistani programme, he reluctantly agreed to 
another tightening of export controls.43 
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While Washington and London attempted to restrict Pakistani access to sensitive materials, 
the professed need to gain the trust and support of Muslim states in combating the Soviets in 
Afghanistan butted up against continued media deployment of the ‘Islamic bomb’ trope.44 
Throughout 1980, print and broadcast media imbued the Pakistani nuclear programme with 
transnational religious overtones. Just as in 1979 when the issue became a major story, the 
media used the ‘Islamic bomb’—often in a lazy or sensationalist manner—as shorthand for 
an expected proliferation cascade with dire consequences for the Middle East. The 
persistence of this trope created an uncomfortable tension between Pakistani nuclear 
aspirations, the Afghanistan crisis, and efforts to build a Muslim anti-Soviet alliance. 
Since December 1979, stories had circulated about the delivery of uranium ‘yellow 
cake’ from the Islamic African nation of Niger to Libya and then to Pakistan with French 
involvement.45 The possibility that these Islamic states had received raw uranium supplies 
outside of international controls disturbed FCO officials.46 Rumours of violent uranium 
convoy hijackings and diversion to Libya and Pakistan precipitated hurried denials from 
Nigeri-French mining concerns SOMAIR and COMINAK.47 The reporting on this matter 
once again argued that a Pakistani bomb could be a Libyan-funded ‘Islamic bomb.’48 In the 
United States, the CIA maintained its persistent belief in the possibility of an ‘Islamic bomb.’ 
In an assessment of Pakistani connections in the Middle East, the agency again suggested 
that Libya and Pakistan were cooperating on nuclear weapons technology.49 The same 
organisation later contended that Pakistani attainment of ‘the bomb’ might well 
axiomatically imply Libya nuclear capability.50 The CIA’s position is at least in part 
explicable by reference to the position the agency found itself in at the end of the 1970s. 
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Carter was winding down the CIA, and the foregrounding of new ‘threats to national security’ 
would serve as a countermeasure to this. In the case of Iran, the general feeling within the 
US government was that the intelligence agency had failed to anticipate the rise and triumph 
of the clerics. Thus, a fixation on the Muslim threat may have been overcompensation for 
this oversight.51 
 In March, it became clear to British politicians and officials that a major media 
investigation into the alleged ‘Islamic bomb’ was underway. Having been so deeply 
involved in the inverter affair, EEIC again approached the British government with 
disturbing news. BBC journalists, as part of research for a documentary on Pakistani nuclear 
ambitions, had approached the company.52 Company management had denied the BBC 
permission to film at the factory, but that did not stop production going ahead. The 
programme—which eventually appeared in June—was hugely significant for the ‘Islamic 
bomb’ concept. In the intervening months, stories about Pakistani nuclear aspirations were 
continually framed within a pan-Islamic context. Discussion of Libya seemed to require a 
mention of alleged Libyan-Pakistani cooperation.53 Journalists couched their commentary in 
the now familiar language of an Islamic proliferation cascade. For example, Jack Anderson 
wrote in the Washington Post: 
 
When Pakistan does get its nuclear bomb, the world will enter a new and more 
dangerous era. A shaky dictatorship like Gen. Zia ul-Haq’s, armed with a nuclear 
arsenal is frightening enough. What makes the situation far worse is that Pakistan 
will likely share its nuclear know-how with even less responsible Arab nations, like 
the fanatic Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya, which is a protector of terrorists and an 
implacable foe of Israel.54 
 
Echoing Dalyell’s December 1979 address, Anderson’s piece illustrates how entrenched the 
belief that Pakistan would share its nuclear technology with its co-religionists had become. 
As Rodney Jones argues, coverage of the ‘Islamic bomb’ implicitly (and sometimes 
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explicitly) contains within it “worst-case scenarios about threats to the security and perhaps 
survival of Israel.”55 
 On June 16, the BBC aired ‘Project 706: The Islamic Bomb’ as part of the popular 
Panorama current affairs strand. The documentary underscored alleged Pakistani-Libyan 
connections, uranium from Niger, the complicity of British, German, Italian, and Swiss 
industry, and the threat of an Islamic proliferation cascade.56 The opening monologue by 
reporter Philip Tibenham drew upon ‘Islamic bomb’ speculation, alarmingly informing 
viewers that: 
 
This convoy grinding across the empty Sahara is carrying what could be the raw 
material for the world’s first nuclear war. The trucks are heading for a dusty desert 
air strip with a cargo of uranium yellow cake. It’s been mined in the Islamic state of 
Niger. It’ll be flown on to Islamic Libya; then on to Islamic Pakistan. Tonight, 
Panorama reports exclusively on payments of millions of pounds by Libya’s 
Colonel Gaddafi to finance Pakistan’s efforts to build the ‘Islamic bomb’.57 
 
The JNU assessed the documentary as, in the broadest sense, a substantially accurate account 
of Pakistani efforts. In detail, however, the programme was characterised as speculative and 
inaccurate. Analysts contended that by far the most important allegation was the 
Libyan/‘Islamic’ bomb, but that there was still no substantive evidence that Libya had 
provided finance or that Pakistan had agreed to proliferate. Anonymous allegations in the 
documentary were “sensational” but carried “little conviction” (although DoE analysts were 
slightly more convinced of the interviewee’s sincerity).58 On-the-record government 
responses stressed Libyan adherence to the NPT and Pakistani non-proliferation assurances. 
For Thatcher’s government, the most embarrassing element was the broadcasting of the 
programme during a visit to London by Agha Shahi, provoking anger amongst the Pakistani 
delegation.59 Government analysts argued that, overall, European industrial firms—including 
EEIC—came off far worse than governments, Dutch laxity receiving no coverage at all. 
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Furthermore, the documentary offered an “extremely shallow” analysis of the links between 
civilian and military nuclear technology. Crucially, British experts did not see the film as 
harmful to the government or detrimental to international anti-proliferation efforts.60 In the 
face of media reporting on the documentary—particularly in the Guardian, the paper that led 
reporting on the ‘Islamic bomb’—the Thatcher government stressed Pakistani assurances 
and a lack of evidence for an Islamic connection.61 
 As the media continued to draw attention to the Pakistani nuclear programme’s 
supposed religious aspects, journalists drew other states aspirations into the fold. The Daily 
Express cited Islamic—but secular—Ba’athist Iraq as the next nation likely to “go nuclear” 
in a lurid story about murders, smugglers, and Parisian chambermaids. As part of a report on 
Egyptian physicist Yehya al-Meshad’s killing by persons unknown (allegedly because of his 
role in Saddam Hussein’s nuclear programme), the newspaper warned its readers that, “Arab 
states have lost all hope of winning a conventional war against Israel. So a terrifying 
premium has been placed on the alternative—a nuclear bomb. Pakistan, funded by Libya’s 
Colonel Gaddafi, already has the know-how.”62 The Guardian’s Eric Silver, reporting from 
Jerusalem, observed, “no one here doubts the danger from an Arab or Islamic bomb.”63 In an 
editorial also criticising the Israeli nuclear stance, the normally sober Times asked if by 1985 
might there not be nuclear weapons in the hands of “fanatical Islamic revolutionaries?” or 
could the Libyan-Pakistani ‘Islamic bomb’ have eventuated?64 This last piece did not go 
unchallenged. Syed Aziz Pasha, General Secretary of the Union of Muslim Organisations of 
UK and Eire, castigated the Times for causing “anger and distress” not only to British, but to 
all Muslims. Aziz contended that the so-called ‘Islamic bomb’ did not actually exist and 
argued that no other nuclear programme had ever been named for the religious affiliations of 
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the originating state. The paper rather primly added, “The phrase ‘Islamic bomb’, which has 
passed into common usage, did not originate with the The Times.”65 
The protest by Aziz did not stop the The Times publishing another piece on Pakistan 
that explicitly connected nuclear ambitions and Islam. Going back to Bhutto’s death cell 
testimony, the article concluded “Pakistan’s nuclear activity—and the implications of an 
Islamic bomb, if ever such a thing should exist—threaten to usher in a new age of 
uncertainty.”66 Veteran journalist James Cameron, even while satirising attitudes towards 
nuclear weapons, asserted that Islam was “the originator of spreading God’s word by the 
sword” and that he would not “especially like to be sent into eternity by a General Zia finger 
on the button, let alone a Khomeini finger.”67 Even in satire, the media portrayed Islam as 
violent and the ‘Islamic bomb’ as leading to an almost inevitable Middle Eastern apocalypse.  
 The American press also weighed in, bringing together a mix of the Khan Affair, 
Islam, Swiss obduracy, and Libyan anti-Americanism. Revelations surrounding ‘Billygate,’ 
the Libyan business connections of Carter’s wayward brother, then under investigation by 
the Justice Department did not help the situation.68 In a Washington Post article that liberally 
referenced the Panorama documentary, an anonymous US official made a thinly veiled 
swipe at the Europeans, commenting, “Some countries were lax and bureaucratically inept 
… but some others knew what was happening and allowed it to go ahead for political or 
commercial reasons.”69 By the end of the year, the same newspaper reported alleged fissures 
in the ‘Islamic bomb’ project, Libya portrayed as frustrated by a lack of Pakistani progress.70 
The issue that dominated the American media when it came to Islam was not the potential 
for a Muslim nuclear weapon. The Iranian hostage crisis occupied far more column inches 
and hours of broadcasting. The encounter with an unrealised Islamic nuclear weapon 
remained less significant than the very real encounter with the new form of political Islam 
represented by Iran.  
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In public at least, the idea that a Pakistani nuclear bomb was axiomatically an Islamic bomb 
had—by 1980—become so firmly embedded in the media that it went almost totally 
unchallenged. The Libyan connection, Bhutto and Zia’s inflammatory rhetoric, and the 
perceived certainty of a pan-Islamic proliferation cascade became accepted as fact. Rebuttals 
by Muslim leaders such as Syed Aziz Pasha and official governmental comment that such 
assertions were speculative at best went unheeded. Unlike in 1979, a remarkable aspect of 
this is the lack of comment on the issue within the available official documents, the 
declassified record showing little in the way of high-level internal discussion. What is 
unsurprising is the disparity in coverage of the issue in Britain and America. In Britain, the 
topic was far more pervasive. British partnership in Urenco, the Khan Affair’s public 
prominence, and Pakistani procurement’s European focus explain the British media’s 
fascination with the ‘Islamic bomb.’ In America, the issue was subsumed beneath the more 
pressing topics of the Iranian hostage crisis and Afghanistan. The ‘Islamic bomb’—while 
terrifying—was a yet-to-be-attained capability. In Iran, by contrast, what was portrayed as a 
violent, irrational, radical Islamic state directly threatened American citizens.  
 
Non-proliferation and the Impact of Afghanistan 
As Soviet troops entered Kabul and détente was in its death throes, Carter determined to 
make the Kremlin’s actions as costly as possible. He noted in his diary, “I sent messages to 
our allies, key non-aligned leaders, plus all the Muslim countries—urging them to speak out 
strongly against the Soviet action.”71 This Soviet act of “brutality” posed a direct threat to 
the oil fields of the Persian Gulf and to Afghanistan’s neighbour, Pakistan.72 Soviet 
intervention fed perceptions that—from Angola to the Horn of Africa and to Vietnam—the 
forces of communism were once more on the march.73 Pakistan—the pivotal state in the 
region since American loss of influence in Iran—was one of the first states considered in the 
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aftermath of invasion, the need to bolster Pakistan overriding other regional concerns.74 The 
relationship with Britain remained vital to building a consensus amongst America’s 
European allies. For Thatcher’s government, Afghanistan presented the first major test of 
their commitment to the trans-Atlantic foreign policy relationship.75 Thatcher supported 
Carter when it came to the need for resolute action.76 Finally, the Islamic world—as Carter 
had indicated—was key. During 1978 and 1978, the ‘Islamic bomb’ had featured in 
discussions about how to deal with the Pakistani nuclear programme but had failed to 
influence actual policy. By the time of the Afghanistan crisis, there was a confirmed need for 
the West to make use of the bonds of Islam in order to build a vigorous Muslim anti-Soviet 
alliance. As Andrew Preston has noted, the assembling of an Islamic coalition to resist the 
Soviets was founded in a belief that this would “realign the Islamic world’s sympathies 
towards the United States.”77 Unlike the image created in public, within government Islam 
was now viewed as a positive force for good in the reinvigorated Cold War. 
 The need to reinforce and reassure Pakistan gave rise to another change in US 
government policy. Despite the mid-1979 move to mitigating, rather than preventing, 
eventual Pakistani nuclear capability, the Carter administration had been determined not to 
offer the Pakistanis arms and aid. Furthermore, mitigation did not mean that efforts to delay 
Pakistani nuclear acquisition had ended and the issues of non-proliferation and the supply of 
conventional arms were still intimately linked. As has been demonstrated, export controls 
and international diplomacy were used to hinder the programme. However, with the crisis in 
Afghanistan, Carter’s policy mutated again, moving from one of mitigation with punishment 
(in the form of withholding arms and aid), to one of simple mitigation, where Afghanistan 
caused arms supplies to be de-linked from the nuclear issue. However, major challenges 
remained. Carter’s previous zeal for non-proliferation—and Congress’s concurrent 
enthusiasm—created difficulties when attempting to bolster Pakistan. Changes were not the 
sole province of the US government. The shift from prevention to mitigation had also been 
apparent in British policy during 1979. This change remained in 1980, with Thatcher’s 
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government following the American lead. There were voices within both governments that 
still called for a strong non-proliferation policy. Non-proliferation advocates like Gerald 
Smith in Washington and Robert Alston in London made the case for continued pursuit of 
active non-proliferation policies in the case of Pakistan, but their entreaties were largely 
ignored by more senior figures who remained committed to mitigation. 
 For America, Britain, and Pakistan, appearances were vital and it was crucial that—
in public at least—perceptions did not arise that sub-continental non-proliferation policy was 
being abandoned. Consequently, there were persistent demands to Zia’s government for 
assurances that they would not conduct the most public and visible statement of nuclear 
attainment, a nuclear test. Thus, Pakistan would enter a state of ‘nuclear ambiguity’ similar 
to Israel. Concurrently, Islamabad did not wish the appearance of allying too closely with the 
West in order to maintain standing in the Muslim and non-aligned worlds. Consequently, Zia 
rejected Carter administration offers of aid and military equipment. 
 
From the moment the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan, the Pakistani nuclear programme 
influenced thinking on how to bolster and aid a nation that became the lynchpin of the anti-
Soviet effort. As the NSC’s Thomas Thornton recalled, the American position on Pakistan 
changed literally overnight.78 The embargo on military sales underwent swift reassessment in 
the face of a drastically changed situation in South Asia. Even though the Carter 
administration had acquiesced to eventual Pakistani nuclear capability, Cyrus Vance still 
contended that the nuclear programme precluded significant economic aid and credit for 
military purchases. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown suggested distinguishing between 
the Pakistani programme as was, and a Pakistani programme involving nuclear testing.79 
This was a key point. A Pakistani test would dramatically demonstrate the failure of non-
proliferation policy. Exerting pressure on Zia not to test at least preserved the outward 
appearance of a successful stance on proliferation. However, certain legislation blocked the 
way to full-blown aid for Pakistan: the Symington Amendment. 
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 The Amendment impeded acceptance of what Vance, articulating the policy of 
acquiescence, observed as the “facts of nuclear life” regarding Pakistan.80 Given that the 
administration had, by mid-1979, abandoned efforts to totally prevent Pakistani acquisition 
of nuclear capability, the “facts of life” were that at some point Pakistan would become at 
least a tacit nuclear weapon state. Several options were presented to Carter, including a 
presidential waiver, exploring Saudi financing for Pakistani arms purchases, or seeking a 
one-time Congressional appropriation for military purchases. A waiver was unlikely because 
of overwhelming intelligence pointing to a Pakistani nuclear weapons programme.81 
Regardless of means, from the outset it was imperative that Pakistan be brought into the fold 
in order to construct a strong anti-Soviet front in Afghanistan. In Islamabad, Arthur Hummel 
was convinced that if the Amendment could not be bypassed, the ability to aid Pakistan 
would be severely muted. The ambassador recommended that the administration deal 
urgently with the threat to Pakistan, and rationalised the abandonment of efforts to prevent 
Pakistani nuclear acquisition by stating that the nuclear programme’s slow pace permitted 
the sidelining of non-proliferation matters for the time being.82 In the face of a renewed 
Soviet threat, non-proliferationist Democratic members of Congress such as Jonathan 
Bingham (D-NY), Frank Church (D-ID), and Clement Zablocki (D-WI) supported special 
authorisation for aid to Pakistan, overriding the US legislation.83 Thus, the most ardently 
non-proliferationist members of Congress actively supported the mitigation policy of de-
linking arms sales and the nuclear issue. The Symington Amendment notwithstanding, the 
administration very quickly deprioritised the nuclear programme. As Brown admitted to his 
Chinese hosts in Beijing at the end of January, the administration had moved from a policy 
of prevention to one of mitigation. “Our big problem with Pakistan was their attempts to get 
a nuclear program,” stated the Secretary of Defense, “Although we still object to their doing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 UKE Washington to FCO, ‘Afghanistan,’ December 28, 1979, TNA FCO96/961. 
81 Saunders to Vance, ‘NSC Discussion of Support for Pakistan,’ January 1, 1980, DNSA, NP01707, 2-4. 
82 Brzezinski to Carter, ‘Daily Report,’ January 3, 1980, JCPL, RAC NLC-1-13-7-5-4. 
83 UKE Washington to FCO, ‘Nuclear South Asia,’ January 4, 1980, TNA FCO37/2370. 
! 233!
so, we will now set that aside for the time being and concentrate on strengthening Pakistan 
against potential Soviet action.”84 
 With the USSR having invaded a non-aligned Islamic state, Islam and independent 
nationalism became significant issues for the Carter administration in mobilising regional 
resistance to Soviet adventurism.85 Gaining Islamic support for US objectives meant 
demonstrating that America was not solely guided by oil and Israel, a demonstration that 
policymakers hoped would win over states distrustful of America because of anti-colonialist, 
pan-Arab, and Islamic ideologies.86 Zia also hoped that by sponsoring an “Afghan jihad” he 
could gain prestige in the Islamic world.87 
There was a raft of suggestions regarding how to achieve US goals in relation to 
Pakistan, from a resurrection of A-7 sales, to debt relief, food aid, refugee assistance, and oil 
supplies.88 These suggestions were tied together into a $400 million deal offered to Agha 
Shahi when he visited Washington in mid-January.89 Brzezinski had wanted a much more 
substantial package for Pakistan, and was frustrated when budgetary restraints, lingering 
non-proliferation worries, and human rights concerns militated against a larger offer.90 
Seeking a commitment from Pakistan to not test a nuclear weapon was a component of the 
proposed deal.91 Vance informed the Pakistani foreign minister that the nuclear issue could 
be set aside for the time being but was at pains to point out that a test would drastically alter 
the US-Pakistan relationship. In response, Shahi made a vague commitment that Pakistan 
would “do nothing to embarrass” the United States.92 Thomas Pickering had, during his visit 
to London, made it clear to his British counterparts that the Carter administration still took 
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the appearance of proliferation seriously. The US representative emphasised to his hosts that 
while further pressure would not be put on Pakistan regarding the nuclear issue and aid 
offers were not contingent upon changes in Pakistani nuclear policy, the US government 
believed it had made it clear that proliferation remained relevant. Pickering argued that a 
nuclear test would radically alter US-Pakistani relations, making it almost impossible to 
obtain Congressional approval of military aid.93 However, Islamabad did not welcome with 
open arms the $400 million package put to Shahi in Washington. Zia publicly scoffed at the 
offer, famously stating it was “peanuts.”94 Zia’s disparagement represented not just a blow 
for administration credibility over Pakistan, but a very public strike at the heart of non-
proliferation policy.  
 
The UK, recalling the heady days of MacMillan and Kennedy, was a key US ally in the 
reinvigorated Cold War. US officials highlighted to the British government that the 
administration’s nuclear policy towards Pakistan had essentially been “put on ice” and that 
nuclear questions should not prevent swift, decisive action on Afghanistan.95 The FCO was 
happy to follow the US lead and saw little that Britain could actually do for Zia, but did not 
want to let the question of a more “forthcoming” Western policy towards Pakistan “run into 
the sands.” The UK, Carrington’s FCO suggested, was in a position to discretely encourage 
other NATO nations to support US action. At all levels there was an awareness of Indian 
concerns about both the Pakistani nuclear programme and Western re-arming of their 
neighbour, but the FCO believed that action could not be totally constrained by the 
traditional Indo-Pakistani rivalry.96 
 Senior British figures, from the Foreign Secretary down, allied themselves with the 
American approach. Carrington’s high-profile visit to Islamabad in mid-January was not 
simply to show solidarity with Pakistan but pressed home British views on Zia’s nuclear 
aspirations. Patrick Moberly, one of Carrington’s top advisers, reaffirmed the centrality of 
the ‘no testing’ paradigm by contending that “an explosion would endanger Pakistan’s 
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security by alarming her neighbours, alerting her enemies and scaring off her friends.”97 
Moberly also thought it too early to discern how the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and 
the Western reaction to it influenced Zia on the nuclear issue: he might be more disposed to 
listen to reason, but equally he might see Afghanistan as giving him leeway to ignore 
diplomatic appeals.98 In Islamabad, Carrington enjoyed extensive discussions with Zia and 
Agha Shahi. Covering the nuclear issue, Shahi assured Carrington that a Pakistani test would 
not take place for at least six months and that the “next government” would make any 
decision for such an action and reiterated Pakistan’s commitment not to transfer nuclear 
technology or manufacture nuclear weapons.99  
Carrington’s post-journey report to Thatcher failed to mention the nuclear issue, 
illustrating the extent to which it had been deprioritised since mid-1979. The Foreign 
Secretary did highlight the leading role that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were taking in 
mobilising Muslim opinion against the USSR. The Pakistanis, Carrington argued, were quite 
justified in being affronted at the meagreness of the US aid offer when their existing military 
equipment was so out-dated and ill-suited for purpose.100 In the face of this, the Foreign 
Secretary contended that the UK should encourage Carter to meet Pakistan’s military needs 
up to a level that gave India “no justifiable reasons for concern.”101 The Pakistanis certainly 
saw Britain’s role as a conduit for their own interests. While visiting Islamabad, Carrington 
had taken it upon himself to act as a messenger between Pakistan and India and the Western 
states, something that Zia valued highly.102 British diplomats believed they were expected to 
encourage Saudi Arabia to fund Pakistani defence purchases, lead Western opinion, and urge 
the US to do more.103 The British relationship with the Saudis was, however, severely 
compromised by the Islamic world’s reaction to the ‘Death of a Princess’ affair.104 During 
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multilateral talks in London at the end of January, British officials insisted that the nuclear 
issue should not be “pushed into the shadows,” but only because of the regionally disastrous 
consequences of a Pakistani test. The US side argued that they had made the dire 
consequences of a test abundantly clear.105 However, British policy in these early days 
evolved into a ‘wait-and-see’ stance, holding back on major commitments to Pakistan until 
Brzezinski and Christopher had visited Islamabad for talks and Zia had hosted a major 
gathering of Islamic states.106 More widely, as Daniel James Lahey points out, British 
commitments on Afghanistan were diplomatic, rather than economic, in nature. Thatcher 
could ill-afford anti-Soviet trade restrictions that damaged the fragile British economy.107 
Thus, initial British policy towards Pakistan during the early days of the Afghanistan crisis 
was founded in diplomatic and moral support. Britain adopted a ‘light touch’ approach 
emphasising quiet diplomacy that supported US efforts and the campaign against the 
clandestine purchasing programme. 
  
The Christopher-Brzezinski mission to Islamabad and Riyadh in early February left the US 
officials feeling optimistic about the future of US-Pakistani relations, despite continued 
Pakistan intransigence.108 American refusals to extend security commitments to cover an 
attack by India (one of the issues driving the nuclear programme) concerned the Pakistanis, 
but experienced South Asia hands Thomas Thornton and Jane Coon remained puzzled by 
Zia’s overall attitude.109 Overtures to Zia had the side effect of upsetting and angering India. 
In January 1980, Indira Gandhi had returned to power and, while—prompted by 
Carrington’s efforts—denouncing Soviet adventurism, was even more anxious about US 
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efforts to turn Pakistan “into an arsenal.”110 Indian disquiet moved Carter to approve the 
shipment of nuclear fuel for the reactors at Tarapur, overturning a decision by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC.)111 In trying to balance Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and 
national security policy, Carter only hastened the demise of his flagship non-proliferation 
policy. 
 On leaving Pakistan, Brzezinski was, according to one British official, euphoric.112 
The National Security Adviser commented to Sir Robert Wade-Gery, British Deputy 
Secretary of the Cabinet, that the “material for a successful Southwest Asia policy is there 
for us to work with.”113 For Brzezinski, a “successful Southwest Asia policy” was one that 
continued to deprioritise Pakistani nuclear ambitions while emphasising the communist 
threat. Reporting back to colleagues in Washington, Brzezinski and Christopher observed 
that during talks with the Pakistanis, there had been some indications that a nuclear test 
might be imminent, but these were judged as purely a negotiating tactic, and Shahi 
vociferously denied there would be a test, in an echo of his earlier remarks to Carrington 
about the testing issue. Brzezinski argued that the administration should only present 
Congress with modifications to the 1959 US-Pakistan security agreement and a waiver of the 
Symington Amendment as part of specific aid proposals, rather than as independent actions. 
Christopher suggested that Pakistan preferred an “Islamic option,” whereby it should count 
on a US security umbrella but rely on Muslim states for direct cooperation and support.114 
Reporting to Carter, Brzezinski stated that the Pakistanis realised the US stood four 
square behind the 1959 agreement and, as a result, there had been no need to increase the 
$400 million package or offer a formal security treaty. On broader geopolitical matters, he 
contended that effectively mobilising Muslim support required increased efforts on the 
Palestinian situation and military aid to Saudi Arabia.115 News from Beijing that Pakistan 
might imminently conduct a nuclear test put the ‘no testing’ question in alarming perspective. 
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The US ambassador to China reported that although the Chinese had discouraged Pakistani 
nuclear development, a test was imminent.116 As it transpired, the ambassador was mistaken, 
but there was momentary alarm that Islamabad had already attained nuclear capability.117  
 Within the Carter administration there were voices demanding a less relaxed non-
proliferation policy. Ardent non-proliferationist Gerald Smith took a dim view of the damage 
US overtures to Zia were doing to global anti-proliferation efforts. However, by this point 
Smith’s views had been smothered by the mitigationist policy adopted by more influential 
figures in the administration. Smith recounted that, despite continued demands, Zia had still 
not definitively ruled out a nuclear test. Smith also recognised that overtures to Pakistan 
were damaging to Carter’s wider non-proliferation efforts. The ambassador saw risks in 
courting Pakistan: what, Smith wondered, would happen if Zia used US guns to protect the 
enrichment plant at Kahuta? How should the US react if Pakistan tested a device after a 
Soviet invasion of their territory, just as America was due to come to their aid? Conversely, 
Smith subscribed to the West German view that military supplies to Pakistan probably gave 
leverage over their nuclear decision-making and there was general agreement that there must 
be no decrease in efforts to rigorously control exports to Pakistan.118  
 Despite the American and British governments stressing that non-proliferation 
remained important, it became clear that in Washington the policy of mitigating Pakistani 
acquisition of nuclear capability was increasingly de-linked from the issue of arms sales. As 
it became clearer that non-proliferation objectives were being divorced from the broader 
anti-Soviet policy, the NSC articulated the policy of acquiescence to Pakistani nuclear 
ambitions, stating that although elements of US support should be founded on a request to 
Pakistan for the strongest non-proliferation statement possible, aid should not be made 
conditional on the content and nature of such a statement.119 As the NSC—and Brzezinski in 
particular—gained pre-eminence in foreign policy and the perception built that the Soviets 
were on the march in the developing world, hawkish attitudes towards the USSR overrode 
the humanitarian elements of Carter’s policies. 
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 As the US and UK governments pursued the policy of mitigation, primarily through 
seeking ‘no test’ assurances, it became apparent the Pakistanis also put a great deal of store 
in the wider perception of their actions. Given the significance that Western media attached 
to the Pakistani nuclear programme, a consensus in Washington and London emerged that 
the nuclear issue was not a major factor in Pakistani refusal to accept the American aid 
package after Agha Shahi formally and publicly rejected the offer on March 5. Instead, Shahi 
emphasised reliance on Pakistan’s growing friendships with China, the Islamic world, and 
non-aligned states, arguing that a closer relationship with the US could damage these 
increasingly vital connections.120 However, speculation remained that the nuclear issue was 
one of the key reasons for refusal. Although Shah Nawaz had indicated that the Pakistani 
government thought that nuclear strings were attached to the aid offer, Carter surmised that 
Zia had concluded the value of the aid package was outweighed by the risks of allying too 
closely with the US. Thus, Carter concluded, the main financing for aid should come from 
Islamic states.121 Thatcher agreed and noted that the UK would quietly continue to encourage 
closer relations between Pakistan and the wider Islamic world.122 The State Department and 
the FCO agreed that the nuclear issue was not a major factor governing Pakistani decision-
making. The area where Robert Gallucci felt nuclear matters may have had influence was 
over overt US statements on nuclear testing. Gallucci argued the mantra that a test would 
“drastically change the relationship” made Zia doubt the depth of Carter’s commitment to 
Pakistani security. Gallucci continued that, if the administration eventually reached an 
arrangement with Zia (and he stressed that this might never actually happen), it was doubtful 
it would provide additional leverage in the nuclear area. At best, it would allow for 
continued dialogue.123 The British Embassy in Islamabad concurred with Gallucci’s 
assessment. Fresh indications had come to light that cast doubt on existing assessments of 
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the timescale for a Pakistani test, although the dates that had been speculated about in the 
media were regarded as implausible.124 
 Alston and the JNU found themselves in a similar position to Gerald Smith in 
Washington. Alston’s anti-proliferation stance was now superseded by an Anglo-American 
position that sought the appearance of non-proliferation through ‘no testing’ assurances but 
that had in reality deprioritised the goal of getting Pakistan to abandon its nuclear ambitions. 
Carrington had insisted that while Afghanistan was the most pressing issue, Pakistani 
nuclear activities were viewed no less seriously than before December 1979. Export controls 
were particularly important, because if Western governments dropped their guards, the 
Pakistanis might take it as a sign that a lower priority had been given to non-proliferation 
objectives.125 Alston, disturbed that the Afghanistan crisis had not improved prospects for 
resolving the nuclear dilemma, offered a new policy. In light of Shahi’s rejection of the 
American offer, perhaps a proposal could be formulated to boost Pakistani confidence in the 
face of the Soviet and Indian threats and address the nuclear quandary? Thus, Alston and the 
JNU suggested offering Pakistan a package combining enrichment, reprocessing, and power 
services that was intended to halt Zia’s moves towards weapons capability and re-establish 
the pre-eminence of non-proliferation policy.126 JNU’s counterparts in SAD argued that the 
proposal was founded on false premises, contending that rejection of the US aid offer was 
nothing to do with its size and scope, and everything to do with appearances. SAD 
contended that by being seen to reject the aid offer, Pakistan increased its standing with 
Islamic and NAM countries.127  
 A trilateral discussion between the JNU, Oliver Forster, and John Thomson debated 
Alston’s desire to move back towards a preventative non-proliferation policy. Thompson had 
been the driving force behind 1979’s abortive ‘universal declaration’ on nuclear trade and 
exports, the failed policy that codified British acquiescence to eventual Pakistan nuclear 
capability. Afghanistan, Alston argued, had not changed the basic British attitude that the 
nuclear dilemma was extremely serious, even though American commitment was weakening. 
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The inducements that Alston outlined were, he contended, formulated to allow Zia to 
abandon his nuclear aspirations without losing face.128 Responding, Thomson emphasised 
that the package should be presented in such a way as to not upset the Indians. Perhaps a 
similar offer could be made to them?129 Forster—while supporting the basic idea—suggested 
that issues of prestige and national security made Zia unlikely to change his nuclear position, 
arguing that the invasion made it the wrong time for such an approach and Indian 
involvement could exacerbate anti-Western feeling in Pakistan.130 SAD echoed Forster’s 
opinion, agreeing that it was entirely the wrong time to pressure Pakistan. One optimistic 
note was that Zia had so far failed to extract the economic support he expected from other 
Islamic states. This might offer an area for negotiation, although observers thought it 
unlikely that Zia would accept any deal with nuclear strings attached.131 
 The opportunity to explore Pakistani attitudes came in mid-June when Agha Shahi 
visited London. Shahi expounded upon the Pakistani-hosted Islamic Conference’s success in 
creating a united front against the USSR and expressed satisfaction with the extent of 
Western support. However, too much Western involvement, Shahi contended, would spoil 
Pakistan’s non-aligned credentials and remove the appearance of independent action.132 The 
Pakistani Foreign Minister submitted a list of military equipment he wished to obtain from 
Britain and Carrington promised to attend to it as quickly as possible. Thus Britain’s most 
senior diplomat, by accepting the Pakistani request for military aid, fully acquiesced to the 
policy of simply mitigating the nuclear programme and de-linking arms and non-
proliferation. The only comment on nuclear issues was when the Pakistani ambassador stated 
that the BBC’s ‘Muslim bomb’ documentary had been “inaccurate and unhelpful.”133 The 
government was reticent to involve itself and suggested that the Pakistani embassy contact 
the BBC directly.134 In conversation with Thatcher, Shahi raised many of the same points 
but—bringing up a subject that had been thought long buried by the British—expressed 
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worry about India’s new fleet of British-made Jaguar strike aircraft.135 The lack of reflection 
on nuclear matters in these discussions, and those conducted by Douglas Hurd in September, 
demonstrate how much events in Afghanistan had pushed the issue aside. Although attempts 
to retard the Pakistani programme continued through the means of export controls and 
international diplomacy, just as the FCO had suggested, direct pressure on the Zia 
government effectively ceased.136 
 Cessation of pressure on Pakistan did not halt British government consideration of 
non-proliferation. Following multilateral discussions at the June NATO summit in Ankara, 
Carrington tasked the JNU with drafting a ministerial briefing on non-proliferation. The JNU 
took the opportunity to try and resist the mitigationist policy by offering a gloomy, slightly 
alarmist view of the terrain that drew on prevailing ‘Islamic bomb’ ideas. The report opened 
bleakly: the price for stopping a proliferation cascade was eternal vigilance as, “every act of 
proliferation increases pressure on others to follow suit.”137 As far as Middle Eastern 
proliferation was concerned, this issue was hived off from the challenge of Pakistan. In the 
Middle East, the peace process was the best guarantee of non-proliferation. In Pakistan, the 
best guarantee was resolution of Indo-Pakistani tension.138 Despite this compartmentalisation, 
the JNU speculated about the Libya-Pakistani connection, but again no solid evidence was 
provided. The report concluded by offering the same solutions that had been discussed ad 
infinitum: export controls, international consensus, access to reprocessing facilities, and 
safeguards.139 Alston’s subsequent paper was similarly alarmist about a proliferation cascade 
rooted in Pakistan. Stopping Pakistan was considerably more urgent than action against India, 
especially as it could prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East.140 
 Despite Alston and the JNU’s efforts, overt non-proliferation did not make it back 
onto the agenda. Although Britain remained a driving force in the field of export controls, 
Thatcher’s government followed the US lead when it came to refraining from explicit 
pressure on Pakistan. Zia’s obduracy, US lethargy, and the exigencies of the renewed Cold 
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War had all militated against strong action against Islamabad’s nuclear aspirations. British 
and American analysts were correct in one particular respect: the chances of persuading Zia 
to change direction and eschew nuclear capability were close to zero. 
 
Re-calibrating Non-proliferation Policy 
The quest for a new approach to the nuclear dilemma was not confined to London. A US 
survey on global attitudes towards non-proliferation revealed that a majority of non-
communist nations considered America an unreliable nuclear partner and, with an over-
emphasis on supply and the fuel cycle (typified by INFCE and the anti-reprocessing stance), 
had failed to adequately focus on potential bomb-makers.141 Concurrent with the JNU-SAD 
discussions, the elite PRC attempted to thrash out a revised Pakistan policy. Vance—in one 
of his last contributions to the debate before resigning from office—stated that the non-
proliferation objectives laid out in 1977 still stood, but that there were questions over the 
methods used to achieve the desired results.142 Smith then outlined three options: to continue 
on the present course; to accept a universal, non-discriminatory code on nuclear trade, as 
advocated by the UK in 1979; or to promote a regime that required safeguards on all new 
export agreements, indefinite deferral of reprocessing, international plutonium storage, 
multinational control of sensitive facilities, and improved international cooperation when 
dealing with ‘problem countries.’ The DoD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ACDA, and the State 
Department all supported option three. At the same meeting, the NSC vigorously opposed 
any leniency towards India. The appearance of preferential treatment over fuel supplies to 
Tarapur would badly affect the US position with Pakistan and undercut global non-
proliferation efforts.143 The NSC—in the process of establishing hegemony over foreign 
policy decision-making as part of the tussle between Brzezinski and Vance—was dubious 
about Smith being assigned leadership. As far as the NSC was concerned, this would 
produce a one sided, non-proliferationist report for the President.144 The NSC, rationalising 
the South Asian proliferation predicament in terms of the prevailing mitigationist viewpoint, 
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argued that proliferation was a long-term challenge that was subordinate to more immediate 
concerns.145 All of this came at a time when the proliferation problem was deepening. The 
CIA argued the Pakistanis believed (quite perceptively, as it turned out) that the US was 
resigned to their having nuclear weapons capability, while India was seen as being 
determined to move forward with continued PNE testing. The latter thus further increased 
Pakistani resolve to obtain atomic weapons.146 
 As these discussions were taking place, moves were afoot to reassess non-
proliferation policy in the wake of the INFCE meetings. Smith had canvassed the opinions of 
key Congressional figures and received a lengthy response from Bingham and Zablocki. 
Both politicians feared the effects of a Middle Eastern, Islamic proliferation cascade that 
would have knock-on effects in South Asia. They argued: 
If Pakistan acquires nuclear weapons, India might in turn increase the level of her 
own weapons work or perhaps try militarily to halt the Pakistani program. And so 
too might the Soviet Union, which could in any event be looking for a pretext for 
adventure in Pakistan. The acquisition of weapons by Libya would drastically 
increase the pressure on our friends the Egyptians and the Sudanese as well as 
creating other possibilities too numerous even to formulate. One could go on in this 
fashion almost indefinitely.147 
 
Amongst the worry, Bingham and Zablocki had a point: the impact of Pakistani acquisition 
of nuclear weapons was unknown. Which way would India jump? What would the USSR 
do? Would the weapons end up in Libyan hands? Carter was also subject to perceptive 
accusations from Congressional supporters of non-proliferation that, in light of Pakistan and 
the nuclear shipments to India, he had abandoned his anti-nuclear policy.148 
 The Carter administration sought to recalibrate non-proliferation policy in light of a 
changed global situation, a reinvigorated Cold War, Congressional pressure, and allied 
attitudes. Particularly in the case of Pakistan, this remained a preoccupation of the 
administration in the last few months of Carter’s time in office. The NSC saw difficulties 
ahead, especially in the area of relations between key allies in Europe and Asia. The 
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countries of the developing world were hugely concerned about energy security and major 
nuclear states—most significantly Britain and France—were pushing ahead with extensive 
reprocessing programmes. Set against this backdrop was an abject lack of progress on major 
non-proliferation challenges such as those involving Pakistan and South Africa.149 In fact, 
the recommendations offered for approval fell into the ‘more of the same’ category: 
deferment of reprocessing, strict supplier controls, and full scope safeguards.150 Even after 
all the experiences since 1977, little new was suggested. In the White House, Gus Speth—
Carter’s anti-nuclear environmental affairs adviser—suggested a stronger stance on non-
proliferation and a delay in the review of policy until after the November election.151 Speth’s 
suggestions were—like the departed Cyrus Vance’s—founded in a belief that Carter’s 1977 
non-proliferation policies were still relevant. Speth unsurprisingly offered a detailed policy 
platform that mandated strict adherence to the original principles propounded by Carter and 
layered on further domestic and international restrictions.152  Like Smith, Alston, and other 
non-proliferation advocates, Speth found his entreaties ignored. 
 In the midst of debates over non-proliferation, the State Department assessed 
Pakistani objectives as getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan as quickly as possible, 
minimising the Soviet incentive to put pressure on Pakistan, and preventing Soviet and 
Indian interests from coalescing.153 Pakistani attitudes were not the only thing considered 
when addressing the nuclear problem. Connections with the wider Islamic world were vital. 
While the Islamic Conference continued to condemn Soviet aggression, it criticised the US 
for not doing enough to promote peace in the Middle East.154 Resolving the Palestinian 
situation was seen as vital to bolster Islamic support for the US in Afghanistan. The US 
embassy in Singapore argued that a lack of American cultural connection to the “extended 
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Middle East”, coupled to the rise of political Islam—that incorporated social radicalism and 
anti-superpower “xenophobia”—was a major new factor.155 
 Even without the impact of wider political and cultural factors, the chances of 
persuading Zia to veer away from the nuclear option or for greater legal flexibility on 
nuclear matters were bleak. Yet again, the Symington Amendment provided a seemingly 
insurmountable obstacle. The NSC asked if there was any way Carter could use executive 
power to bypass the restrictions? Furthermore, the Tarapur situation had agitated non-
proliferationists in Congress, making a legislative exception for Pakistan unlikely.156 Vance’s 
replacement Edmund Muskie contended that bypassing the Symington Amendment would 
show greater US support for Pakistan. Harking back to Vietnam, Muskie likened it to “the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution of the Middle East.”157 David Newsom noted the US could help the 
Pakistanis with military equipment, if the Saudis footed the bill, but on the nuclear front the 
administration should expect no help from Islamabad.158 There were no immediate plans to 
increase the aid offer to Zia, such were the restrictions of the Symington Amendment. The 
administration was happy to sell weapons, but could not legally provide the funds to the 
cash-strapped Pakistanis. Saudi Arabia was, as always, a potential source of funding, but 
despite Pakistani efforts to leverage Islamic brotherhood, Saudi money had not yet been 
forthcoming.159 Here were prime examples of two key factors. Firstly, prior US enthusiasm 
for non-proliferation was now severely hampering efforts to constructively aid the nation 
that had actually provoked much of the concern about proliferation. Secondly, and 
significantly, the NSC and the State Department requests that Carter use executive power to 
override the Symington Amendment demonstrate how the policy of acquiescence and 
mitigation—originating in mid-1979 and then further influenced by the Afghanistan 
situation—had become the mainstream of the administration’s attitude towards Pakistan’s 
nuclear ambitions. 
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 By autumn, with the US Presidential election campaign in full swing, prospects for a 
breakthrough with Pakistan had not improved. Christopher noted that there was virtually no 
chance of getting a waiver of the Symington Amendment. The bad blood created between 
the administration, the NRC, and Congress over Tarapur had poisoned that well. Christopher 
also pointed out how much impact media coverage of the Pakistani nuclear project had been 
having on Congressional willingness to authorise military aid. Stories about Swiss supplies 
and Pakistani purchasing had, and were continuing to have, a negative impact on the 
prospects for gaining Congressional agreement to a waiver of the Symington Amendment. 
Only a month before the election, and despite plans to sell the highly advanced F-16 fighter 
aircraft and other military materials to Pakistan, he stated, “nothing can be done until next 
spring.”160 Next spring, something would be done, but not by Carter and his team. On 
October 3, Zia visited the White House. As Dennis Kux notes, by this point Zia had 
concluded that Reagan would win the election, so saw no need to take the initiative on 
security assistance. When, in the final minutes of the meeting, Carter offered Zia the F-16, 
the Pakistani president casually noted that as Carter was undoubtedly busy with his election 
campaign, such matters could easily wait.161 Despite positivity in the White House and a 
remarkable comeback in opinion polls in the week before polling day, Ronald Reagan 
proved the more adept campaigner and won a landslide victory. On November 4, Carter 
became the first incumbent since Herbert Hoover in 1932 to fail at winning a second term.162 
Foreign policy had played a significant role in ensuring Carter’s election in 1976. In 1980, 
foreign policy was one of the primary causes of his downfall. 
 
Conclusion 
For America and Britain, 1980 was a low-water mark in efforts to forestall Pakistani nuclear 
capability. The Carter and Thatcher governments were committed to rigorous controls on 
nuclear-related exports and expended considerable political capital on efforts to gain 
international acceptance of their standpoint. However, the obduracy of fellow supplier states 
such as West Germany and Switzerland diminished the effectiveness of the crusade. 
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Diplomatic efforts to persuade Zia to rein in his ambitions were, if anything, even less 
successful. The crisis in Afghanistan, Pakistani recalcitrance, and the need for all sides to 
keep up appearances precluded success. Carter, who began with such high hopes for his non-
proliferation policy, found himself hoisted by a petard of his own making. The UK and US 
discovered that faced by a state determined to acquire nuclear weapons, diplomacy and aid 
carried little weight. This was especially true after the invasion of Afghanistan, when 
Pakistan was in the front line of a new Cold War. In public, the Pakistani programme was 
continually linked to fear of an ‘Islamic bomb’ and the spread of nuclear weapons to the 
Middle East. If nothing else, this was the true public legacy of Bhutto and Zia’s nuclear 
ambitions. In international diplomacy, however, it was once more issues of credibility and 
‘face’ that played the more significant role in non-proliferation discussions. Within three 
months of Ronald Reagan’s January 1981 ascent to the White House, the new President’s 
administration had put together an assistance package worth $3.2 billion over five years, a 




The story of American and British involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear programme did not end 
with Jimmy Carter’s departure from the White House. Like Carter, Ronald Reagan placed 
Pakistan at the heart of his anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan. The major change was 
willingness—bolstered by Zia’s assurances over production, proliferation, and most 
importantly testing—to offer substantial military and economic aid. The Pakistani leader did 
not turn down Reagan’s 1981 offer of a $3.6 billion package of arms, money, and food as 
“peanuts.” Under Reagan, US-Pakistani cooperation over Afghanistan ballooned into a 
sizeable operation supporting the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviets. Margaret Thatcher 
wholeheartedly supported Reagan’s policy, but continued to monitor the clandestine 
Pakistani programme. British officials remained active in trying to combat the covert 
enrichment project, although by the mid-1980s, the project was well on the way to success. 
 Discomfort over Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions did not entirely dissipate as figures 
in Congress and the administration questioned the American stance. Congressmen and 
Senators expressed unease and anger over the Pakistani nuclear situation. Senators Alan 
Cranston (D-CA) and John Glenn, and Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY) were three of 
the most notable figures to raise the issue.1 Solarz went so far as to have an amendment to 
the Foreign Assistance Act (the ‘Solarz Amendment’) passed, barring aid to any country 
exploding a nuclear device. Thus, the ‘no test’ paradigm of acquiescence to Pakistani nuclear 
ambitions became US law.2 Individuals within the Reagan administration also remained 
anxious about Zia’s aspirations. In 1982, Secretary of State George Schulz warned that Zia 
was likely to break his promises and proliferate to “unstable Arab countries.”3 Four years 
later, ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman argued that Zia was continually lying regarding 
enrichment and by 1987, senior State Department officials warned that Zia was approaching 
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a "threshold which he cannot cross without blatantly violating his pledge not to embarrass 
[i.e.: not test] the President.”4  
 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Western relationships with the Pakistani nuclear 
programme came under renewed scrutiny because of the ‘Test War’ between Islamabad and 
New Delhi and the exposure of the A. Q. Khan proliferation network. The series of nuclear 
tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 alarmed observers who saw a dangerous increase in 
South Asian tension. The 2004 exposure of the Khan network—which had supplied 
centrifuge designs to Iran, Libya, and North Korea—by the American and British 
intelligence services prompted significant media coverage, and led directly to many of the 
popular books which continue to perpetuate misplaced concerns about an ‘Islamic bomb.’ 
 
This thesis has given a detailed analysis of American and British responses to the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons programme in the 1970s. The Pakistani case highlights a strong Anglo-
American non-proliferation relationship. Despite problems created by British commercial 
interests, Britain remained America’s strongest global anti-proliferation partner. When 
compared to the often acrimonious American relationships with France and West Germany, 
the Anglo-American ‘non-proliferation special relationship’ was functional and productive. 
The case of Pakistan also demonstrates that American and British non-proliferation policy 
was characterised by a remarkable resistance to partisan politicisation. Across the years of 
three American presidencies and three British prime ministers, Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions 
failed to become a political ‘football’ utilised for party-political ends. Apart from the laxity 
of the Nixon years and early Ford period, Washington and London took non-proliferation 
very seriously and the issue was one that transcended political boundaries. In the case of the 
1976 US presidential election, it was precisely because of the seriousness of the issue and the 
casualness with which it had been treated by Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger that proliferation 
became a political issue. 
Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger’s acquiescence to Pakistani demands for arms 
while receiving nothing in return demonstrated that regional security concerns overrode non-
proliferation concerns, despite signs that Pakistan was actively pursuing a military atomic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Adelman to Poindexter, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program and US Security Assurances,’ June 16, 1986, 
RTPP, Doc.20; McGoldrick to Negroponte, ‘Pakistan,’ April 9, 1987, RTPP, Doc.23. 
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programme. Cognisant of Pakistan’s stubborn determination to attain nuclear capability, 
pressured by a Congress awakening to the dangers of proliferation, and provoked by Jimmy 
Carter’s foregrounding of the problem, the Ford administration switched from broad 
tolerance to an active engagement in non-proliferation policy. 
British investigations revealed the clandestine Pakistani purchasing networks 
feeding into a covert enrichment programme. In 1976-77, Callaghan’s government did not 
lack the will to tackle this issue, but the incompleteness of existing proliferation controls, a 
dubious legal case to prevent exports, and the recalcitrance of nuclear supplier states, and a 
desire not to lose credibility through public embarrassment hampered British government 
actions. Evidence emerging in 1978 strengthened the case that Pakistan was pursuing a 
clandestine enrichment programme as part of its nuclear quest. Here the ‘non-proliferation 
special relationship’ became fully functional, when the British government—supported and 
aided by the United States—commenced a campaign conducted in the diplomatic shadows to 
marshal a united front amongst nuclear supplier states to prevent Pakistani acquisition of 
sensitive technologies. 
Towards this end, the non-proliferation relationship saw a division of labour. The 
United States took the lead in diplomatically combating the French reprocessing plant deal, 
the overt element of the Pakistani programme. In turn, Britain led the campaign against the 
covert elements—the secret enrichment project and its associated purchasing programme—
of Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions. First Britain, and then America, took the clandestine 
Pakistani uranium enrichment programme very seriously. Britain was the first to grasp the 
implications of Pakistan’s purchasing activities but as has been demonstrated, internal 
debates over the nature of Pakistani purchases and the reluctance of other key nuclear 
supplier states such as Switzerland to adopt the same firm stance as Britain and America 
limited action. When both states did act, they showed joint determination and willingness to 
proceed. The complementary but different approaches of the US and UK tell us much about 
the relative standing of each state. The Americans were able to put significant pressure on 
France in a very public way because of their status—even in a post-Vietnam, post-Watergate 
era of diminished respect for the USA—as the foremost Western power. The fact that Britain 
took the route of covert, more subtle diplomatic action confirms the decline of Britain to a 
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middle-ranking power. However, in many ways this lack of genuine global standing gave 
Britain greater freedom to act and allowed the luxury of being able to ignore the 
requirements of non-proliferation when necessary, freed of the responsibilities associated 
with American superpower status 
Indeed, Britain and America were forced to delicately balance relations with other 
world powers in pursuit of their goal. The greatest success for non-proliferation diplomacy 
was the overt campaign against the French reprocessing plant. Although diplomatic pressure 
was a component of this, the French decision that non-proliferation mattered more than the 
reprocessing plant contract, and the concurrent realisation that they could make more money 
selling nuclear services when compared with selling the technology itself, was not entirely 
influenced by allied pressure. Additionally, Carter’s decision to exempt Britain, France, and 
other Western European states from his reprocessing ban allowed France to maintain the 
domestic industry required to sell these reprocessing services. This diplomatic ‘victory’ was 
not without its problems, as when Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s government demonstrated 
unwillingness to publicly proclaim its decision or to definitively break the contract with 
Pakistan. 
The final French cancellation of the reprocessing plant contract gave the US 
government a chance to have meaningful discussions with Pakistan over issues of aid and 
arms sales that had been hampered by Islamabad’s determination to acquire the reprocessing 
plant. However, in attempting to balance non-proliferation and conventional arms control 
policies, Carter only succeeded in pushing Pakistan away from the United States. There was 
tension between Carter’s multifarious policy aims: the desire to achieve non-proliferation 
goals conflicted with other global policy imperatives, such as regional security and human 
rights commitments. 
Zia’s unwillingness to abandon the nuclear programme prompted a policy change 
that has previously gone unnoticed. During 1979, the Carter administration and Thatcher’s 
government shifted from a commitment to prevention of proliferation in South Asia to a 
policy of mitigation of proliferation, centred on the quest for assurances from both Pakistan 
and India not to undertake nuclear tests. America and Britain together strove to maintain the 
appearance of actively pursuing non-proliferation through requests for Pakistan not to 
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undertake nuclear testing, the most public demonstration of nuclear attainment. If Pakistan 
were to test, it would throw the entire trilateral relationship into doubt by publicly 
humiliating the US and UK governments when they had invested significant political capital 
in anti-proliferation activities and thus reduce the ability to take anti-proliferation action on 
the global stage. This change illustrates the difficulties of pursuing non-proliferation when 
faced with a determined and skilful state apparatus and—significantly—the role of 
credibility and saving ‘face’ in influencing non-proliferation policy. Media stories about the 
Khan Affair, the ‘Islamic bomb’, and the clandestine purchasing project heaped greater 
pressure on Washington and London to take stronger action against Pakistan This again 
emphasises the significance of recalcitrance on the part of key supplier states in the non-
proliferation arena. Despite the problem created by supplier state reluctance, the clandestine 
purchasing programme was the most promising avenue for non-proliferation success and the 
one area where the UK and US governments did continue to make genuine efforts to retard 
the Pakistani nuclear programme through export controls and international diplomacy. 
 
Despite the broad harmony of the US-UK ‘non-proliferation special relationship’, the 
partnership was not entirely trouble free. Britain’s economic situation and the impact this 
had on arms sales and the nuclear industry caused problems. Throughout the period under 
study, British efforts to sell the nominally nuclear capable Jaguar strike aircraft to India were 
a persistent problem for sub-continental non-proliferation policies. In pursuing this sale, the 
Wilson and Callaghan governments compartmentalised arms sales and nuclear issues and 
indicated that, although India had joined the ‘nuclear club,’ the consequences were slight. 
Even though Callaghan’s government was committed to non-proliferation—David Owen 
being particularly dedicated—commercial considerations frequently trumped non-
proliferation objectives. Britain’s dire economic situation in the 1970s was the main concern. 
Without massive external deals, the teetering British aerospace industry would collapse. 
Additionally, with Sweden out of the picture, the only other competitor to the Jaguar was the 
French Mirage. British officials could not countenance withdrawing from the bidding 
process and gifting the French a lucrative contract. The consequence of this was frustration 
in Washington at British intransigence over Jaguar. 
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Policymakers in the Carter administration repeatedly attempted to persuade London 
and New Delhi to abandon the Jaguar negotiations. The US had seen some success in 
pressuring Sweden to drop out of the tendering process and attempted to persuade their 
British allies to do the same. While Jaguar would not represent a significant increase in 
Indian capability, it was the symbolism of Pakistan’s rivals being equipped with modern 
weapons that could potentially act as nuclear delivery systems (while the United States was 
using similar weapon systems as ‘carrots and sticks’ in its dealings with Islamabad) that was 
the underlying problem. The British government—faced with the potential loss of a hugely 
lucrative arms deal—wilfully ignored the non-proliferation complications. The ways in 
which Britain and America were using arms sales were quite different. For Britain, arms 
sales were an economic concern divorced from non-proliferation action. The sheer 
commitment to the Jaguar deal demonstrates that, in the face of an economic crisis, the 
British government was quite willing to subordinate non-proliferation to economic necessity. 
For the executive branch in the United States, arms sales were never a commercial concern; 
rather they were a bribe or a bludgeon used to try to persuade Islamabad to abandon the 
nuclear programme. 
Britain’s domestic nuclear industry also complicated non-proliferation diplomacy, 
with the go-ahead to build the THORP weakening British non-proliferation standing in 
Pakistani eyes. While the FCO had resisted pressure from the departments of Trade and 
Industry to take a softer line on export controls in favour of a stronger anti-proliferation 
stance, there was no such resistance in the face of the economic realities of the THORP. 
Stronger export controls might well cause the loss of a few million pounds worth of business, 
but the potential loss of the revenue generated by the THORP was several orders of 
magnitude greater. Similarly to the Jaguar deal, non-proliferation concerns had to be 
subservient to the commercial interests of the state when faced with the potential loss of a 
massive revenue generating facility. Jimmy Carter was willing to abandon commercial 
considerations in favour of non-proliferation, not so the Wilson and Callaghan governments. 
When billions of pounds worth of military aircraft or reprocessing services were at risk, 
economic self-interest trumped proliferation concerns. With this in mind, the United States 
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was in many ways the more responsible global power and Britain merely confirmed its status 
as a regional power, happy to act when its own interests remained unthreatened. 
It is intriguing to consider whether the Anglo-American alliance against Pakistan 
from 1974 to 1980 was indeed a ‘special relationship.’ It is possible to argue that rather than 
a ‘special relationship,’ what can be seen in this period was, at least in part, a ‘marriage of 
convenience.’ Out of the United States’ major Western European allies of France, the FRG, 
and the UK, Britain was the only one of the three not to be engaged in major nuclear deals 
with developing world states. Thus, it could be argued that although there was a significant 
relationship in play, there was also the simple fact that Britain was the only partner available 
to the United States when taking action against Pakistan. 
 
When America and Britain engaged in anti-proliferation activity on the subcontinent, the 
historical record runs counter to popular belief. Contrary to alarmist popular analyses, the 
‘Islamic bomb’ paradigm was never an important factor in American and British non-
proliferation policymaking. While the media and peripheral political figures placed great 
store in the reality of an ‘Islamic bomb,’ at government level the concept did not affect 
actual policy directed against Pakistan. Although some key individuals feared—and 
institutions such as the CIA investigated—the ‘Islamic bomb,’ the majority opinion was that 
it was a propaganda rather a policy challenge. Thus, while Washington and London battled 
popular perceptions of Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations as a pan-Islamic project, in private 
policymaking carried on as normal. What this propaganda problem did do was change public 
perceptions of Pakistani atomic aspirations geopolitically, from a regional South Asian 
problem to a much wider problem that encompassed the Middle East, with all the challenges 
that implied. For the American and British governments, it was the publicity surrounding 
pan-Islamic nuclear capability and the perception this created, not belief in the reality of an 
‘Islamic bomb’ that created problems. In truth, the ‘Islamic bomb’ exerted little—if any—
influence on policymaking regarding Pakistan. 
 Much more important to non-proliferation policy and action were ideas of credibility 
and ‘face’. America, Britain, France, and Pakistan all—at different times and for different 
reasons—sought to maintain credibility in one way or another. The British government’s 
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initial inaction regarding inverters was, in part, based on a desire not to create a humiliating 
diplomatic incident. Even more significantly, the entire strategy of mitigation and the 
requests to Zia not to test a nuclear device were founded in a need to maintain American and 
British credibility in global non-proliferation affairs. Thus, it was ideas of national standing 
and the ability to influence on the global stage that exerted the greater pressure on 
policymakers. This came about not because of fears of Islamic proliferation, but because of 
the determination and stubbornness of Zia and his government. 
 However, it is the ‘Islamic bomb’ paradigm that has become an abiding feature of 
discussions surrounding the nuclear ambitions of Muslim states. Throughout the 1980s and 
into the 1990s, the threat of the ‘Islamic bomb’ frequently and repeatedly emerged as 
shorthand for an aggressive, confrontational ‘Islamic’ quest for power.5 Such notions were 
given an additional spur by the increasing popularity of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis 
propounded by Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. Huntington. Much of the reasoning for the 
illegal invasion of Iraq by America and Britain in 2003 was founded in an official conspiracy 
theory about supposed ‘weapons of mass destruction’ being developed by the ‘Islamic’ (but 
actually fairly secular) regime of Saddam Hussein.6 More recently, the ‘Islamic bomb’ 
construct has come full circle, with senior Iranian figures loudly proclaiming their quest for 
the ‘holy Islamic bomb.’ As with Bhutto and Zia’s statements in the 1970s, these rhetorical 
outbursts have been utilised by proponents of a harsh policy towards Iran.7 
 
This thesis has thrown new light on a key moment in non-proliferation history. By so doing, 
it illuminates the roots of cultural imaginings, brings Britain into play as a significant force 
in global non-proliferation policy, and moves the timeline of Western acquiescence to 
Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions further back in time. Nuclear non-proliferation remains a 
contested topic in foreign affairs. The nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea—while 
at quite different stages in their development—have provoked fear, outrage, and no small 
amount of sabre rattling on all sides. However, if this study has demonstrated anything, it is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See Gusterson, 125-126 for examples of this trend. 
6 Kathryn S. Olmsted, Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy, World War I to 9/11 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 207-211. 
7 Ahmad Hashemi, ‘Don’t be fooled: Iran wants the bomb,’ Times of Israel, January 13, 2013, 
http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/while-iran-builds-its-holy-islamic-bomb (accessed on February 15, 2014). 
! 257!
that framing nuclear proliferation in terms of a ‘clash of civilisations’ is both false and 
diplomatically unhelpful. Far more important than religion in this case was international 
credibility. By eschewing a reliance on the rhetoric of the ‘clash of civilisations’ and the 
‘Islamic bomb’ it will be possible to more clearly comprehend why certain states seek 
nuclear capability. Hopefully a more nuanced understanding of the history of proliferation 
and non-proliferation will—in some small way—contribute to more fruitful, productive 
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